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INTRODUCTION
CHINA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS: SOME OBSERVATIONS
F. Gilbert Chan & Ka-che Yip
This book is not a comprehensive study of China's foreign policy;
it offers instead a selective treatment of China's relations with the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the United States (US),
and Taiwan. With the possible exception of June Dreyer's chapter,
which chronicles the rivalries between the People's Republic of China
(PRC) and the USSR along the Sinkiang border, the book concentrates on the developments of the 1970s.
The contributors of this volume have come from different
backgrounds, although all of them received their graduate training
from major American universities. Bryon Weng, now teaching at the
Chinese University of Hong Kong, is a Taiwanese, while Gilbert
Chan and Ka-che Yip were brought up in the British colony of Hong
Kong. To them, the Taiwan problem may be more than an academic
issue, and their analyses of the subject often reflect the emotional
dilemma of many Chinese intellectuals who have no political
connection with either the Kuomintang (KMT) or the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP). The views expressed by these three
contributors on the question of Taiwan obviously do not represent the
opinions of either the editors of the Occasional Papers/Reprints Series
in Contemporary Asian Studies or the School of Law at the
University of Maryland.
From 1968 through February 1977, Robert Sutter was a Chinese
foreign policy analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency. He and
Robert Worden are now associated with the Library of Congress.
June Dreyer worked in the same library before she started to teach at
the University of Miami. While their experiences in these government agencies have brought a new dimension to their studies, their
interpretations of China's foreign relations do not reflect the views of
the US government.

THE SINO-SOVIET CONFRONTATION
China's decision against renewing the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty of
Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance, which expired in 1980,
was not unexpected. The hostility and suspicion which marked the
(1)

2

CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIEs SERIES

relations of the two Communist powers for the last twenty years had
rendered the treaty virtually meaningless. Indeed, as Harry Schwartz
noted in the mid-1960s, the alliance was "unnatural" because of the
"conflicting . . . national interests of these two great nations."' In
1969, Harrison Salisbury of the New York Times openly discussed
"the coming war between Russia and China."2
The causes of the Sino-Soviet dispute are complicated and
fundamental, and Franz Michael is incorrect to dismiss it as simply
"a power struggle for the leadership of the Communist bloc."3 The
peoples of the PRC and the USSR have been shaped by different
histories and traditions. They are further separated by the wide gap
in their economic and technological developments. Thanks to the
dissimilar revolutionary realities in China and Russia, the leaders of
the two Communist parties have pursued different national goals
through different political strategies. Moreover, even prior to
Khrushchev's attacks on Stalin in 1956, the USSR had not been
overly generous toward China. The credit of 300 million dollars
which Stalin extended to the PRC in the 1950 treaty compared poorly
with the loan of 450 million dollars granted to Poland two years
earlier. 4
The Sino-Soviet dispute along the Sinkiang border, as described
by June Dreyer in the second chapter of this volume, clearly
illustrates some of the differences which have brought about the
1. Schwartz, Tsars, Mandarins, and Commissars: A History of Chinese-Russian
Relations (revised edition; Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Press, 1973}, p.3.
2. Salisbury, The Coming War Between Russia and China (London: Pan Books
Ltd., 1969).
3. See Michael's statement in Sino-Soviet Conflict: Report on Sino-Soviet Conflict
and Itslmplications, submitted by the Subcommittee on the Far East and the Pacific,
Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives !Washington, D.C.: US
Government Printing Office, 1965), p. 8. For further discussions of the Sino-Soviet
dispute, see Schwartz, Tsars, Mandarins, and Commissars; C. P. Fitzgerald, The
Chinese View of Their Place in the World !London: Oxford University Press, 1969}, esp.
pp. 44-68; G. F. Hudson, Richard Lowenthal, and Roderick MacFarquhar, The
Sino-Soviet Dispute <New York: Praeger, 196U; 0. Edmund Clubb, China and Russia:
The ~Great Game" <New York: Columbia University Press, 1971}; Klaus Mehnert,
Peking and Moscow <New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1963}; Sidney Klein, The Road
Divides: Economic Aspects of the Sino-Soviet Dispute CHong Kong: International
Studies Group, 1966); David Floyd, Mao Against Khrushchev: A Short History of the
Sino-Soviet Conflict <New York: Praeger, 1963}; Harold C. Hinton, The Bear at the
Gate: Chinese Policymaking under Soviet Pressure (Stanford: Hoover Institution on
War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford University, 197U; and 0. B. Borisov and B. T.
Koloskov, Sino-Soviet Relations !Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975L
4. Schwartz, Tsars, Mandarins, and Commissars, p. 158.
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confrontation between the two Communist parties. China's interests
in the "Western Regions" can be dated back to the glorious era of the
Han dynasty, although this vast territory did not become a Chinese
province until 1884. Conflicts with Russia over this borderland,
however, had started before the close of the seventeenth century.
Negotiations between the Manchu dynasty and the czarist government at Nerchinsk and Kiakhta, in 1689 and 1727 respectively,
resulted in the loss of Chinese territory in these "Western Regions."
Russian aggression intensified in the nineteenth century as the
Manchus declined in power. 5
After the Russian Revolution of 1917, as June Dreyer suggests,
the USSR "proved even more interested" in Sinkiang than its czarist
predecessor. Indeed, at times, Stalin was willing to hurt the Chinese
Communist movement in order to protect the Soviet influence in this
province. In 1937, for example, when Governor Sheng Shih-ts'ai
proposed to Ch'en Shao-yu and K'ang Sheng that he would become a
CCP member, Stalin pressured the Chinese Communists to reject
Sheng's application. Nonetheless, in the following year, the Soviet
leader persuaded Sheng to join the Russian Communist Party,
thereby extending Soviet control over Sinkiang. 6 In view of these
earlier developments along China's northwestern frontier, one may
argue that the confrontation between the USSR and the PRC in the
post-1956 years was inevitable.
The Chinese Communist leaders disagreed with Khrushchev,
and later with Brezhnev in the 1960s, over their different policies
toward Washington. They denounced Khrushchev's pursuit of peaceful coexistence with the US as "revisionistic," while condemning
Moscow's reluctance to support their attempt to "liberate" Taiwan in
1958. Sino-Soviet relations were further strained when the US
stepped up its involvement in Vietnam in early 1965. According to
Harold Hinton, Chinese and Soviet policies toward the war were
"competitive and almost hostile." 7 As the PRC became increasingly
concerned with the possibility of Russian invasion, its leaders
5. Clubb, China and Russia, pp. 30-132; and Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, The Ili Crisis;
A Study of Sino-Russian Diplomacy, 1878-1881 <Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965).
6. F. Gilbert Chan, "Regionalism and Central Power: Sheng Shih-ts'ai in
Sinkiang, 1933-1944," in F. Gilbert Chan (ed.l, China at the Crossroads: Nationalists
and Communists, 1927-1949 <Boulder: Westview Press, 1980>, pp. 139-40; and Allen S.
Whiting and Sheng Shih-ts'ai, Sinkiang: Pawn or Pivot? lEast Lansing: Michigan State
University Press, 1958), pp. 53-57.
7. Harold C. Hinton, The Sino-Soviet Confrontation: Implications for the Future
<New York: Crane, Russak & Co., Ltd., 1976>, p. 8.
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abandoned the strategy of struggling simultaneously against Moscow
and Washington. Henceforth, they treated the USSR as China's
principal enemy. In an interview on August 21-23, 1980 with Oriana
Fallaci, a noted Italian journalist, Teng Hsiao-p'ing warned the
Western powers about "the inevitability of the third world war." 8
In the third chapter of this volume, Robert Sutter discusses
China's endeavors to improve its relations with the Nixon administration. Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai, the main architects of this
policy, were determined to "broaden Peking's leverage against the
USSR," and the US "seemed to have sufficient strength to serve as an
effective deterrent to Soviet pressure." Nevertheless, as "antihegemonism" constituted the core of China's foreign policy in the 1970s,
the Chinese leaders were evidently troubled by Washington's "weakness," especially after the collapse of the US position in Indochina
during the spring of 1975. In the 1980 interview, Teng Hsiao-p'ing
bluntly told Oriana Fallaci that "America fears the Soviet Union." 9
In addition to normalizing its relations with the US, the PRC
also tried to win the support of Japan, as well as countries in both
Southeast Asia and Western Europe, in order to counteract the Soviet
military threat. After long and difficult negotiations, Peking concluded the Treaty of Peace and Friendship with Tokyo on August 12,
1978. The Chinese leaders succeeded in including in this document
the provision of "antihegemonism" which, though somewhat modified to accommodate Japanese sensitivities, was clearly directed
against the USSR. Significantly, when Hua Kuo-feng visited Japan
in May 1980, he stated that it would be "a matter of course" for the
Japanese government to increase its military spending. 111 Preoccupied
with the threat of Soviet aggression, the Chinese leadership had
obviously overcome its earlier fear of the "revival of Japanese
militarism."
China's "punitive" expedition against Hanoi in early 1979 was
indicative of its apprehension of Soviet-Vietnamese encirclement.
Hanoi's military raids into Thailand in June 1980 reinforced Peking's
suspicion that Vietnam's aggressive activities in Southeast Asia
represented an extension of Soviet influence in that region. Teng
Hsiao-p'ing therefore characterized Hanoi as "the Cuba of the East,"
charging that "the Vietnamese are following the footsteps of the
Soviet Union." 11
8.
9.
10.
11.

Washington Post, September 1, 1980, p. A10.
Ibid.
Ibid., May 29, 1980, p. A17.
See E'allaci's interview with Teng, in ibid., September 1, 1980, p. A10.
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In spite of the many differences between the PRC and the USSR,
however, it seems unlikely that polemics will, in the near future, give
way to a war of weapons. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has
apparently dragged the USSR into such a political quagmire that it
may discourage this Communist power from taking military actions
in other parts of the world. Moreover, many of the Soviet leaders,
including Brezhnev, are advanced in years, and some are in very poor
health. It is doubtful that they will risk a major confrontation with
the PRC. Similarly, the post-Mao leadership in China is, at present,
busily involved in the task of modernization, and Hua Kuo-feng and
Teng Hsiao-p'ing simply cannot afford to waste their limited
resources on a military adventure against the USSR. Yet, these
encouraging factors notwithstanding, few observers have, so far,
suggested that the two Communist rivals will soon settle their
differences in a peaceful fashion. In fact, the roots of their dispute are
so deeply grounded that the possibility of a Sino-Soviet rapprochement seems extremely remote.

SINO-AMERICAN RAPPROCHMENT AND THE FUTURE OF
TAIWAN
On December 15, 1978, President Jimmy Carter announced that
the US would establish full diplomatic relations with the PRC at the
beginning of the following year. The Americans would henceforth
terminate their official ties with the Republic of China <ROC), while
maintaining their economic and cultural connections. The security
treaty of 1954 would be abrogated a year afterward. These executive
actions completed the process of normalization started by Richard
Nixon's ping-pong diplomacy of 1971. 12
Carter's "China decision" did not represent an "about face" of
Washington's policy toward the PRC. The process of normalization
was initiated by a Republican president, and the diplomatic goal was
finally achieved under a Democratic administration almost seven
years after the promulgation of the Shanghai Communique of
February 1972. The delay was caused by the Watergate scandal and
Gerald Ford's preoccupation with the 1976 presidential campaign
against a conservative challenger within his own party.
12. On President Carter's decision to establish diplomatic relations with China,
see Hungdah Chiu and Karen Murphy !eds.l, The Chinese Connection and Normalization (Baltimore: School of Law, University of Maryland, 19801, esp. 107-15; and John
Tierney, Jr. led. I, About Face: The China Decision and Its Consequences !New Rochelle,
N.Y.: Arlington Houe Publishers, 19791.
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In the Shanghai Communique, the American government did not
challenge the "one China" policy pursued by both Peking and Taipei.
According to Ralph Clough, this policy was "firmly grounded in
historical precedent." 13 Indeed, as Robert Worden points out in the
fourth chapter of this book, the Chinese government described the
Taiwan problem in February 1972 as "the crucial question" in
Sino-American relations. ·
Carter's recognition of the PRC was intended to serve US
interests. He hoped to use the "China card" to strengthen Washington's position vis-a-vis Moscow. During his visit to Peking in May
1978, Zbigniew Brzezinski, assistant to the president on national
security matters, assured his hosts at a banquet:
As ·reflected in the Shanghai Communique, our commitment to
friendship with China is based on shared concerns and is derived
from a long-term strategic view . . . . We recognize- and share
-China's resolve to resist the efforts of any nation which seeks
to establish global or regional hegemony. 14
He further entertained the Chinese with his anti-Soviet jokes,
earning the nickname of "polar-bear tamer" for himself. 15
Taiwan has not fared poorly after severing its diplomatic
connections with Washington. Under the provisions of the Taiwan
Relations Act of 1979, the US will continue to supply the ROC with
"arms of a defensive character." Moreover, Washington will henceforth "consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other
than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to
the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave
concern to the United States." 16 As Byron Weng elaborates in the last
chapter of this volume, Peking has likewise initia~ed a new
conciliatory policy toward the ROC. In the summer of 1980,

13. Clough, Island China <Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978), p.
123. For the text of the Shanghai Communique, see GeneT. Hsiao led.), Sino-American
Detente and Its Policy Implications <New York: Praeger, 1974), pp. 298-301.
14. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, People's Republic of
China <hereinafter FBIS-CHD, May 22, 1978, p. A3.
15. Newsweek,June 5, 1978, p. 61.
16. The text of the Taiwan Relations Act is included in Chiu and Murphy leds.),
The Chinese Connection and Normalization, pp. 116-23. The quotations appear in p.
116.
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Ambassador Leonard Woodcock observed that tensions across the
Taiwan Strait were "at their lowest level in thirty years." 17
In spite of the shock of diplomatic isolation, Taiwan's economy
has continued to prosper. On September 19, 1980, Premier Sun
Yun-suan reported to the Legislative Yuan in Taipei that the island's
foreign trade in the first eight months of the year had shown an
increase of 31.2 percent when compared with the same period in
1979. 18 Through its "dummy corporations" in Hong Kong, Taiwan has
also begun to trade with the Chinese Communists on the mainland.
Yet, because of many fundamental differences between Taipei and
Peking, the process of rapprochement is going to be slow and difficult.
It will require, according to Ambassador Woodcock, "delicacy,
delicacy, and more delicacy." 19
In his chapter, Byron Weng emphasizes the economic successes of
the Chinese people on Taiwan. He suggests that the developmental
experience of the island can be valuable to Teng Hsiao-p'ing's
program of "Four Modernizations." This should, in his opinion, form
the basis of peaceful negotiations .between Peking and Taipei. ~t is
unlikely, however, that this will happen in the foreseeable future.
Indeed, there is no easy solution for the Taiwan problem. The leaders
of both governments must bear the awesome responsibility of
formulating a bold and imaginative policy to meet the new challenges
of the 1980s.

17. Quoted in James P. Sterba, "China Opens Trade Doors to Taiwan Delicately," New York Times, August 31, 1980, p.E2.
18. Free China Weekly (Taipei), September 21, 1980, p. 4. Cf. U.S. News and World
Report, July 23, 1979, p. 37.
19. Quoted in Sterba, "China Opens Trade Door," p. E2.
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Chapter One
THE ROLE OF ETHNICITY IN THE
SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE
June T. Dreyer
THE PROTAGONISTS
The Sino-Soviet frontier in Central Asia is an artificial boundary
which divides several minority groups. This chapter will focus on two
of these groups, the Kazakhs and the Uighurs, and their relations with
their fellow Turkic Muslim peoples and with the Soviet and Chinese
governments.
There are approximately five million Uighurs and 700,000
Kazakhs in China, most of them living in Sinkiang province, 1 which
is contiguous to the Soviet republic of Kazakhstan. According to the
1970 Soviet census, there are 173,000 Uighurs and nearly 5.3 million
KazaK.hs in the Union of Soviet SoCialist Republics (USSR). Both
Soviet and Chinese Uighurs and Kazakhs are minority groups not
only in relation to the populations of their own countries (China has
an estimated 950 million people and the Soviet Union, according to
its 1970 census, has 241,720,000), but even in the provinces in which
they live. Sinkiang has a population of approximately eleven million
persons and Kazakhstan, 12.13 million. The importance of the
Uighurs and Kazakhs, however, lies not in their numbers but in their
interactions with the other minority peoples of the area, and in the
strategic positions of these groups with regard to the Soviet and
Chinese leaderships. The position of these minority peoples becomes
much more impressive if viewed in this light. The combined minority
people of the four Soviet Central Asian republics account for 59
percent of the total population, and those of China's Sinkiang
province, more than 60 percent.
The ethnic mosaic of Central Asia is complex, formed over many
centuries of nomadic migration and the rise and fall of invading
1. Peking Review (hereinafter PR), XIX, No. 22 (May 28, 1976), p. 28. Other
Chinese population figures are, unless otherwise specified, drawn from John S. Aird,
Population Estimates for the Provinces of the People's Republic of China: 1953 to 1974,
International Population Reports, Series P-95, No. 73, United States Department of
Commerce, 1974. The population of Sinkiang was given as eleven million in a
broadcast by Urumchi Radio, November 1, 1976. Soviet population data are, unless
otherwise specified, drawn from the 1974 census as reported in the Current Digest of
the Soviet Press (hereinafter CDSPJ, XXIII, No. 16 (May 18, 1971), pp. 14-18.
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warrior tribes. The emergent picture is one of constant reshuffiing of
alignments and of a steppe constantly in flux. Both Uighurs and
Kazakhs are Turkic Muslim peoples, though the modem-day Uighurs
are predominantly sedentary agriculturalists while the Kazakhs are
nomadic herders. The Uighurs first appeared as a clearly separate
people in records dating from-the fourth century A.D. By the eighth
century, they had created a large empire in what is now the
Mongolian People's Republic (MPR), but were themselves conquered
by another tribe, the Kirghiz, during the following century. Many of
the defeated Uighurs dispersed throughout Central Asia; some
intermarried and intermingled with other steppe peoples. A large
number entered what is now Sinkiang province in 840 A.D., and soon
established their dominance of the oasis areas characteristic of
southern Sinkiang.
The word Kazakh first appeared during the fifteenth century. Of
Turkish origin, it derives from a term meaning a masterless person
or freebooter, and comes by extension to refer to nomads as well. The
Kazakhs are closely relateQ to other Central Asian Muslim peoples,
particularly to the Kirghiz and Uzbeks. The traditional nobilities of
the Kazakhs and these other groups trace their origins to Genghis
Khan, a Mongol. While the accuracy of historical records, and
particularly of genealogical tables, from this period is often diluted by
fanciful embellishment, the Mongol conquests of the twelfth century
apparently effected a fundamental redistribution of the various
nomadic groups of the Central Asian steppes. In the following
centuries, the culture of the Kazakhs, Kirghiz, and Uzbeks was
formed. Because of this, different ethnic groups may, indeed, have the
same ancestor. Whether the presence of the ancestor in several
different genealogical tables is genuine or fictitious is often less
important than the fact that these tables are taken seriously by the
groups involved. Normally these kinship groups were loosely organized and spread over extensive areas. Unless united under a single
leader, such as Genghis Khan, they did not pose a large-scale threat
to more centralized governmental systems. Nevertheless, kinship,
real or imaginary, often manifested itself in cooperation in time of
hostilities, and even resulted in a certain amount of crossing of ethnic
lines. 2 In addition to the potential binding force of kinship, coopera2. Lawrence Krader, Peoples of Central Asia (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1963), p. 193. See also Alfred E. Hudson, Kazakh Social Structure, Yale
University Publications in Anthropology No. 20, 1938 (reprinted; New York: Human
Relations Area Files Press, 1964).
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tion has also been facilitated by the Muslim faith common to most of
these groups. The Islamic admonition to join together in time of holy
war was generally enthusiastically accepted by most members of the
group, even when the cause might appear to outsiders as rather
tenuously related to religious matters. The circumstance of finding
themselves in the paths of two expanding empires was to provide the
peoples of the steppes with many causes for uprising.

THE COURSE OF THE CZARIST EMPIRE IN CENTRAL
ASIA
Imperial China had traditionally claimed jurisdiction over
Central Asia, but rarely exercised it in fact. Chinese civilization was
based on sedentary agriculture, and the mountainous, arid cold of
much of Central Asia did not attract Han Chinese settlers. Save for a
small area in which moderate climatic conditions prevailed, the
territory referred to rather vaguely in Chinese sources as "the
Western Regions" could not be considered part of either the Chinese
cultural or administrative sphere. A few caravan routes traversed the
area from earliest times, allowing trade between Han China3 and
imperial Rome, but the hazards of the route combined with the
anti-commercial bias of official Confucian philosophy to limit the
effects of this contact. It would be difficult to consider Central Asia an
integral part of the Chinese economic unit. Culturally, since the
inhabitants of these lands did not partake of Han civilization, they
were regarded by the Han Chinese as barbarians. The expert
horsemanship and martial skills which characterized their life-styles
were frequently threats to Han culture.
These peoples could be, and several times were, conquered by
Chinese armies, yet even garrisoning such far-flung areas was
difficult and expensive. One solution devised to alleviate the problem
of maintaining armed forces in distant areas was the military
agricultural colony; soldiers were charged with raising their own food
and were expected to form self-sufficient outposts of the empire. The
plan, though ingenious, had several drawbacks. For example, soldiers
tended to marry local women and eventually became assimilated to
the very people they had been sent to subdue. In general, Chinese
policy toward these and other border peoples aimed at control rather
3. The Han dynasty, commonly divided into Former or Western Han C206 B.C. 23 A.D.) and Later or Eastern Han (25- 220 A.D.>, is regarded as one of China's most
glorious periods, giving its name to the majority (94 per cent of the present-day
population) ethnic group of the country.
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than absorption; the inhabitants were permitted to maintain their
traditional life-styles and cultures so long as they did not disturb the
order and peace of empire.
Meanwhile, shortly after the Kazakhs began to appear as a
separate people, the Russian empire started to expand eastward. In
1689, China ceded 93,000 square miles of its Central Asian domains
to the czar's government, and in 1727 the Treaty of Kiakhta gave
Russia an additional 40,000 square miles. In the following years, the
once-powerful Ch'ing dynasty became increasingly enfeebled and
unable to repel the demands of foreign powers. By the Treaty of
Aigun in 1858, the land on the left bank of the Amur River down to
the Ussuri became Russian territory and in 1860, the Treaty of
Peking enabled Russia to annex 133,000 square miles of land east of
the Ussuri to the Pacific.• The Ch'ing government resented these
cessions, which, together with other concessions to various foreign
countries, came to be known as the "unequal treaties." Since these
settlements were forced on an unwilling government, China today
claims sovereign rights over large portions of Kazakhstan and other
parts of Soviet Central Asia.
One result of czarist expansion was the colonization of Kazakhstan by peasants from European Russia. The Russian government
had originally restricted migration but, on realizing its value, began
to offer attractive inducements to settlers. Their arrival aroused
considerable resentment among the Kazakhs, whose numbers were
then estimated at three million. 5 The nomads had pastured their
herds over large portions of the steppes. Russian colonization took
land away from grazing, and denied many Kazakhs the use of their
traditional winter camps. Many of them fled south, to land still held
by China.
The increasing weakness of the Ch'ing dynasty had other
repercussions besides the cession of territory to Russia. The efficient
and relatively honest governors and officials the Chinese government
sent to the "Western Regions" soon after it had reconquered the area
in 1759 were gradually replaced with less competent and greedy
types who oppressed the peoples under their charge and aroused their
hostility. Both this and the arrival of the Kazakhs, whom the Russian
government could claim were subjects of the czar, played into Russian
hands.
4. W. A. Douglas Jackson, The Russo-Chinese Borderlands <Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1962), pp. 112-13, 116.
5. George J. Demko, The Russian Colonization of Kazakhstan, 1896-1916
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1969l, pp.121-22.
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Accumulated grievances against the Ch'ing government flared
into a Muslim rebellion in 1862, which eventually encompassed the
entire Chinese northwest. In 1865 a Turkic Muslim named Yakub
Beg took advantage of the rebellion to set up an independent state in
Sinkiang; tacit support from Russia helped Yakub Beg to maintain
his position. 6 In the attendant chaos, however, Russia's trade was
disrupted and its consulates burned. There was also a substantial
exodus of refugees into Russia. Seeing a territorial opportunity in
this as well as a way to reassert its trading position, Russia moved
into the rich Ili Valley, in Kazakh territory, and annexed it. The
enfeebled Ch'ing dynasty, in a costly campaign which it could ill
afford, defeated the northwest Muslim rebellion and destroyed Yakub
Beg's state. The subsequent Chinese demand that Russia withdraw
from Ili led to a major diplomatic confrontation between the two
countries. Eventually, an agreement was signed providing for Russian
withdrawal in return for China's cession of some territory west oflli, the
granting of special trading concessions to Russia in nearby areas, and the
payment of a nine million ruble indemnity to cover Russia's expenses in
"administering" Ili. 7
Fearful of further Russian moves, the Ch'ing government decided
to incorporate what had been the "Western Regions" into the regular
administrative system of China. In 1884 the area was transformed
into a province with the name Sinkiang, or "New Territory."
In the following years, the czarist government attempted to cope
with mounting domestic problems, a costly and ultimately humiliating war with Japan, and international intrigues on its European
borders. But the colonization of Kazakhstan continued. Between 1896
and 1916, more than 1.4 million new settlers poured into Kazakhstan
and implanted a strong Russian presence there. Its economy became
firmly tied to that of European Russia, supplying it with meat, hides,
and dairy products. 8
Further escalation of tensions between China and Russia over
Central Asia was limited by domestic difficulties which prevented
them from further consolidating their hold over their Central Asian
6. Yuan Tsing, "Yakub Beg and the Moselm Rebellion in Chinese Turkestan,"
Central Asiatic Journal, IV, No. 2 (June 19621, p. 154.
7. Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, The Ili Crisis: A Study of Sino-Russian Diplomacy,
1871-1881 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 19651, pp. 186-87.
8. Demko, Russian Colonization, p. 182.
9. Elizabeth E. Bacon, Central Asians under Russian Rule <Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 19661, pp. 116-17; and Richard Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet
Union (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 19641, p.83.
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domains. In 1911, the Ch'ing dynasty fell, being replaced by a series
of warlord governments that were preoccupied with quarrels with
other warlords; even Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang (KMT) government, which assumed power in 1928, was unable to exercise more
than nominal control over Sinkiang. In Russia, a 1916 decree ordered
Kazakhs, who were traditionally exempt from military service, to be
drafted to help fight in World War I, and this caused a bloody
rebellion which further weakened the faltering czarist government.
During the ensuing disruptions on the steppe, additional numbers of
Kazakhs fled to China. 9

THE 1917 REVOLUTION AND ITS EFFECTS ON CENTRAL
ASIA
The success of the Bolshevik Revolution that began in Russia in
1917 changed the power equation in Central Asia in favor of the
newly established Soviet Union. The new government's success did
not come easily, and its relations with the non-Russian peoples of the
former czarist empire were among its more difficult problems. In an
earlier bid for the support of these peoples, called minority
nationalities in Marxist parlance, it had promised self-determination
to all who wanted it. Nonetheless, when the Communist party's
struggle against the czarist government actually came to fruition, the
party came to view self-determination as "profoundly
counterrevolutionary" and ruthlessly suppressed such movements.
The Kazakhs' Alash-Orda provisional government was one of the
victims. A bitter anti-Bolshevik struggle took place, and many
Kazakhs joined the White Army of Admiral A. V. Kolchak. 10 The
economy of the area was badly affected. In the Kazakh province of
Semirechie, for instance, livestock dropped by 51.67 percent between
1917 and 1920. 11 In 1920 and 1921, moreover, the Kazakh areas were
hit by famine. The Kazakhs were more seriously affected than the
Russian colonists; their herds had been depleted in the fighting and
they did not receive their fair share of the emergency food supplies
sent in by the new government. An estimated one million persons
died of hunger and related diseases in 1921 alone, and a necessary
preoccupation with sheer survival reduced the Kazakhs' organized
resistance to the Bolshevik government. 12

10. Pipes, Formation, pp. 108, 172-73.
11. Bacon, Central Asians, p. 117.
12. Pipes, Formation, p. 174.
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.In contrast to the czarist government's relatively cautious
attitude toward altering the traditional life-styles of its Central Asian
subjects, the Soviet government promoted rapid change. Although
Kazakhstan was designated an "autonomous" socialist republic in
1920 and given the constitutional right to secede from the USSR, its
non-Russian inhabitants actually had very little to say about the
governance of their areas, and any attempts to exercise the right to
secede would be regarded as counterrevolutionary. Measures were
introduced to force the nomads to settle down, to destroy tribal and
kinship ties which might facilitate resistance to the new government,
to promote agriculture as an alternative to pastoralism, and to
introduce the Kazakhs and other Central Asian peoples to the
Russian language and Marxist culture. While motivated by a desire
to improve the lives of Central Asian peopl~s as well as to facilitate
the new government's control of the areas, the reforms were not
perceived as improvements by many of those affected. The fictional
nature of autonomy was patently obvious to all. The Turkic Muslim
intelligentsia, influential despite its small numbers, was irked by the
introduction of a new Cyrillic-based language which the government
alleged would suit the nationality's needs better than the traditional
Arabic script. The intelligentsia would have preferred a system
devised by Crimean Tatar Ismail Bey Gaspirali (1851-1914), which
would have been suitable for all Turkic peoples, and viewed the
Soviet government's choice of a Cyrillic script as an attempt to
separate the Kazakhs from these other peoples. 13
In addition, there was a cultural contradiction between the
Soviet leadership's implicit belief that agriculture was a more
desirable way of life and the nomads' attachment to their animals
and to a peripatetic mode of existence. A collectivization program,
begun in 1928, was carried out without adequate planning, and it
was far in advance of collectivization in Russian areas. Forced into
collectives where grazing was often insufficient, thousands of
Kazakhs watched their herds starve. Others killed their animals and
tried to escape. Some of these fled to Afghanistan, others to China.
The Kazakh population of the USSR fell by almost 900,000 between
1926 and 1939, and there was a sharp drop in numbers of animals as
well. 14 Soviet policies were administered through the local Russiancolonist elite, with damaging effect on the Turkic Muslim peoples. As

13. Bacon, Central Asians, p. 114.
14. Ibid., p. ll8.
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Richard Pipes notes, the elite "utilized the Soviet government and
party machines to intensify the economic and political exploitation of
the native population." The Bolshevik Revolution brought to the
Muslim areas "not an abolition of colonialism, but colonialism in a
new and much more oppressive form." 15
The situation of the Kazakhs and Uighurs, like those of other
Soviet nationalities, has been better since the death of Stalin, though
not so much so as to eliminate discontent. Khrushchev's reforms in
higher education allowed higher percentages of Kazakhs, Uighurs,
and most other nationalities to attend universities and to take
advantage of better job opportunities. Standards of living in Central
Asia have improved markedly. Locally situated factories turn out
desired consumer goods. The infamous Soviet housing shortage is
significantly less serious in Central Asia than in European Russia, as
in the supply of fresh meat, milk, and vegetables. There is a Kazakh
member of the Pclitburo. 16
Still, the results of raised living standards and two generations of
pressure have not made significant numbers of Turkic Muslims into
either committed Soviet citizens or assimilated Russians. Nomadism
has survived, albeit in a modified form. Although Soviet propaganda
describes nomads as "roving" (otgonnyi), rather than nomadic
(kochevoi), herders as "specialists skilled in the care of livestock," and
the nomadic family as a "bridgade" with each member holding an
official title, pastoral nomads continue to move seasonally in family
groups to find grazing for their animals. 17
A recent study maintains that the Turkic Muslim peoples have
been extraordinarily resistant to assimiliation. This is true even of
persons who have been exposed to Russians for long periods of time.
Using linguistic identification as an index of assimilation, the study
concludes that the russification level of urbanized Kazakh communities who have had more than two centuries of extensive contact with
Russians is only 3.2 percent; that for rural Kazakhs is even lower, 2.7
percent. 18 Interestingly, the 1970 Soviet census listed a slightly
higher percentage of Uighurs reporting Uighur as their native
language than in the previous census of 1959 (88.5 percent versus 85

15. Pipes, Formation, p. 191.
16. Ann Sheehy, "The Central Asian Republics," Conflict Studies, No. 30
!December 1972), pp. 13-27.
17. Bacon, Central Asians, pp. 119-20.
18. Brian Silver, "Social Mobilzation and the Russification of Soviet Nationalities," American Political Science Review, LXVIII, No. 1 (March 1974), p. 63.
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percent). The percentage of Kazakhs remained almost exactly the
same as in 1959. 19 Similar figures are reported for other Central
Asian minorities, tending to support the conclusion that the effect of
exposure to Russians on the russification of Muslims is "exceedingly
small."20 An American student in Tashkent in 1970 was told by a
Russian that it was hard for him to believe at first that Russian rule
had extended to Central Asia. 21
A Western social scientist, analyzing the significantly higher
rates of population increase among Central Asian minorities than
among Russians, describes these peoples as pursuing la vengeance des
berceaux, getting even through the cradle, or compensation for heavy
in-migration to their homelands and some assimilation losses
through a high birth rate. In the Central Asian republics, the Muslim
school-age population is much higher than the Muslim percentage in
the total population of the province, even though children of the
Muslim minorities, particularly female children, are more likely to
drop out of school than Russian children. The fact that available
labor now seems to be directed at Siberia rather than Central Asia
makes russification still less likely. 22 Nonetheless, as Russian
dissident Andrei Sakharov points out, Soviet prisons are filled with
ethnic dissidents. 23

ACTIVITIES OF THE SOVIET AND CHINESE COMMUNIST
PARTIES IN SINKIANG
While the Soviet government was extending and consolidating
its power over the former czarist domains in Central Asia, it did not
lose interest in those Central Asian territories still nominally under
Chinese control. When the Bolshevik government assumed power in
Russia, it issued a declaration abrogating the unequal treaties
concluded during the czarist era. None of the land obtained
thereunder, however, was returned to China, and the Soviet Union
proved even more interested in Sinkiang than had czarist Russia. The
warlord of Sinkiang, Sheng Shih-ts'ai, was concerned with
maintaining his independence from the government of China, then
19. CDSP, XXI, No. 16, p. 16.
20. Silver, "Social Mobilization," p. 62.
21. David C. Montgomery, "An American Student in Tashkent," Asian Affairs,
February 1972, p. 37; quoted in Sheehy, "Central Asian Republics," p. 19.
22. Rein Taagepera, "National Differences Within Soviet Demographic Trends,"
Soviet Studies (Glasgow), XX, No. 4 <April 1969l, pp. 478, 481, and 489.
23. Andrei Sakharov, Sakharov Speaks <New York: Alfred Knopf, 1974), p. 43.
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headed by Chiang Kai-shek, and the Soviet Union provided financial
assistance which helped Sheng in this endeavor. In return, the USSR
received a privileged position in Sinkiang. Soviet geologists explored
the province's rich natural resources, Soviet engineers surveyed
railways and Soviet pilots manned Sinkiang's air routes.
The Russians also promoted propaganda activities aimed at
forming a pro-Soviet Communist party; the atmosphere in Sinkiang
was for the most part distinctly unfriendly to the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP). In 1934, when the beleaguered CCP fled its Kiangsi
Soviet base to escape annihilation by Chiang Kai-shek's forces, it
wandered about for many months in search of a reasonably safe
haven. The USSR, ostensibly its fraternal socialist ally and adviser,
never told the CCP of its favorable position in Sinkiang. According to
an ex-CCP leader, this was because Stalin had designs on Sinkiang
and wished to exclude Chinese influence of any sort from the
province. 24
In 1938, Sheng, seemingly attempting to gain some degree of
independence from the USSR by playing off the Soviet and Chinese
Communist parties against one another, welcomed several CCP
advisers into his government and even announced his intention to
join the CCP. Nevertheless, a few years later, he accused them of
being involved in a plot against him, and had them arrested and
executed. Mao Tse-tung's brother, Tse-min, was one of the victims.
In the early 1940s, owing to its involvement in World War II, the
USSR could no longer sustain its aid to Sinkiang. In fact, it looked to
Sheng Shih-ts'ai as if the Soviet Union might be losing the war. He
thereupon turned toward mending fences with Chiang Kai-shek's
KMT government. Accepting a cabinet-level position in Chungking,
Sheng left Sinkiang in 1944, and the KMT was able to choose its first
governor of the province. Sinkiang's non-.Han groups were not
pleased by the reassertion of Chinese control, and the new provincial
administration proved neither tactful nor honest. Han settlers were
arriving and would presumably occupy minorities' lands. A Han
army stationed there had to be provisioned and paid, and the
province's economy was deteriorating.
Meanwhile, the Soviet Union had taken the offensive in World
War II and was able to reassert its interest in Sinkiang. The previous
government-to-province special relationship having failed, the USSR

24. Allen S. Whiting and Sheng Shih-ts'ai, Sinkiang: Pawn or Pivot? <East
Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1958), p. 54.
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began to work through Sinkiang's aggrieved non-Han groups.
Sympathetic Soviet agents provided dissident ethnic group leaders
with financial aid and advice. A major rebellion ensued, and a
multi-ethnic alliance representing Uighurs, Kazakhs, Kirghiz, White
Russians and others established an independent state - the East
Turkistan Republic (ETR) with its capital at Ining - in the
predominantly Kazakh territory bordering Soviet Kazakhstan. Its
leader, Akhmedjan, was a Uighur, and the ETR's mainstay was its
Kazakh cavalry, commanded by Osman Bator. At one point the rebel
cavalry threatened the provincial capital of Urumchi. 25 They pulled
back only when the Soviet Union, having offered its services as
mediator, advised them to do so; this seems to indicate the
movement's dependence on the USSR. Yet, in view of the abundant
evidence of KMT mismanagement, the Soviet Union was clearly
exploiting existing grievances rather than creating them.
Chiang Kai-shek's KMT government was amenable to compromise, especially since the Sinkiang rebellion was tying down troops
and material Chiang could have put to better use in the battle with
the CCP. Eventually a compromise was worked out, providing for
increased minority representation in government and a greater
degree of automony for the province. Burhan, a Tartar who had
managed to create a certain amount of rapport with all sides, was
made governor. As a partial guarantee that the KMT would observe
its part of the bargain, the ETR troops would not be dispersed, while
a KMT garrison also remained in Sinkiang.
Meanwhile, however, Chiang Kai-shek was losing his battle with
the CCP. The Soviet Union not only did not aid the CCP in this effort,
but actually entered into publicly announced negotiations with the
KMT. Although the exact bargaining terms were not revealed, the
Soviet Union was clearly offering Chiang Kai-shek's government
arms - which would surely be used against the CCP - in return for
some form of USSR control over Sinkiang. 26 Eventually, the CCP's
military success foreclosed this option. By the late summer of 1949
their armies had been victorious in most of the rest of China and
were pressing hard on Sinkiang. At this point virtually the entire
provincial government of Sinkiang, from Governor Burhan on down,
and including most of those who had been leaders of the ETR,
defected to the CCP en masse.
25. Excellent accounts of this period may be found in Whiting and Sheng,
Sinkiang; and Owen Lattimore, Pivot of Asia <Boston: Little, Brown, 1950>.
26. New York Times, (hereinafter NYT), February 1, 1949, p. 1; February 2, 1949,
p. 18; February 6, 1949, Section 4, p. 1; and March 22, 1949, p. 22.
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Thus Sinkiang, with its large Turkic Muslim majority (estimated
at 75 percent Uighur, 10 percent Kazakh, and less than 6 percent
Han Chinese at this time) formally became part of the People's
Republic of China (PRC). Exactly how the province's leadership had
been persuaded to defect is not known. But, in addition to the
certainty of CCP takeover regardless of their wishes, the provincial
leaders were surely influenced by promises that Sinkiang would
receive autonomous status (the content of this autonomy probably
being somewhat ambiguous), that there would be concessions to the
ethnic groups and their cultures, and that the leadership role of the
present elite would continue. This last promise the CCP did not have
to keep in several significant cases. The plane carrying most of the
high-ranking ETR leaders, including Akhmedjan, crashed mysteriously en route to a conference in Peking. The Chinese did not release
news of the disaster until many months later, thus fanning speculation that the crash might not have been accidental.27 The only
remaining ETR leader of note was Salfudin, a young Moscow-trained
Uighur who spoke Chinese rather poorly at this time. He had been
engaged in fomenting anti-Han Chinese riots in Sinkiang during the
early 1940s, had been minister of education in the ETR government,
and was a member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
(CPSU).
Salfudin was not the only reminder of the Soviet Union's
privileged position in Sinkiang. The new PRC began its political
career as an international outcast, and was forced to turn to the
USSR for help. Negotiations over a treaty dragged on for nine weeks,
leading observers to conclude that the Soviet Union was driving a
hard bargain. The full provisions of what would become the
Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1950 were not announced by either side, but are
known to have included a special consular position for the USSR in
Sinkiang, in addition to joint exploitation of Sinkiang's resources and
the creation of joint stock companies to exploit those resources. 28
The Chinese did not send People's Liberation Army (PLA) work
teams to the three predominantly Kazakh districts i'n December
1949, when such teams were sent to the rest of Sinkiang, explaining
that "conditions were as yet unsettled" in those areas. 29 The work

27. Whiting and Sheng, Sinkiang, pp. 142-43.
28. Ibid., p. 86.
29. K. F. Kotov, Autonomy of Local Nationalities in the Chinese People's Republic
(Moscow: State Publishing House, 1956), trans. in United States Department of
Commerce, Joint Publications Research Service, No. 3547, p. 56.
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teams did not appear in the three districts until the latter half of
1950, after the Sino-Soviet Treaty was signed. One may speculate
that the "unsettled conditions" may have included the unsettled
question of who should administer the three districts with the USSR
arguing for jurisdiction over them. Though the Soviet Union did not
get them, it retained an influential position in these areas. When the
organs of local power in IIi, Tacheng, and Tarbagatai were "reorganized" toward the end of 1950, the Administrative Control Boards
which replaced them included many Kazakhs and Uighurs who had
been members of, or sympathetic to, the ETR government, though a
Han Chinese generally held the final decision-making power. In
urban areas of the three districts, the pro-Soviet minority intelligentsia remained in power and was not generally compelled to
undergo intensive ideological remolding or reform. The local clan
headman structure was left largely unaltered as well, save for those
headmen who overtly resisted the new government. Osman Bator,
whose Kazakh cavalry had been so important to the success of the
ETR, was one such holdout. He fled south, where he was eventually
captured and executed. As for Salfudin, while he was in Moscow
helping to negotiate the 1950 treaty, it was announced from Peking
that he had become a member of the CCP, having meanwhile
resigned from the CPSU.
In 1951, a purge was undertaken, probably in connection with
the "three-anti" campaign then being conducted in other parts of
China. It reportedly removed pro-Soviet figures in the minority areas,
and a large-scale pacification and reeducation campaign was conducted in 1953. As the official New China News Agency (NCNA)
explained, "it was only after all this that the entire Kazakh people
returned to the fold of the ancestral land."30
In general, however, strenuous efforts were made to conceal any
differences between the Chinese and Soviet governments over
minority lands. The national boundary was referred to as "Friendship
Border," and Kazakhs and Uighurs of both nations, who were
virtually indistinguishable without reference to passports, crossed it
frequently to trade, graze their herds, and visit kinfolk. Soviet
technicians were lavishly praised in the Chinese press for the selfless
way in which they were helping their socialist neighbor to develop its
resources, and Soviet ethnographers worked with the Han Chinese

30. NCNA, Lanchow, May 6, 1954; quoted in Whiting and Sheng, Sinkiang, p.
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among Sinkiang minorities. 31 Soviet aid helped build a railroad
connecting Lanchow, capital of China's Kansu province, with Drumchi, the capital of Sinkiang. It was planned to continue the line
through Ili, where it would ultimately reach the Soviet border.
Meanwhile, the USSR would extend the terminus of its Turk-Sib
railroad from Aktogal to the border; the two lines would connect at a
new town, Druzhba (Friendship).
Wishing to avoid antagonizing the minorities and risk the
reinforcement of any pro-Soviet tendencies they might have,
Chinese policy was cautious and followed a modified Soviet plan.
"Land" reform was carried out under slogans such as "herdowners
and [poorer] herders both profit" and "no struggle, no liquidation, no
division of property." Chinese state trading organs offered relatively
high prices for herders' products. While presented as evidence of the
PRC's high regard for its minority nationalities and its desire to
insure their prosperity, this was also a way for the new government
to gain control in the herding areas by linking them with the Chinese
market system, and to redirect trade away from the USSR as well.
Lenient attitudes were also taken toward most religious practices,
even toward polygamy.
In 1954, Khrushchev visited Peking, hoping to obtain Chinese
support in his bid to succeed Stalin. This he did, but not before the
Chinese exacted a quid pro quo. Khrushchev agreed, among other
things, to terminate the joint stock companies in Sinkiang. Soviet
influence, however, remained in the form of advisers and technicians,
and Sinkiang needed to order equipment and spare parts from the
USSR. The Chinese also announced that Uighur, Kazakh, and other
Turkic Muslim languages would henceforth be written with the
Cyrillic script. This was understandable, as the intelligentsia of these
minorities had often been educated in the Soviet Union and many in
this group were already acquainted with Cyrillic. Yet, the use of such
script in writing Uighur and Kazakh also created a bond between
these Chinese minorities and their fellow Uighurs and Kazakhs in
the USSR, while creating a linquisitic distance between the Chinese
minorities and the Han majority in China. Sheng Shih-ts'ai, from his
vantage point in Taiwan, later recalled his own misgivings when his
Soviet advisers repeatedly declared that "the peoples along the
Sino-Soviet frontier are all brethren. The racially related peoples will
31. See, for example, Kotov's report as cited in n. 29 above; and S. I. Bruk, "Ethnic
Composition and Distribution of the Population in the Sinkiang.Uighur Autonomous
Region in the People's Republic of China," Sovetskaya Etnografiya, No. 2 (19561.
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one day be united as citizens of the same nation." 32 It is, therefore,
inconceivable that the leaders of the PRC would not have seen the
implication of allowing Cyrillic to replace Arabic in Sinkiang, and
the fact that this decision was announced at all is indicative of the
degree to which the Chinese government felt it necessary to placate
the Soviet Union at this time. 33
A month after Khrushchev's visit to China, the Ili Kazakh
Autonomous Chou was created, encompassing the three predominantly Kazakh districts of the former ETR and, like the ETR, having its
capital at Ining. The chairperson was a Kazakh, and there were
Uighur and Kazakh vice-chairpersons, but there was also significant
(and presumably more powerful) representation from regular units of
the PLA and from the Sinkiang Production and Construction Corps.
The latter, with its motto "on the one shoulder a rifle, on the other a
hoe," was intended to garrison the area while helping local people to
develop their economy. The possibility of American and other
imperialist intervention always existed, and there were surely ways
in which the local economy could be improved. But it was also
possible for the Soviet leaders to view the Production and Construction Corps as guarding the border against the USSR. And the local
people, noting the large number of persons in the corps and their
preoccupation with agricultural, as opposed to animal husbandry,
could see the crops as yet another Han Chinese plan to usurp their
lands, turn the nomads into sedentary agriculturalists and assimilate
them. The corps also bore an uncomfortable resemblance to the
military agricultural colonies of imperial China, whose policies
toward minorities were regularly and vehemently denounced by Mao
Tse-tung. In 1956, there began a large-scale transfer of Han Chinese
into Sinkiang, with many of them being absorbed either into the
corps or onto newly created state farms.
Curiously, and very much at variance with the practice elsewhere in China, the IIi Kazakh's creation in 1954 and Sinkiang's
reconstitution as the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region (SUAR)
during the following year, occurred although elections in fourteen
counties of IIi chou could not be held until 1956. Normally, such
elections would precede the founding of the administrative areas.
32. Whiting and Sheng, Sinkiang, p. 168.
33. There is no evidence that the decision to use Cyrillic was actually implemented on a significant scale, though the break with the USSR and China's
development of its own Latin-based pin-yin system as a standard orthography for all
the PRC's linguistic groups occurred too soon after the above mentioned decision to
draw any meaningful conclusion from this.
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In 1956, moreover, the CCP began a major investigation of its
policies toward minority nationalities; this was carried on at the
same time as persons throughout China were encouraged to voice
their opinions of socialism in a campaign to "let a hundred flowers
bloom, let a hundred schools of thought contend." The results, as they
became known in 1957, were profoundly disquieting to CCP leaders.
As they pertained to the Uighurs, Kazakhs, and other minorities of
Sinkiang, the campaign revealed lurking preferences for the Soviet
Union over China, often strongly voiced preferences for an independent Kazakh, Uighur, or Turkic state, and the conviction that were
ETR leader Akhmedjan still alive, he would be most dissatisfied with
what had become of the autonomy he thought he had been promised.
There were also charges that the Han Chinese were exploiting the
minorities, and demands that they leave Sinkiang en masse.
Salfudin, who had been made governor of the SUAR in 1955,
attempted to refute these charges in the expected ways. According to
him, Sinkiang had "always" been part of China, the Han Chinese
were sacrificing themselves to build a better Sinkiang, and there was
sufficient wealth in the province for all. Those who thought otherwise
were either counterrevolutionaries or had been duped by
counterrevolutionaries. 34 As might be anticipated, many of the
hundred flowers were found to be poisonous weeds; some Uighurs and
Kazakhs who had voiced their opinions were removed from the
socialist Garden of Eden and sent for "reform through labor." These
included, among others, the talented young poet Kazhykumar
Shabdanov; Jahoda, the head of the IIi Kazakh Autonomous Chou;
the vice-director of the chou's Propaganda Department; and the
president of its People's Court. 35 Significantly, Zunin Taipov, a
Uighur and former leader of the ETR army had been absorbed into
the Chinese military, was removed as well.
Public mention of the pro-Soviet predilections of those purged
was necessarily muted, in order to avoid creating a confrontation
with the Soviet Union. The anti-Soviet component of the anti-rightist
campaign is sworn to by later refugees into the Soviet Union and can

34. Salfudin's speech to the party committee of the SUAR, December 16, 1957, as
reported by Peking Radio, December 25, 1957.
35. Li Hui-yu, "The IIi Autonomous Chou Has Very Extensive Power; Why Do the
Local Nationalists Say It Has No Powers?" in 1-lijih-pao [IIi Daily[, August 30, 1958;
quoted in George Moseley, A Sino-Soviet Cultural Frontier: The Ili Kazakh Autonomous Chou (Cambridge, Mass.: East Asian Research Center, Harvard University,
1966), p. 68.
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be read into the Chinese criticisms of local nationalism in Sinkiang.
While pro-Uighur, pro-Kazakh, and pan-Turkic sentiments are not
the same as pro-Soviet sentiments, the role of the Soviet Union in
supporting such separatist movements must be kept in mind. Thus
every nostalgic recollection of Akhmedjan, Osman Bator, or the ETR
inevitably reminded the Chinese leadership of Soviet machinations in
Sinkiang. Also very much on the minds of Chinese leaders was the
example of Mongolia, where the USSR had successfully encouraged
"local nationalists" to set up a state allegedly "independent" of China
when, in fact, it was almost completely dependent on Soviet aid and
trade. Hence local nationalism in Sinkiang, while not the same as
pro-Sovietism, is perceived by the Chinese leadership as largely
overlapping with it.

SINKIANG MINORITIES AND THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE,
1958-1976
In 1958 China began the Great Leap Forward (GLF), which
sharply departed from the social, economic, and ideological policies
the PRC had pursued during the previous nine years. There were
many reasons behind the launching of the GLF, and why it was
begun at this particular time. Among the more important were the
growing conviction among an influential segment of the Chinese
leadership that continued adherence to the Soviet model would be
detrimental to China's development, and the feeling that the Soviet
Union had abandoned its commitment to true Marxism. Communes
encompassing tens of thousands of persons were created, the use of
material incentives in production was drastically curtailed, and there
was large-scale confiscation of private property. The relative tolerance accorded to minority nationalities' languages, customs, and
life-styles under the influence of the Soviet model was also ended.
The minorities of Sinkiang were expected, among other things, to
contribute their animals to the communes, learn Han Chinese, adopt
Han cultural forms, and give up various "decadent" customs including polgamy. Communes were not generally established in Uighur
and Kazakh areas until several months after they had been set up in
much of the rest of China, and by that time their major deficiencies
had become known. Although there is some evidence that these
communes were created in a somewhat modified form, their effects
were as dysfunctional as in other areas of China. Production fell
sharply, and there was widespread hunger and dissatisfaction with
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the economic and social policies of the GLF. There were rumors of
small-scale uprisings in Sinkiang in 1958 and 1959. 36 •
The Soviet leadership was contemptuous of the Chinese policies
and annoyed at the repudiation of the USSR's model which the GLF
represented. Khrushchev was publicly critical of the communes; the
Soviet press treated China's ensuing economic difficuliies with smug
"concern." In 1960, all Soviet technicians still remaining in China
were abruptly withdrawn. The strains in the Sino-Soviet relationship
became increasingly evident to outside observers. A combination of
intense minority dissatisfaction with Chinese rule in Sinkiang and
growing hostility between Soviet and Chinese leaderships provided
the backdrop for conflict in border areas.
The first public manifestation of this internationalization (or,
perhaps more accurately, reinternationalization) of the Sinkiang
border land question occurred during the spring of 1962, though its
direct antecedents can be traced back to 1958. The culturally
repressive social policies introduced during the GLF and the critical
economic situation which followed this movement strained Sinkiang's
minority groups' tenuous allegiance to Han China. The belief that
Han residents received preferential treatment in the allocation of
food and other rationed commodities exacerbated these strains.
On the southeast coast of China, authorities were allowing those
citizens who wished to leave for Hong Kong to do so. Those who left
presumably included a high percentage of the malcontents; their
departure thus reduced the task of enforcing social order. In addition,
whatever their political beliefs, the emigration of these persons would
certainly ease pressure on China's scarce food resources. Apparently,
the authorities in Sinkiang were initially similarly disposed toward
allowing Uighurs and Kazakhs to leave for the Soviet Union.
Subsequently, however, they began to worry over the large size of the
migrant population, the fact that they were taking their herds with
them, and the uses to which the now openly hostile Soviet Union
could put the refugees. Chinese officials also discovered that Soviet
consular authorities had been issuing thousands of false Soviet
passports to those who wished to have them. 37
The exodus was ordered halted, to the annoyance of many
would-be emigrants. There seems to have been a demonstration of
36. Moseley, A Sino-Soviet Cultural Frontier, pp. 107-10.
37. "China Said To Send Troops to Sinkiang," NYT, April 16, 1964, quoting a
White Russian refugee interviewed in Hong Kong (p. 6). See also Moseley, A
Sino-Soviet Cultural Frontier, p. 108.
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some size in front of CCP headquarters in the Ili Kazakh Autonomous Chou, during which the demonstrators were fired upon.
Several dozen Uighurs and Kazakhs were killed. News of the
massacre spread quickly, resulting in rioting and disorder in other
parts of Sinkiang. The Chinese suspected the Soviet Union of having
fomented the incident, which indeed resembled the incidents preceding the formation of the ETR two decades before. The Russians, on
the other hand, used the incident to "prove" the repressive, racist
nature of Chinese policy toward non-Han peoples.
The Chinese have said virtually nothing publicly about these
events. More than two and half years after the incident, Chou En-lai
reported to the Third National People's Congress:
In 1962, under the instigation and direct direction of external
forces, a group of the most reactionary protagonists of local
nationalism staged a traitorous counterrevolutionary rebellion
in Ining, Sinkiarig, and incited and organized the flight to foreign
territory of a large number of people near the frontier. 38
The Soviets claimed to present an eyewitness account, which was
somewhat more graphic. According to their report, "bursts of
machine-gun fire from the windows lashed the crowd . . . shooting
people in the back." There were "several dozen bodies of men, women,
old men and children," which served, the Soviets insisted, "as
testimony to the bankruptcy of the nationalities policy pursued by
the Chinese leaders, as a reproach to their unclean conscience."39
However different their emphases, the official Chinese and
Soviet accounts agree on the essence of the story. The incident
touched off an ongoing public confrontation between China and the
Soviet Union which has been carried out through overt military
means, clandestine infiltration, and propaganda channels. This
confrontation has had important repercussions for the political,
economic, and cultural lives of the minority peoples of both sides of
the border.
38. Chou En-lai, "Report on the Work of the Government," speech to the First
Session of the Third National People's Congress, December 30, 1964; trans. in United
States Consulate General, Hong Kong, Survey of the China Mainland Press,
(hereinafter SCMP), No. 3370, p. 12.
39. Zunin Taipov, "Eyewitness Account: On the other Side of the Barricade,"
Kazakhstanskaya pravda (hereinafter KPl, September 29, 1963, in CDSP, XV, No. 38,
p. 16. See also A. Mirov, "Sinkiang Tragedy," Literaturnaya gazeta, May 7, 1969, in
CDSP, XXI, No. 19, pp. 5-6.
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Militarily, both sides complain of border incursions by planes,
troops, and ostensibly private citizens.40 Only once has fighting on
any significant scale been reported from the Sinkiang-Kazakhstan
area; in August 1969, there were clashes involving several hundred
Chinese and Soviet troops, with casualties on both sides. The Chinese
accused the Soviet Union of sending helicopters, tanks, armored
vehicles, and several hundred troops two kilometers into the Chinese
side of the border, where they were repelled. The Chinese Foreign
Ministry charged that larger numbers of troops and vehicles were
being assembled to provoke even larger conflicts in the future!' The
Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs replied that the Chinese authorities had been "deliberately exacerbating" the border situation for
several months, and had purposely provoked both this and a previous
clash in the Ussuri River area. The fact that the Chinese soldiers
were equipped with movie cameras was held indicative of the planned
nature of the Chinese attacks, and captured documents were released
purportedly to prove Chinese guilt in the Ussuri clashes!2 In 1976,
however, an analyst of the United States Central Intelligence Agency
maintained that while the Chinese did indeed provoke the AmurUssuri confrontation, the one in Sinkiang-Kazakhstan was perpetrated by the Soviets. 43
A smaller-scale confrontation on the Sinkiang border occurred in
March 1974, when a Soviet helicopter landed inside Chinese territory
at Altai and was seized by the Chinese. According to the Soviet
Foreign Ministry, the vehicle had been sent to pick up a seriously ill
serviceman who urgently needed hospitalization. It had lost its
bearings and made a forced landing in China, when its fuel supply
ran out. 44 In response, the Chinese Foreign Ministry accused the
USSR of cooking up "a bunch of lies to cover the crime," noting that
the helicopter carried neither medical personnel nor medical equipment, while possessing arms, ammunition, and reconnaissance
equipment. Documents on board indicated that the crew was on a
40. See, for example, protest of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the
USSR, in NCNA, September 17, 1968; and the Soviet Union's reply, "Provocative
Fabrication of the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs," Izvestia, November 2, 1968, in
CDSP, XX, No. 43, p. 42.
41. PR, XII, No. 33 <August 15, 1969), p. 3.
42. S. Borzenko et al., "On Stony Hill," Pravda, August 16, 1969, in CDSP, XXI,
No. 33, p. 4.
43. Roger Glenn Brown, "Chinese Politics and American Foreign Policy," Foreign
Policy, No. 23 <Summer 1976), pp. 3·23.
44. Pravda, March 21, 1974, p. 9; CDSP, XXVI, No. 12, p. 4.
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"special mission;" moreover, this intrusion was not an isolated
incident. 45
Mass rallies were held throughout Sinkiang, in which the
participants accused the Soviet Union of carrying out provocations,
planning a large-scale invasion and wishing to add to the 560,000
square kilometers they had already "stolen" from Sinkiang (a
reference to the treaty of 1881).46 Despite the Soviet Union's threat of
"serious consequences," the helicopter and its crew were not returned
until more than two and a half years later. As the PRC explained,
"investigation has established the veracity of the Soviet crew's
contention that they crossed into Chinese territory unintentionally." 47
In both Soviet and Chinese accounts of the 1969 and 1974
incidents, indigenous ethnic names are conspicuously lacking among
the personnel mentioned. The two governments clearly believed that
border defense in this area was too important to be left to the natives.
The Chinese belatedly noted that "people of all nationalities" had
helped in apprehending the Soviet helicopter crew and paraded one of
them at National Day rallies in Peking several months later, where he
declared that "the militia and people of various nationalities . . . . are
not to be bullied. "48
Although the physical presence of the minority peoples is
scarcely noticeable in the post-1962 confrontations, propaganda
channels for both parties of the dispute have sought to fill in the gaps
with lengthy discussions of the feelings of Kazakhs and Uighurs on
each side of the border. The 1962 incident touched off a major media
"war," with both China and the Soviet Union increasing their
minority language broadcasting to areas where trans-border reception was possible. The Soviets were aided in this by the reemergence
in the USSR ofleading Kazkhs and Uighurs who had been imprisoned
or purged by the Chinese government, mostly during the anti-rightist
campaign. Just how they made their escape has never been clarified,
but it is plain that they are of great value to the Soviet Union as
propagandists.
Uighur, Kazakh, and Kirghiz programs beamed from Tashkent,
Alma Ata, and Frunze were instituted in 1964 and expanded in 1967.
45. NCNA <Peking), March 23, 1974; SCMP, No. 3585, p. 66.
46. See, for example, Urumchi Radio CSinkiangl. March 28, 1974, in United States
Foreign Broadcast Information Service, China, <hereinafter FBIS-CHil, No. 62, 1974,
pp.A1-A3.
47. TASS, December 27, 1976; CDSP, XXVII, No. 52, p. 14.
48. Peking Radio, October 1, 1974, in FBIS-CHI, No. 192, 1974, p. D6; October 17,
1974, in FBIS-CHI, No. 201, 1974, p. A4.
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Special correspondents from TASS and Kazakhstanskaya pravda,
among others, joined the refugee newscasters, who claimed to have
seen both sides of the border. Most of the programs seem to present
an accurate description of the situation in Sinkiang, presumably in
order to establish the credibility of the broadcasts. Other themes,
however, include the material advantages of life for Kazakhs,
Uighurs, and others in the USSR, the availability of higher level of
labor-saving technology, and the greater cultural freedom and
diversity allowed there. The broadcasts frequently hark back to the
IIi revolt of 1944, the founding of the ETR, the historical independence of the Turkic Muslim peoples and their praiseworthy struggle to
maintain this independence, the 1962 incident, and other items with
similarly subversive content. Sympathy is expressed for those who
are being persecuted by the Chinese authorities for having relatives
in the Soviet Union or who are suspected of pro-autonomy or
pro-Soviet feelings. 49
In many Soviet propaganda releases, there is a clear implication
that the minorities' sympathetic kin, backed by the Soviet government, are ready to welcome their Chinese relatives to the Soviet
Union. A Western journalist who visited Alma Ata in 1976 noted
the publication there of a thrice-weekly paper called Yeni Khayat, or
New Life, for the refugees. It employed Arabic script, according to its
editor, because the Soviet authorities discovered that the refugees
had difficulty adjusting to the Cyrillic-based script used by other
Turkic-Muslim language newspapers published in the USSR. Yet, the
Soviets probably had other reasons for not using the Latin-based
alphabet which the Chinese introduced in 1960 after their break with
the USSR.
Yeni Khayat's editor claimed that more than 100,000 persons had
crossed the border. They had been provided with food, clothing, and
medical attention and eventually settled on collective farms; most
have apparently continued as sheep herders. 50 To enhance the
contrast between the picture of the cultural genocide of minorities in
China and their happy life in the USSR, the Soviet Union has also

49. Gretchen S. Brainerd, "Soviets Intensify Propaganda to Moslem Nationalities
in China," Radio Liberty dispatch (Munich), February 14, 1972, pp. 1-4. For some
examples of the Soviet reports, see Taipov, "Eyewitness Account," CDSP, XXI, No. 19,
p.5; and 0. Matskevich, "Along the Border," KP, September 24, 1963, p. 3, in CDSP,
XV, No. 38, pp. 17-18.
50. Christopher S. Wren, "Kazakhstan Beckons Refugees from China," NYT, April
24, 1976, p. 8. Chinese sources give a lower figure of 60,000.
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allocated funds to refurbish Islamic monuments, including Tamerlane's tomb, 51 and has published multi-volume compendia on Uighur,
Kazakh, and other nationality heritages.
The Chinese Communists have countered by accusing the USSR
of being a "big prison for nationalities," of forcing the nationalities to
learn Russian (this last juxtaposed with a quotation from Lenin on
linguistic diversity), and of exploiting its nationality repu"blics. 52 As
Chinese analysts noted, a 1974 edition of the book, Problems of the
CPSU Economic Policy and Reclamation of Virgin Lands in Kazakhstan, had quoted Leonid Brezhnev as saying: "We must spare no
expenditure to carry out material encouragement, for such expenditure will bring returns a hundredfold." But the 1976 reprint deleted
these words. This showed, according to these analysts, the deliberately "exploitative nature of the Brezhnev government."53
Just how seriously each party takes the propaganda efforts of the
other is unclear, though neither has exerted much effort to jam its
antagonist's broadcasts. In 1964, seemingly concerned with the Soviet
propaganda, Salfudin publicly accused the USSR of using radio
transmission to "spread lies and slander attacking the leadership of
the CCP and to distort the history of Sinkiang in an effort to
undermine the unity of the Chinese people ·of all nationalities."54
In 1967, Ivan Spivanhov, deputy chief editor of Kazakhstanskaya
pravda, reportedly stated that Chinese broadcasts "beam in hot and
strong." Yet "few people take any notice. It is so rude and clumsy."55
Nonetheless, the efforts to answer Chinese charges may, indeed,
indicate a somewhat less nonchalant attitude. China's claim to much
of Soviet Central Asia, as Pravda suggested, was based on the
grounds that "many hundreds of years ago, Chinese troops came to
these parts and the Chinese emperor once used to collect tribute from
the local inhabitants." This was "childish," because "one could [also]
say that . . . the boundary of the PRC passes only along the line of
the Great Wall, less than 100 kilometers from Peking: the boundary
of China did once pass there, the wall being evidence of this." 56
51. Hedrick Smith, "Tamerlane Stirs Soviet Controversy," NYT, June 2, 1974, p.2.
52. "Soviet People's Struggle Against New Tsars," PR, XIX, No. 46 <November 12,
1976), pp. 21-22; and "Analysis of Soviet Revisionists' Policy of 'National
Rapprochement,'" PR, XVII, No. 29 (July 19, 1974), pp. 18-20.
53. "Soviet Social Imperialism Pursues a Policy of National Oppression,'' PR, XIX,
No. 22 (May 28, 1976), pp. 19-23.
54. NCNA <Urumchil, April 28, 1964.
55. Brainerd, "Soviets Intensify Propaganda," p.2.
56. September 2, 1964, in CDSP, XVI, No. 34, pp. 4-5.

CHINA's FoREIGN RELATIONs: SELECTED STUDIES

31

The USSR also reacted sharply to evidences of collaboration
between the PRC and Ukrainian separatists, and refuted Chinese
charges that Kazakhstan was being exploited. 57 In 1972, moreover,
Izvestia announced plans to publish a ten-volume dictionary of the
Kazakh language and a multi-volume Kazakh Soviet encyclopedia. 58
There was renewed evidence of concern with civil defense in
Kazakhstan, and Brezhnev personally made highly touted visits to
the republic in 1970 and 1972. 59
Chinese media have attempted to refute Soviet charges of
cultural repression with lengthy articles discussing the exact numbers of pamphlets, books, and texts printed in Uighur, Kazakh,
Mongolian, Kirghiz, and Sibo. These publications, according to a
Chinese newspaper, have "had considerable use in developing the
languages and literatures of the various nationalities, enriching their
culture and accelerating the progress of the socialist revolution and
reconstruction in Sinkiang."60 A post-Cultural Revolution attempt to
renew pressure on these minorities to use the Latin alphabet was
made at the same time as many of China's non-Sinkiang minority
groups were being urged to study Han Chinese; 61 apparently it was
considered sufficient to separate Chinese Uighurs and Kazakhs from
their Soviet counterparts on the basis of script.
The death of Mao's then heir-apparent, Lin Piao, coincided with a
further liberalization of attitudes toward minorities. Uighurs and
Kazakhs were reportedly adapting the new revolutionary operas

57. M. Panchuk, "The Chinese Splitters and the Ukrainian Nationalists,"
Rabochaya ga.zeta, February 27, 1972; CDSP, XXIX, No. 8, pp. 13-14. For a
representative sample of Chinese propaganda in favor of the Ukrainian nationalists,
see NCNA (Peking), October 15, 1974; FBIS-CHI, No. 201, 1974, p. Al. For an example
of Soviet refutation of Chinese charges of USSR exploitation of Kazakhstan, see E.
Bagramov, "The Drawing Together of Nationalities Is a Law of Communist Construction," Pravda, June 22, 1972; CDSP, XXIV, No. 25, pp. 10-11.
58. Izvestia, November 23, 1972, p. 5, in CDSP, XXIV, No. 47, p. 23; and May 12,
1972, in CDSP, XXIV, No. 19, p. 26. The effect of showing the Soviet Union's
encouragement of nationality cultures may have been somewhat diluted by the
newspaper's observation that the encyclopedia's first entry was that of Abas, "the great
Kazakh poet and educator, whose ardent dream was to educate his people and bring
them closer to Russian culture."
59. V. Titov, "Our Common Duty," Pravda, August 14, 1972; CDSP, XXI, No. 33,
pp. 6-7. For accounts of Brezhnev's visits, see CDSP, XXII, No. 35, pp. 1-8; and XXIV,
No. 35, pp. 6·7.
60. Kuang-ming jih-pao [Bright Daily], October 23, 1963.
61. Contrast Jen-min jih-pao [People's Daily], August 22, 1971, with Urumchi
Radio, December 10, 1970.
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introduced under the aegis of Mao's wife to their own languages and
art forms, and were receiving more consumer goods manufactured to
the specifications of their customs and traditions. 62 A protege of Lin
Piao, who had become first party secretary of the SU AR after the
Cultural Revolution, was removed from office and replaced by
Salfudin, thus placing a minority group member in charge of the
SUAR for the first time since 1949. Other Uighurs and Kazakhs were
given prestigious, although not necessarily influential, positions in
government and party, and a campaign was initiated to recruit more of
them into leadership positions at lower levels ofsociety. 63
Chinese propagandists insisted that the 1962 incident had been
instigated by the Soviet Union; it constituted one more sad proof that
the USSR was following in the footsteps of its czarist predecessors.
They flatly rejected Russia's explanation of the nineteenth-century
territorial. cessions. As they argued, the lands obtained thereunder
should have been returned, presumably with their inhabitants as
well. A news report supposedly emanating from NCNA, which
circulated in the capitals of several African states, implied that the
peoples of Soviet Central Asia desired to "enter into a close union
with China."64
Thus, while the Soviets have been less overtly fearful of the
effect of Chinese propaganda than the Chinese have seemed of Soviet
propaganda, both parties have attempted to answer each other's
charges, and have accompanied these refutations by actions significantly liberalizing policies toward minorities.
Nonetheless, neither side remains certain of the loyalties of its
minorities. Within a few years of one another, two books were
published in the Soviet Union to disprove "falsifiers of history who
claimed that Soviet rule was established artificially and against the
wishes of the population of Central Asia and Kazakhstan." 65 A few
62. Urumchi Radio, October 9, 1974.
63. NCNA (Urumchil, May 17, 1972; SCMP. No. 5143, pp. 22-23.
64. TASS, April21, 1969; CDSP, XXI, No. 34, p. 17. TASS's evident anger at this,
and Russian fears of the potentially subversive effects of such statements, make it
unlikely that the NCNA report was a Soviet fabrication. Nonetheless, information
available to the author indicates that the report may well have been fabricated by
United States' intelligence sources.
65. Khamid Inoyatov, Central Asia and Kazakhstan Before and After the October
Revolution (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1966); and I. I. Mint, The Triumph of Soviet
Rule in Central Asia and Kazakhstan (Tashkent: USSR Academy of Sciences' Branch
Publishing House, 1967). The latter was reviewed in Pravda, No. 22, 1967, p. 3, in
CDSP, XIX, No. 47, p. 22. Cf. L. M. Drobizheva, "On the Social Homogeneity of the
Republics and the Development of National Relations in the USSR," Istoria SSR, No. 1
(January 1967!, in CDSP, XIX, No. 18, pp. 28-29.

CHINA's FoREIGN RELATIONs: SELECTED STuDIEs

33

years later, several Kirghiz scholars were severely criticized for
various "errors," including their assertion that even if a nationality's
demands for separation and political self-determination should
conflict with the interests of the nation, no one had the right to
intervene forcibly in the nation's internal life and "correct" its errors.
In China, the media have reacted with almost frenetic joy at each
new archaeological find in Sinkiang which links that province with
China proper. For example, a rally was held in 1975, with banners
and headlines proclaiming that "T'ang [Dynasty] Relics Prove
Sinkiang Historically Part of China." Rally leaders dutifully reiterated the most recent twist in the party line, and explained that these
latest discoveries would give the lie to nationalistically minded
internal splittists and to the Soviet revisionist new czars who wished
to separate Sinkiang from the ancestral land. 66
The group accompanying James Schlesinger to China in 1976
testified to their Chinese hosts' extreme nervousness while guiding
the American guests through Sinkiang. In a newspaper account
admittedly modified for diplomatic reasons, Robert L. Bartley
reported on the crowds in Ining, less than fifty miles from the Soviet
border:
As our caravan goes from stop to stop, the crowds on the streets
grow, until at last the local citizens virtually climb into the cars.
The crowds are nearly all Kazakh and Uighur, though the town
is supposed to be half Chinese. They break into almost joyous
applause at every wave. Our hosts from Peking grow testier than
at any other point in the trip. 67
In 1976, a West German magazine published the story of the
arrest of two recent refugees from China to the Soviet Union: one a
Kazakh and the other a Kirghiz. After being apprehended, both were
placed in a Soviet prison where a fellow prisoner, an ethnic Russian
hostile to the Soviet government and familiar with the cruelties of
the Gulag Archipelago, was amazed to learn that the two refugees
were happy with their new lot. He quoted one as saying, "I have a
bunk, a light bulb in the cell, we get food every day, even fish. What

66. Urumchi Radio, March 16, 1975; FBIS-CHI, No. 54, 1975, p. E5.
67. Bartley, "In China, Trust What You Feel," Wall Street Journal, October 1,
1976, p. 10.
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else do I need?" 68 Members of the Schlesinger party confided that
their Chinese hosts seemed taken aback by the relatively low
standards of living in Sinkiang, speculating that the Chinese guides
were shocked by the discrepancy between reality and what their own
propaganda had led them to believe. 69

CONCLUSION
It has been noted that the principal factors in the internationalization of the Turkic Muslim question were the hostilities between
the two host countries and the deteriorating economic conditions in
China during the late 1950s and early 1960s. The many references in
Chinese media to the existence of local nationalism over the entire
decade of the 1950s make it clear that Kazakh and Uighur
dissatisfaction with Chinese Communist rule existed prior to the
catalyzing incident of May 1962. Nonetheless, owing to the appearance of Sino-Soviet friendship, the public manifestation of their
dissatisfaction was muted.
The exact nature of Kazakh and Uighur demands on the Chinese
government has never been made clear. There are references to
separatism, implying an independent Sinkiang; some prefer to join
together with other Turkic Muslims (some of whom would undoubtedly come from Soviet Kazakhstan) in a larger separate state, while
others demand greater autonomy of Sinkiang within the Chinese
state. There are, moreover, demands for the Han Chinese to leave
Sinkiang; others simply ask that they relinguish their commanding
positions in the province's economic and administrative infrastructure.
Whether or not Soviet intrigues were behind the May 1962
incident, as the Chinese charge, the Soviets hastened to make use of
Kazakh and Uighur dissatisfaction thereafter. The USSR, championing the cause of China's Turkic Muslim peoples, sought to contrast
the economic hardship and cultural repression on the Chinese side of
the border with the allegedly improved situation on the Soviet side.
The Soviet Kazakhs and other Central Asian minorities seem to have
profited as a result. In an effort to provide suitable anti-Chinese
propoaganda, the Soviets granted them various cultural and material
benefits. Chinese Kazakhs and Uighurs have benefited as well, since
the PRC has perceived it as necessary to refute Soviet charges.
68. A. Uchitel, "Escape to an Adjacent Cell," Possev, No. 2 (February 1976), in
Freedom at Issue, September-October 1976, p. 10.
69. Information available to the author.
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Compilations have been made of folk-songs, and resources have been
transferred to Sinkiang via a preferential revenue redistribution plan
which returns more money to the province than is collected there.
This has allowed the construction of mining and other industries and
aided in raising living standards. There has also been an increase in
the number of Uighurs and Kazakhs in leadership positions in the
SUAR.
While Chinese and Soviet Kazakhs and Uighurs have gained
leverage over their respective governments as a result of the
Sino-Soviet situation, there are limits as to how far either government can be manipulated. Past experience has shown that overzealous catering to minority cultures generally reinforces the continued perception of ethnic separatism and prevents the drawing
together of the minority peoples which the two countries desire. The
granting of more autonomy may also lead to subsequent demands for
separatism. Moreover, the more liberal policies of China and the
USSR are doubtless looked upon with justifiable skepticism by
minorities on both sides of the border. In some instances, the
liberality of a pronouncement may be tempered by other words
spoken in a different context; in other instances, the policies are
known to be subject to rapid reversal.
With the higher degree of ideological orthodoxy demanded and
lower living standards prevailing on the Chinese side, the Soviet
Union would probably enjoy an advantage in any contest between the
two states for the loyalties of the Central Asian peoples. Still, for
reasons discussed earlier, the USSR cannot be fully certain of the
loyalties of its own minorities. Furthermore, the PRC has recently
endeavored to raise living standards in Sinkiang, to coopt more
Uighurs and Kazakhs into the province's elite, and to relax some of
the more culturally repressive aspects of the past. It is therefore
unlikely that the Soviet Union will decide to employ the incitement
of China's Kazakhs and Uighurs in any large-scale way. AntiChinese propaganda and infiltration directed toward Sinkiang will
probably continue on a small scale, in an attempt to impress the
Chinese with the potentially damaging effects of a larger-scale effort.
Since the Soviet Union does not intend to support Chinese Kazakh
separatism or autonomy in any meaningful way, and because of the
ever larger Han Chinese presence in Sinkiang, the Turkic Muslims in
Central Asia who desire a separate state will not likely see their wish
fulfilled.
The most feasible scenario for the creation of such a separate
state would entail a major destabiliaztion of the present equilibrium
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on the border, such as a Sino-Soviet war. Given the unlikely
eventuality of a war between the two states and the resurfacing of
autonomy demands, there is a high probability that the Soviet Union
would win and, as part of the settlement, might detach Sinkiang from
China and establish it as an autonomous state, albeit one dependent
on the USSR for its continued existence. At first glance, the effort
might not seem worth the potential gains, in view of the Soviet
Union's not wholly successful record of relations with its own Central
Asian minorities. On the other hand, the example of the MPR may
indicate that the venture is indeed worthwhile. The MPR is, and
Sinkiang could be, a buffer state between the Soviet Union and
China. The MPR is rich in minerals and has been usefully integrated
into the Soviet economy; Sinkiang could be as well. Moreover, though
Mongolians would probably, under other circumstances, wish a
higher degree of international maneuverability, their actions indicate
their strong preference for an independence circumscribed by the
Soviet Union to the risk of inclusion within the Chinese state. Thus,
there are very real prospects for gain for the Soviet Union in such a
situation.
Chinese foreign policymakers have demonstrated themselves to
be highly skilled and fully cognizant of the realities of, and
limitations on, Chinese power. The existence of the MPR is a constant
reminder of what may happen in Sinkiang. It is therefore probable
that they will do their utmost to prevent an escalation of Sino-Soviet
violence. The influx of Han Chinese to Sinkiang will likely continue
insofar as the local economy can absorb the immigrants. Sinkiang's
minorities will be carefully treated in such a way as to diffuse
resentment. While granting them some privileges, the PRC will not
court the minorities to such a degree that further demands for
separatism will be encouraged.
The best laid plans of government policymakers have gone astray
before, and it is not beyond the realm of posibility that this may
happen again. History is replete with wars which began accidentally,
and a Sino-Soviet armed struggle is but one of several possible
scenarios which may rekindle hopes for separatism in Sinkiang
and/or Soviet Central Asia. It is conceivable, for example, that such a
minority group uprising may occur independent of any impetus from
Peking or Moscow. Here the social mobilization phenomenon may be
of crucial importance. In destroying the traditionally loose-knit
kinship groups of Central Asian peoples and in giving them a
common written language, making them literate, and drawing them
into factories and mass organizations, the Chinese and Soviet
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governments may inadvertently be creating the preconditions for
large-scale well-organized resistance to their respective rule, rather
than the small-scale and loosely organized hostilities they have
successfully coped with so far.
It is difficult to determine how much genuine feeling Chinese
Kazakhs and Uighurs have for their kinfolk across the border, and
vice versa. The constant propaganda of both sides, particularly that of
the Soviet Union, suggests that they are indeed one people. This
would surely reinforce such feeling as do exist, and may even create
them where they do not exist. This may spark desires for irredentism
which operate independently of official Chinese or Soviet wishes.
At present, however, these possibilities remain remote and the
outlook seems to portend a continuation of low-level resistance which
may occasionally be exacerbated by local economic shortages or a
misguided or misinterpreted order from Peking or Moscow. There
seems little probability of either escalating or solving the Turkic
Muslim problem.
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Chapter Two
THE EVOLUTION OF CHINA'S APPROACH TO THE
SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES
Robert G. Sutter*

THE ORIGINS OF CHINA'S APPROACH TO THE
SUPERPOWERS 1
The rapprochement of the United States (US) with the People's
Republic of China (PRC), achieved during President Richard M.
Nixon's February 1972 visit to China, marked the most important
breakthrough in modern Chinese foreign policy. Peking's
normalization of relations with Washington was especially useful in
fostering China's vital interests in the Asian balance of power. In the
late 1960s, the PRC leadership became increasingly aware of China's
vulnerable strategic position. That vulnerability stemmed in part
from disruptions of China's military preparedness during the
Cultural Revolution, and it was increased by significantly larger
Soviet military power deployed along the Chinese frontier. But at its
heart lay Peking's strident opposition to both superpowers.
The August 1968 Soviet incursion into Czechoslovakia and
Moscow's concurrent formulation of the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine
of limited sovereignty demonstrated to the Chinese that the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) might be prepared to use
overwhelming military superiority to pressure, and even to invade,
the PRC. At the same time, Peking voiced growing concern over
alleged Soviet efforts to gain influence in countries along China's
periphery in order to "contain" the PRC. The Sino-Soviet border
clashes of 1969 increased Peking's concern over the Soviet "threat."
In response, Chinese officials, under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung
and Chou En-lai, began a major effort in 1969 to broaden Peking's
leverage against the USSR by ending China's international isolation.
In this pursuit they used conventional diplomacy and played down
the ideological shrillness characteristic of Chinese foreign policy
during the Cultural Revolution.
Because of Moscow's massive power, Peking realized that
improving diplomatic relations with most foreign countries would not
* The views expressed in this chapter are those of the author and do not
represent the views of any US government agency.
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be significantly helpful to China's pressing need to offset the USSR.
In Asia, only the US, the other superpower, seemed to have sufficient
strength to serve as an effective deterrent to Soviet pressure. Moscow
had previously shown uneasiness over signs of possible reconciliation
between China and the US. Thus, the Chinese leaders were well
aware that they held an important option. They could move closer to
the US in order to readjust Sino-Soviet relations and form a new
balance of power in Asia favorable to the PRC.
While the Chinese faced increasingly strong Soviet pressure in
1969, the newly installed Nixon administration was beginning policy
initiatives designed to pull back American military forces from Asia
and reduce US commitments along the periphery of China. It was
soon apparent that the so-called Nixon Doctrine of gradual troop
withdrawal was perceived favorably by Peking, at least after the
brief US incursion into Cambodia. The Chinese leaders treated the
American pullback as solid evidence of the Nixon administration's
avowed interest in improving relations with China. They also viewed
it as a major opportunity for the PRC to free itself from the
burdensome task of maintaining an extensive defense network along
China's southern and eastern borders against possible US-backed
armed incursions. Moreover, Peking hoped to spread its own
influence to neighboring Asian areas as the US gradually reduced its
military presence in those regions.
Thanks to these considerations, the PRC agreed to invite
President Nixon to China and to begin the process of normalization of
Sino-American relations. Though the joint communique signed by
Nixon and Chou En-lai in Shanghai in February 1972 acknowledged
major differences between the two nations over ideology, Taiwan, and
several foreign policy issues, the document showed that the two
leaders had reached an important agreement on the principles which
would govern the future international order in Asia. While agreeing
that they would not seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region, both
sides promised to oppose efforts by any other nation to establish
hegemony there.
This accord served China's interests well. For the previous two
decades, Peking had existed within a generally hostile Asian
environment and had periodically faced threats to its national
security. The Sino-American rapprochement offered the PRC an
opportunity to adopt a more relaxed stance on its eastern and
southern flanks. It also provided major support for China against
Soviet pressure. US support for the antihegemony clause in the
Shanghai Communique represented for China an important strategic

40

CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIEs

guarantee. It put Washington on record as opposing any effort by
Moscow to dominate China.
The Sino-US relationship remained the centerpiece of PRC
strategy in the Asia-Pacific region following the promulgation of the
Shanghai Communique. In accord with Peking's interests,
Washington continued to implement the Nixon Doctrine, gradually
withdrawing from Southeast Asia, Taiwan, Korea, and Japan. At the
same time, the US repeatedly insisted that its withdraw} should not
be interpreted as a sign of weakness, since Washington remained
firmly opposed to any other power's attempts to gain a dominant
position in Asia. The Nixon administration kept sufficient force on
hand to back up its stance, thereby reassuring Peking that the US
would honor the Shanghai Communique's provisions against
"hegemony" in East Asia.
A milestone in the development of Peking's new relationship
with the US and the USSR was reached at the Tenth Congress of the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in August 1973. In his August 24
report to the congress, Chou En-lai showed increased confidence over
China's strategic position, portraying the Soviet Union as principally
threatening the West in Europe rather than threatening China. He
offered a lengthy rationale for China's rapprochement with the US
and its continued opposition to the USSR. He implied that Peking
was, in 1973, secure in international affairs; the PRC would focus its
attention and resources on dealing with internal questions. 2
Chou's report pressed the familiar line of forming "the broadest
united front" against the "hegemonism of the two superpowers," but
1. For useful overviews of recent Chinese foreign policy, see Harold C. Hinton,
China's Turbulent Quest: An Analysis of China's Foreign Relations Since 1949 (new
and enlarged edition; Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972>; and A. Doak
Barnett, China and the Major Powers in East Asia (Washington, D.C.: Brookings
Institution, 1977). See also Robert G. Sutter, China-Watch: Toward Sino-American
Reconciliation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978>; Robert G. Sutter,
Chinese Foreign Policy after the Cultural Revolution, 1966-1977 <Boulder: Westview
Press, 1978>; and Robert G. Sutter, "China's Strategy in Asia Following the US Defeat
in Indochina" (paper presented at the Seventh Sino-American Conference on Mainland
China, Taipei, June 1978). Background information on China's foreign policy is
available in US Foreign Broadcast Information Service <hereinafter cited as FBISl,
Trends in Communist Media, a weekly publication analyzing the media comments of
China and other Communist countries. This is particularly useful in documenting the
changes in Chinese foreign policy during this time.
2. For an analysis of Chou's report, see FBIS, Trends in Communist Media,
September 6, 1973. The report appears in The Tenth National Congress of the
Communist Party of China <Documents) <Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1973), pp.
1-37.
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it did so in a way that clearly sanctioned the move toward Sino-US
detente as a means to counterbalance Soviet influence. Chou
sharpened the formula of great-power rivalry that had served as the
major premise of Peking's differentiated approach to the superpowers
in recent years. While noting that the superpowers "contend as well
as collude" with each other, he maintained that "their collusion
serves the purpose of more intensified contention. Contention is
absolute and protracted, whereas collusion is relative and
temporary." In the context of superpower contention, Chou cited
Europe as "strategically the key point" in their rivalry. According to
his analysis, the West always sought to divert the Soviet "peril"
toward China, and the Soviets for their part were, in 1973, feinting to
the East while thrusting toward the West.
Chou's report pulled few punches in its attack on the Soviets,
likening Brezhnev to Hitler and all but writing off any hope for an
improvement in Sino-Soviet relations. Chou recited a familiar litany
of charges, accusing the Kremlin of enforcing a Fascist dictatorship
at home and practicing "social imperialism" across the globe. He
reiterated Peking's position that the dispute over "matters of
principle" should not hinder normalization of state relations on the
basis of peaceful coexistence, and he urged that the border question
should be settled peacefully through negotiations "free from any
threat." This formulation, however, merely reflected Peking's consistent demand for a mutual troop withdrawal from the disputed regions
along the frontier. Indeed, it seems likely that he was making these
points only for the record, for he raised in his report a sarcastic
rhetorical question: "Must China give away all the territory north of
the Great Wall to the Soviet revisionists" in order to demonstrate a
willingness to improve Sino-Soviet relations?
Chou made a passing reference to Soviet troops stationed along
the Chinese border. His most direct portrayal of a threat to China's
security appeared in the course of an appeal for vigilance against
"any war of aggression that imperialism may launch and particularly
against surprise attack on our country by Soviet revisionist soci~l
imperialism." This warning against surprise attack was a new
element in Chinese rhetoric, and it also appeared in the congress
communique. Taken as a whole, however, the discussion of foreign
affairs in the congress did not evoke a sense of imminent threat. In
reference to Mao Tse-tung's May 20, 1970 statement on the danger of
a new world war, Chou was confident that it was possible to "prevent
such a war."

42

CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES

In contrast to its attack on Moscow, Chou's report contained a
positive assessment of the Sino-US rapprochement. When he was
listing Peking's successes in foreign affairs, Chou observed that
"Sino-US relations have been improved to some extent." He justified
Peking's move to improve Sino-US relations while denigrating
Soviet-US detente. He distinguished "necessary compromises between revolutionary countries and imperialist countries" from "collusion and compromise" between Moscow and Washington. He cited a
Leninist scripture for the observation that "there are compromises
and compromises," and he drove his point home by invoking Lenin's
conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, contrasting it with "the
doings of Khrushchev and Brezhnev," who were "betrayers of Lenin."
In another justification of the Sino-American detente, Chou
claimed that the US had "openly admitted that it is increasingly on
the decline," and he argued that the Nixon administration "could not
but pull out of Vietnam." This portrayal of receding US power
contrasted with Chou's description of the "evil and foul things"
perpetrated by the expansionist Soviet Union.

COMPLICATIONS IN CHINA'S FOREIGN APPROACH,
1974-1976

By the end of 1973, it was clear that Peking's more pragmatic
approach toward foreign affairs in general, and toward the two
superpowers in particular, had greatly enhanced China's
international position. In the course of little more than four years
since the end of the Cultural Revolution, Peking had marked four
major achievements: First, the PRC had managed, in some measure
through Sino-Soviet border talks, to stay the Soviet threat against
China. Moreover, it had used its active international diplomacy to
block suspected Soviet efforts to keep China isolated in Asia and
elsewhere. Second, Peking had gained entry into the United Nations,
normalized diplomatic relations with such major capitalist powers as
West Germany, Japan, and Great Dritain, and reestablished its
traditionally favorable position among the independent
Communist-ruled states of North Vietnam, North Korea, and
Rumania. The Chinese had also begun what promised to be a fruitful
reconciliation with the US. Third, the PRC had put aside its past
ideological bias against increasing trade with capitalist states and
had started to open more of its markets to the advanced technology
and resources available in the West, hoping thereby to build China's
strength with equipment purchased abroad. Fourth, Peking was
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pursuing programs of cultural exchange with an increasingly large
number of foreign countries, thereby significantly enhancing China's
appeal internationally.
The new program in foreign affairs was not without its critics
within the Chinese leadership, however. Chou En-lai's efforts were
particularly vulnerable to charges from "leftist" ideological spokesmen in the Chinese hierarchy, who attacked the "expediency" of
Chou's pragmatic initiatives and bemoaned the loss of Maoist
"principle" in the conduct of Chinese foreign affairs. These spokesmen were particularly critical of Chou's foreign policy during massive
political campaigns in China in 1974 and again in 1976, producing
serious disruptions in the development of Chinese foreign affairs.
Furthermore, the success of the new program was largely
dependent on the superpower relationship in Asia and elsewhere.
Whenever the superpower balance changed substantially (or at least
was thought to have changed substantially), Peking felt compelled to
make corresponding shifts in its own foreign approach in order to
adjust to the new situation. In particular, the PRC was relying
heavily on the US and its Asian allies to maintain in the region a
balance of influence that would preclude gains by the USSR. As a
result, the Chinese were seriously concerned about increasing US
"weakness" following American setbacks in Asia during 1975, and it
responded with significant alterations in China's foreign approach.

Impact of the Anti-Confucius Campaign, 1974 3
The development of strong leadership conflicts in China during
1974 interfered with the conduct of Chinese foreign policy. The
conflicts were apparently prompted by Chou En-lai's declining
health. Since Mao was not expected to live much longer, party leaders
in Peking began to jockey for positions of power. "Moderate" leaders,
guided by the ailing Chou and his protege, Vice Premier Teng
Hsiao-p'ing, relied on their control of much of the state and party
bureaucracies. Their opponents were headed by a group of "leftist"
Politburo members known later as the "Gang of Four" (Wang
Hung-wen, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, Chiang Ch'ing, and Yao Wen-yuan).
They had no firm base of power. Although they were influential in
propaganda, educational, and cultural organizations, their basic
support seemed to rest on Mao's personal sanction of their activities.
3. For a more detailed analysis of China's foreign policy during this time, see
Sutter, Chinese Foreign Policy, pp. 33-38.
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The leftists strove to build up their own prestige within the
leadership while tearing down the prestige of the moderates. In 1974,
they exploited the massive political campaign to criticize Confucius
and Lin Piao as a means to attack the moderates' management of
Chinese affairs. Through their use of propaganda during the
campaign, the leftists sniped at moderate policies on education,
rehabilitation of veteran cadres who had been criticized during the
Cultural Revolution, and China's domestic economic development.
The leftist-inspired anti-Confucius campaign also had a significant impact on the conduct of foreign affairs. First, it led to an
outpouring of harsh criticism of foreign music, films, and other
cultural works. This helped to curb what had been an active Chinese
interest in developing cultural exchange with foreign countries.
Second, the campaign criticized Chinese trade with capitalist countries. The propaganda claimed that such trade would render China
dependent on "imperialism," a line which dampened Peking's interest
in increasing trade with the West. Third, the campaign intensified
Sino-Soviet hostility. Not only did the Peking media expand. harsh
polemics against the USSR, but the Chinese, for the first time since
the Sino-Soviet border clashes of 1969, published the arrests of
alleged Soviet "spies" in the PRC. 4 Fourth, Chinese relations with the
US fell prey to the anti-Confucius campaign. Peking became less
interested in cultural exchange and trade with Washington, and
Chinese media criticism of the US increased sharply. At the same
time, the PRC adopted an unusually strong, militant stance on the
sensitive Taiwan issue, warning that China was prepared to launch a
military strike across the Taiwan Strait.
Chou En-lai and the moderate leaders managed to weather the
impact of the leftist challenge during the anti-Confucius campaign.
In his report to the Fourth National People's Congress (NPC) on
January 13, 1975, Chou reaffirmed Peking's commitment to a
pragmatic approach to foreign affairs. Nonetheless, the PRC leadership disputes over power in China remained unresolved. For
4. For example, the PRC publicized the arrest in January 1974 of Soviet
diplomats in Peking and the arrest in March of the same year of a Soviet helicopter
crew which had landed in Sinkiang near the Sino-Soviet border. The diplomats were
promptly expelled from China, leading to a quick end of the incident. Nevertheless,
Peking decided to detain the Soviet helicopter and its crew, and this resulted in a sharp
exchange of Sino-Soviet protests, marking a downturn in the already poor relationship
between the two nations. For a detailed discussion of the Sinkiang incident, see
Chapter Two of this book, "The Role ofEthnicity in the Sino-Soviet Dispute," pp. 27-28.
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example, prior to the convention of the NPC, Chou's protege, Teng
Hsiao-p'ing, received a boost in his career when he was designated
vice chairman of the party in the CCP plenum of January 8-10, 1975.
Yet, soon afterward, leftist standard bearer, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, was
appointed vice premier at the NPC and began to take a more active
role in the management of Chinese foreign policy.

Concern over US "Weakness," 19755
During the next year, Chinese foreign policy was dominated by
Peking's concern over what it perceived to be a major shift in the
international balance of power, especially in East Asia. Although
Chinese leftist leaders continued to snipe at the implementation .of
moderate policies, their influence on PRC foreign policy was not
strong. Strategic concerns stemming particularly from the rapid
collapse of the US position in Indochina in the spring of 1975
prompted increased Chinese efforts in pragmatic, conventional diplomacy designed to stabilize the East Asian balance of power and to
prevent further Soviet expansion. The Chinese response represented
graphic evidence of how far China had come to rely on the US to
maintain an active posture in Asian and world affairs that would
preclude a major expansion of Soviet influence.
The fall of US-backed governments in Cambodia and South
Vietnam in 1975 upset the steady development of an East Asian
balance of power favorable to Chinese interests. From Peking's
perspective, the stability of the newly emerging diplomatic equilibrium had met with a significant setback. While the PRC had expected
Washington to withdraw eventually from Indochina, the precipitous
US decline held serious implications for China's interests. Washington suffered a serious defeat at a time when US leadership and
resolve abroad, especially in East Asia, had already been called into
question as a result of the Watergate scandal and the 1974-1975
economic recession.
Against this backdrop, the US defeats in Indochina cast doubt on
a key premise in Peking's plan to foster a new East Asian order
favorable to Chinese interests. Was the US strong enough and, more
important, was it resolute enough to continue to serve as the main
strategic block against Soviet encroachment and advances in East
Asia? According to the PRC's judgment, the US had indeed been
weakened by the Indochina developments, and its strength and
5. For further information on this issue, see Sutter, "China's Strategy in Asia."
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resolve in East Asia had been similarly affected. To the Chinese, the
US had become less influential in Asia; its utility as a bulwark
against future Soviet expansion was therefore compromised.
To respond to its perception of an altered East Asian situation,
Peking was determined to continue to adhere to the Sino-US plan for
a new East Asian order as articulated in the Shanghai Communique.
But, whereas the PRC had previously relied mainly on US strength
to sustain the favorable balance, it began to take on a greater
responsibility for shoring up East Asian positions against Soviet
expansion. For example, Peking moved adroitly to solidify its
relations with, and to cement anti-Soviet feelings in, the Philippines
and Thailand, the two non-Communist states in East Asia most
affected by the collapse of the US position in Indochina. Peking's
establishment of diplomatic relations with these states - with a joint
communique in each instance testifying to their opposition to
international "hegemony" - was intended to reassure Manila and
Bangkok of their security and stability in the wake of the US defeat.
By doing so, the PRC hoped to prevent the two states from moving
into a one-sided relationship with the USSR, in their hasty search for
big power support in the new Southeast Asian situation.
In Peking's opinion, the US had been "beaten black and blue" in
Indochina, and the Asian people, especially those in Southeast Asia,
were increasingly successful in their efforts to drive the "wolf' - the
US - from the "front gate." Nonetheless, the Chinese made plain
that they were opposed to any unilateral US withdrawal from
international involvement after this setback. They wanted the US to
remain heavily involved abroad, and strategically vigilant against
the USSR in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. They argued that
the US defeats in Indochina had actually presented Washington with
an "opportunity" to pull back from "secondary" areas where it had
overextended itself, in order to serve more effectively as a strategic
bulwark against Soviet expansion in more "vital" areas abroad. In
this vein, the PRC reduced its criticism of US military presence and
political influence in Asia, while giving unusually favorable play to
US statements of resolve to retain strong ties with Japan and
selected non-Communist Asian states, and to maintain a strong naval
presence in the western Pacific and the Indian Ocean.
Peking viewed the USSR as a more immediate and serious threat
to China's aspirations in East and Southeast Asia than it had in the
early 1970s. Accordingly, the PRC adopted a more active policy
against the USSR, aimed at blocking Moscow's attempts to advance
along China's flanks as the US withdrew. It also launched a major
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propaganda campaign to warn other Asian states of the danger posed
by the ravenous "tiger" (the USSR), which lurked at the rear door as
the Asian people pushed the "wolf" through the front gate. Peking,
too, charged that Moscow's plan for a collective security system in
Asia was actually a thinly veiled effort to achieve political "hegemony;" it was the antithesis of the "antihegemony front" fostered by
China and its friends. Because of their high profile against the USSR,
the Chinese viewed with increased suspicion those Asian states
which maintained cordial relations with Moscow, notably Communist
Vietnam.
By late 1975, Peking began to see the situation in East Asia in a
more optimistic light. Although US power and influence in the region
had weakened, Washington continued to be interested in sustaining
an East Asian balance of power that would preclude Soviet expansion. This was underlined by President Gerald R. Ford's announcement of the Pacific Doctrine in late 1975. It was based on continuing
strong US air and naval power in the region, on close US relations
with Japan and other traditional allies, and on developing ties with
the PRC. Significantly, it did not envision any major role for the
USSR to play in the area.
Meanwhile, Peking had achieved considerable success in
broadening its influence among non-Communist Southeast Asian
states. Its warning against the danger of Soviet expansion was
winning new adherents in Southeast Asia. At the end of 1975, the
only areas in East and Southeast Asia where the USSR maintained
considerable influence were Vietnam and Laos.
The PRC, however, still could not afford to be overly optimistic
about the broad international trend of East-West relations. While
feeling more secure in East Asia, the Chinese were alarmed in late
1975 by what they considered to be a less resolute Western posture
vis-a-vis the USSR. They viewed the summit meeting in Helsinki
earlier in August as evidence of a growing trend in the US and other
Western nations to "appease" Moscow in order to direct the Soviet
menace "eastward," away from Europe. Peking warned against
"appeasement" of Soviet "expansionism" under the cover of detente.
It emphasized the danger of a "new world war" which, it charged,
would be started by the Soviet Union.
Chinese criticism of Western "appeasement" intensified when US
Defense Secretary James Schlesinger was dismissed by President
Ford. On November 7, 1975, for example, the New China News
Agency (NCNA) departed from its past circumspect treatment of the
US administration, and replayed in one dispatch some critical
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comments made by foreign leaders on Schlesinger's dismissal.
Nevertheless, it carefully refrained from attributing any of the
criticisms to the agency itself. The PRC clearly regarded the incident
as illustrative of the Ford administration's determination to speed up
detente with the USSR, a decision which the Chinese believed was
detrimental to US national security. 6
On the same day when the NCNA reported Schlesinger's
dismissal, its dispatch carried two "international reference material"
articles, explaining to the Chinese people the significance of the 1938
Munich agreement and the 1940 Dunkirk evacuation. The articles
focused on the disastrous results of the Munich "policy of appeasement" adopted by the British and French leaders to connive "with the
aggressive acts" of the Fascists in order to "divert" the "spearhead of
aggression toward the East." The implications of the Peking media
were obvious. According to the Chinese, the Ford administration's
dismissal of Schlesinger was an attempt to ease US-Soviet tensions,
and it was comparable to Neville Chamberlain's earlier efforts to
appease Hitler at Munich.

POST-MAO DEVELOPMENTS
In 1976, Chinese foreign policies were dominated by the impact
of major internal leadership changes. Premier Chou En-lai, NPC
Chairman Chu Teh, and CCP Chairman Mao Tse-tung died in
January, June, and September, respectively. Moreover, Teng Hsiaop'ing was removed from his posts in April, and the four leftist
Politburo members (known since then as the "Gang of Four") were
arrested in October. Hua Kuo-feng was named to the positions of
acting premier in February, premier in April, and CCP chairman In
October. Yeh Chien-ying and Li Hsien-nien, Politburo members who
had dropped from public view along with Teng Hsiao-p'ing after
Chou's death in January, received unusual prominence in Chinese
media following the purge of the "Gang of Four" in October.
Apparently in reaction to these major leadership shifts, Chinese
spokesmen cautioned repeatedly throughout the year that the basic
orientation of PRC foreign policy would not change. And, in fact, it
did not change, although there were signs that leaders in Peking
disagreed among themselves on how foreign policy should be carried
out. Leftist leaders headed by the "Gang of Four" tried to reverse
several aspects of Chinese policy previously carried out by such
6. For an analysis of the dispatch, see FBIS, Trends in Communist Media,
November 12, 1975.
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moderate leaders as Chou En-lai and Teng Hsiao-p'ing. These leftist
leaders were particularly prominent during the massive domestic
campaign against Teng in mid-1976, and they used their influence in
propaganda circles to push their radical policies. They criticized
Teng's advocacy of increased foreign trade, especially with the West;
they adopted a harder line than the moderates on the Taiwan issue;
and they were more critical of Washington.
Following the removal of the "Gang of Four," Chinese officials
were preoccupied with conventional diplomatic, economic, and military efforts to protect China's security interests in world affairs,
especially against the perceived threats from the Soviet Union. The
PRC tried to foster an "antihegemony united front" with other
developing Third World countries, as well as the US and other
developed Western nations whose interests were seen as directly
threatened by Soviet "hegemonism."
In its bilateral relations with the USSR, Peking worked to
maintain a state of controlled hostility in order to avoid direct
military confrontation with the vastly superior Soviet forces along
the contested Sino-Soviet border. The PRC rebuffed Moscow's public
gestures to revive the stalled border talks, and Sino-Soviet polemics
continued to underline a solid impasse.
In its broader foreign policy, Peking viewed the Sino-Soviet
rivalry for influence in world affairs as a zero-sum game, in which a
gain for Moscow was equivalent to a loss for China. Thus, the PRC
befriended not only those states which had adopted a pro-Peking
orientation, but also those nations which did not cooperate closely
with the USSR. Moreover, the Chinese leaders supported the
continued presence in East and Southeast Asia of strong US naval
and air forces as an effective deterrent to the spread of Soviet
military power along China's periphery. They warned that a precipitous
American withdrawal could create a power vacuum which would likely
befilledbythe USSR. 7
The PRC put aside its previous fears of Japanese militarism, and
strongly urged Japan to strengthen its ties with the US, as well as to
7. For background information on this policy and comments by Chinese officials,
see A New Realism: Factfinding Mission to the People's Republic of China, July 3-13,
1978, a report submitted by the Subcommitte on Asian and Pacific Affairs to the
Committee on International Relations, US House of Representatives !Washington,
D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1978l; and China and Asia: An Analysis of
China's Recent Policy Toward Neighboring States, a report submitted by the
Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, US
House of Representatives <Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1979l.

50

CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STumEs SERIES

expand its defense capabilities in order to guard against the "threat
from the north." At the same time, Peking supported the Indonesian
government's close ties with the US and applauded Jakarta's cool
response to various Soviet blandishments, although Indonesia had
often been suspicious of the PRC's intentions.
The Chinese, too, were increasingly supportive of the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); they wanted the organization
to become an effective instrument to block Soviet expansionism in
Southeast Asia. In contrast, they opposed Hanoi's call for greater
Southeast Asian cooperation, because they considered Hanoi a Soviet
surrogate, and the Vietnamese proposal a thinly disguised effort to
spread Soviet influence in the region. In South Asia, Peking had
likewise been suspicious of India's proposals for regional cooperation
in the early 1970s, when New Delhi was, in Peking's opinion,
assisting Soviet expansion. Yet as India demonstrated greater
independence vis-a-vis the USSR later in the decade, the Chinese
responded more positively to New Delhi's calls for regional cooperation.
Indeed, concern over Sino-Soviet rivalry was not the sole factor
governing China's foreign behavior. For example, domestic politics,
Maoist ideology, Peking's territorial claims, as well as its support for
overseas Chinese, for Communism in Korea, and for insurgencies in
Southeast Asia, all served to complicate the PRC's policy from time to
time. Most important for Washington, the Chinese demanded the
withdrawal of American troops from South Korea even though they
supported continued US military presence in Asia in order to offset
the USSR. At the same time, although Peking wanted to develop
friendly relations with Japan and the non-Communist governments
in Southeast Asia, its leaders did not stop to quarrel with these
governments about conflicting territorial claims; neither did they
refrain from supporting insurgent movements which were directed
against some of these administrations. Nonetheless, these many
considerations largely remained in the background as the PRC
devoted primary attention to fostering an Asian balance of influence
favorable to China and unfavorable to the USSR.
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The Chinese preoccupation with the Sino-Soviet rivalry clearly
benefited the US. While China had previously been the major
opponent to American involvement in world affairs, especially in
Asia, Peking became one of the most vocal supporters of a strong US
military, political, and economic presence. From the PRC's perspective, American interests in Asian and world affairs coincided with
Chinese interests, insofar as they served to preclude the growth of
Soviet influence, particularly along China's frontiers. Significantly,
this support from the PRC did not cost the US much in terms of
material outlays and political prestige. In fact, it allowed Washington
to reduce its costly military presence in Asia without dramatically
upsetting the balance of power there. Peking's positive appraisal of
the US also reduced the possibility of a major Sino-American conflict
in Asia; it became less likely that the Chinese would disrupt the
political order and economic stability of the non-Communist Asian
states for fear that turmoil would open opportunities for Soviet
expansionism.
Meanwhile, Peking encouraged Washington to adopt policies
with respect to Europe, the Middle East, and US-Soviet arms control,
which would compel Moscow to maintain a high level of military
vigilance along its western frontier and thereby reduce its pressure
on China. From time to time, the PRC warned the US against trying
to use cooperation with the USSR in arms control, or in Europe and
the Middle East, as a means to divert the "threat" of Soviet
expansionism eastward, toward China.
The normalization of US-PRC diplomatic relations, announced on
December 15, 1978, was seen by Peking as strengthening its position
in Asia against both the long-standing "threat" from the USSR and
the recently intensified pressures from Soviet-aligned Vietnam. As in
the Sino-Japanese Treaty of August 1978, Peking again emphasized
its stance on "antihegemonism" in the US-PRC communique. On
later occasions, its leaders likewise expressed strong anti-Soviet and
anti-Vietnamese sentiments.
In the wake of Sino-American normalization, Chinese media
soft-pedaled past complaints about progress in US-Soviet detente.
8. Information for this section is taken in part from Congressional Research
Service, Library of Congress, "US-China Relations," Issue Brief 76053 !periodically
updated); and "US-China-Soviet Relations," Issue Brief 79115 (periodically updated).
See also Hungdah Chiu and Karen Murphy (eds), The Chinese Connection and
Normalization (Baltimore: School of Law, University of Maryland 1980).
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Presumably reassured about Washington's intentions with regard to
the US-USSR-PRC triangular relationship, Chinese commentators
did not view the possible conclusion of the SALT II agreement as
evidence of US "appeasement." Instead, they argued that the SALT
accord would not make any substantial difference in the SovietAmerican arms race. This new approach suggested that Peking was
less worried toward the end of 1978 about the US lowering its
military guard against Moscow, and thereby allowing the USSR to
put greater military pressure on China.
Over the next year, the PRC made rapid progress in its economic
relations with the US as the two governments agreed on their
disputed financial claims, and concluded a major trade accord
granting most-favored-nation tariff treatment to Chinese imports to
the US. Washington also pledged to provide China with two billion
dollars in Export-Import Bank loans on a case-by-case basis over a
five-year period. Moreover, the US began a major effort to extend to
the PRC reimbursable technical assistance, and promised to provide
government investment guarantees to American businesses interested in trading in China.
Similarly, bilateral strategic cooperation between the two nations also increased. A month before the announcement of normalization of their relations, the US disclosed that it had dropped its past
policy of blocking West European arms sales to China. Washington
had also eased its control over the export to Peking of certain types of
technology which might be useful for civilian and military purposes.
None of the above-mentioned economic and strategic benefits was
promised to the USSR. To many American observers, the Carter
administration's heretofore avowed policy of "even-handedness" in
dealing with Peking and Moscow was, by late 1979, being replaced by
a clear American "tilt" in favor of China.
Peking appreciated, and was indeed reassured by, this growing
shift in US policy. During the Chinese incursion into Vietnam in
early 1979, however, the PRC officials had shown some signs of
disappointment with the less than enthusiastic American position on
China's action. Their dissatisfaction with the US coincided with, and
was probably related to, a Chinese initiative in early April to start
talks to improve relations with the USSR. Indeed, by proposing to
negotiate with the USSR without preconditions, Peking made its
most serious diplomatic overture to Moscow in a decade.
Nevertheless, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979
destroyed the atmosphere for the talks and drove the PRC and the US
into an even closer strategic relationship vis-a-vis the USSR. Peking
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reacted strongly to the Soviet move. Its officials charged that the
invasion had posed a direct threat to China's security, marking the
most serious escalation of Soviet "expansionism" in more than ten
years. The PRC hoped that the US would adopt a more active
approach to the Middle East-South Asian region in order to
counteract the Soviet "threat." It signaled, to some observers, an even
keener interests in pursuing closer strategic cooperation with
Washington than i"n the past, an interest reflected during the PRC's
discussions with US Defense Secretary Harold Brown in Peking in
January 1980. Thanks to the development in Afghanistan, the
Chinese became more suspicious of Soviet motives in international
affairs, and this resulted in the suspension on January 20, 1980 of the
Sino-Soviet talks which had begun a year earlier.
The Soviet action in Afghanistan and the resulting furor in the
US undercut the arguments of those American policymakers who had
favored an even-handed approach toward Moscow and Peking.
China's strongly anti-Soviet reaction also weakened the contentions
of many Americans who had feared that the PRC could not be trusted
to maintain an anti-Soviet posture in coordination with Washington.
With the apparent demise of the former even-handed strategy, a
new American approach to China and the Soviet Union emerged
during Secretary Brown's visit to the PRC in January 1980. Although
the full details of the visit are not yet readily available, several of its
announced results clearly suggested that the US would side with
China to resist Soviet expansion in Asia. According to various press
accounts, the US agreed to sell a ground station to China, enabling
the PRC to receive data of possible military use from American
satellites. Washington also expressed its willingness to sell to Peking
an array of non-lethal military equipment, which could be expanded
in the future. Moreover, the two nations coordinated their strategies
to support Pakistan and other unspecified efforts (perhaps including
anti-Soviet Afghan forces) to thwart Soviet expansion in southwest
Asia. Finally, the US informed China that it would welcome Chinese
military help against Vietnam in whatever form Peking might
choose, if Vietnam should cross from Cambodian territory into
Thailand.

PROSPECTS
While the PRC will likely continue its current policy toward the
US and the USSR in the near future, longer term prospects remain
unclear. For example, Moscow's fears of Sino-American "collusion"
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can build to such a point that the USSR may decide to attack China,
the weakest link in the US-PRC encirclement effort, in the hope of
discrediting Peking's anti-Soviet posture and of disrupting its
relationship with Washington.
Furthermore, Peking's current emphasis on economic development and foreign trade can lead to serious disagreement with some
Asian countries and perhaps even with the developed nations of the
West. For instance, as the PRC increases its export of textiles,
electronics, and other consumer goods in order to pay for the recent
large increases in foreign imports, it may come into conflict with
other developing countries in Asia which are also increasing their
export of similar goods in order to pay their growing import bills.
This problem can become particularly acute if Japan and the major
developed nations of the West should decide to protect their
indigenous manufacturers of consumer products by limiting the
influx of such goods from overseas.
The unity of the Chinese leadership remains uncertain, and this
constitutes an unpredictable element in China's foreign policy. A
major political purge, similar to those which occurred during the
Cultural Revolution of 1966-1969, after the mysterious demise of Lin
Piao in 1971, and following Mao Tse-tung's death in 1976, can bring
about a significant reorientation in Peking's approach to foreign
affairs. Chinese leaders who are less favorable toward the US and
more flexible toward the USSR may gain power, and they may either
treat the superpowers more even-handedly or seek a guarded
rapprochement with Moscow. A reconciliation of Sino-Soviet relations
will probably not serve American interests. It can enhance Soviet
influence in Asia, and it may prompt the USSR to divert a large part
of its armed forces along the Chinese border to Europe and the
Middle East, thereby increasing pressure on the US and the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
The policies of the USSR and the US will also have an important
bearing on the future Chinese policy. The Brezhnev leadership has,
in recent years, apparently resigned itself to a continuing state of
controlled hostility in its relations with China, and has seemingly
concluded that it is impossible to reach significant compromise with
Peking over the border problem and other issues. After the death of
Brezhnev, however, Moscow may initiate policies which are more
forthcoming toward China, and it may also begin to reduce its forces
along the Chinese frontier. Since the PRC has long regarded the
withdrawal of Soviet troops as the necessary first step for a
settlement of the border dispute, its leaders may view such a move as
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a sign of Soviet goodwill. This can provide a basis for talks leading to
a Sino-Soviet reconciliation.
On the other hand, the Soviet leaders of the post-Brezhnev era
may increase their pressure on China. They may, for example,
encourage the Vietnamese to resist the PRC with force or attempt to
improve relations with the Nationalist government on Taiwan. Such
developments, if coupled with an expansion of Soviet naval and air
power along China's eastern and southern frontiers, may cause
Peking to react by attacking Vietnam and/or Taiwan. In accord with
its recently concluded "friendship" treaty with Vietnam, Moscow may
then respond with military pressure along the PRC's northern border.
This can lead to a major Sino-Soviet conflict.
The Soviet leaders may also use their military forces along the
northern border to occupy one of the more weakly defended frontier
regions, such as sections of Sinkiang. Such a move may start a
protracted war with the PRC, thus seriously discrediting the hard
line anti-Soviet policy currently followed by China. It may thereby
compel Peking to adopt a more accommodating stance. Any SinoSoviet armed conflict will certainly alarm neighboring states; reduce
economic development and stability in Asia, and confront the US
with the difficult task of deciding whether it should support China
against Soviet "hegemony" in Asia.
Similarly, any substantial shift in US foreign policy can lead to
important changes in China's behavior. For instance, Washington
may decide to continue to withdraw militarily from East Asia, to pull
back from bases in Korea and the Philippines, and to reduce the size
of both the US fleet in the western Pacific and the American forces in
Japan. Such actions will almost certainly change China's evaluation
of the US as a strategic counterweight to the USSR, especially if
Moscow should continue its steady military buildup in Asia. In
response, the Chinese may feel compelled to realign their policy
toward a reconciliation with the USSR, or they may rapidly increase
their air and naval power in order to "fill the vacuum" as the US
pulls back, a development which will probably alarm Japan, South
Korea, and other non-Communist states.
American usefulness to China may also be called into question if
Washington should again adopt policies with respect to Europe, the
Middle East, or US-Soviet arms control which would allow Moscow to
relax its military vigilance along the western front, while substantially increasing pressure on China. The PRC may then either resist
such pressure with force or seek reconciliation with the USSR.
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In sum, Peking will probably be encouragd to continue the
conventional policy it has generally pursued toward neighboring
countries over the past decade, and this policy will likely be highly
compatible with American interests in foreign affairs in the near
future, while unfavorable to the USSR. Changes in Peking's policy
will probably be caused either by changes in the PRC leadership
(stemming from the passing of Teng Hsiao-p'ing, a major setback in
China's ambitious economic programs, or some other domestic
difficulties), or by substantial shifts in the policies of the powerful
nations in the region, especially the US and the USSR. The various
scenarios explored above suggest that American interests may well
suffer if the PRC significantly alters its current foreign approach.
They also indicate that Sino-US bilateral relations may not serve as
an important source of leverage for Washington to prevent a major
change in China's foreign policy, a change which will likely be
damaging to the US position in East Asia.
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Chapter Three
TAIWAN: A CRUCIAL QUESTION IN UNITED STATESCHINA RELATIONS

Robert L. Worden
The words "crucial question" were used by the Chinese in
describing their position on Taiwan in the Shanghai Communique
signed by Premier Chou En-lai and President Richard M. Nixon on
February 28, 1972. According to this important document, the
Taiwan issue "is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of
relations" between the People's Republic of China CPRC) and the
United States (US). 1
In announcing the impending January 1, 1979 establishment of
diplomatic relations with the US, the PRC stated on December 15,
1979:
The question of Taiwan was the crucial issue obstructing the
normalization of relations between China and the United States.
It has now been resolved between the two countries in the spirit
of the Shanghai Communique and through their joint efforts. 2
Thus, after nearly three decades of dispute, the Taiwan question in
US-China relations was finally settled. This chapter will discuss the
history of the dispute primarily from the PRC's viewpoint. It will
analyze the efforts of the two nations to resolve the issue, and then
raise questions as to whether normalization did, in fact, solve the
long-standing Taiwan problem.

THE TAIWAN ISSUE IN RETROSPECT, 1950-1971
Sovereignty over Taiwan (previously known as Formosa) has
been a critical concern of various Chinese governments since at least
the seventeenth century. After facing Dutch, French, and British
threats, China lost the island to Japan under the Treaty of
1. "Joint Communique," Peking Review <Beijing Review since January 1979)
(hereinafter PRJ, No. 9 (March 3, 1972), pp. 4-5; emphasis added by author.
2. "Statement of the Chinese Government," PR, No. 51 <December 22, 1978), pp.
8-9; emphasis added by author.
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Shimonoseki of 1895. Taiwan was restored to China after Japan's
defeat in 1945.
The policy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) toward the
island had gone through several changes. In 1928, its leaders
accepted Taiwan's future political autonomy, while in 1943 they
allegedly supported an independence movement in the island. 3 Both
the Cairo Declaration of 1943 and the Potsdam Proclamation of 1945
called for the restoration of Taiwan to the Chinese after Japan's
defeat in World War II. In the post-1943 years and, in particular,
after the Liberation of 1949, the CCP policy shifted toward the
reintegration of the island with mainland China.
The role of the US in Taiwan began at least as early as the Cairo
and Potsdam accords. Its involvement intensified after 1945 as
Washington sided with Chiang Kai-shek in the Chinese civil war.
Nonetheless, when the Nationalists retreated to Taiwan after the
founding of the PRC in October 1949, President Harry Truman
decided against further involvement in China's domestic affairs. He
declared, in January 1950, that the US would not provide military
aid or advice to the Chinese forces on Taiwan; his administration
would not, moreover, seek to establish military bases on the island
"at this time." A corollary statement was issued several days later by
Secretary of State Dean Acheson who delineated the first line of
defense of the US in the West Pacific, a line which was drawn to the
east of (and therefore excluding) Taiwan. 4
Meanwhile, the defeated Nationalist forces consolidated their
control over the island and announced that they were ready to
recapture the mainland. The victorious Communist government, on
the other hand, became committed to the goal of liberating Taiwan.

3. Frank S. T. Hsiao and Lawrence R. Sullivan, "The Chinese Communist Party
and the Status of Taiwan, 1928-1943," Pacific Affairs (Vancouver), LII, No. 3 (Fall
1979), pp. 447, 464.
4. "United States Policy Toward Formosa, Statement by President Truman,
January 5, 1950," in Richard Moorsteen and Morton Abramowitz, Remaking China
Policy: US-China Relations and Governmental Decisionmaking (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1971), Document 3, pp. 93-94. See also Secretary of State
Dean Acheson's statement of January 12, 1950, partially quoted in Immanuel C. Y.
Hsu, The Rise of Modern China (2nd edition; New York: Oxford University Press,
1975), p. 929. William M. Bueler claims that the US, even after the outbreak of the
Korean War, considered its relations with the PRC to be more important than the
interests of both the Nationalist government on Taiwan and the native Taiwanese.
See Bueler, US China Policy and the Problem of Taiwan <Boulder: Colorado Associated
University Press, 1971), p. 20.
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The Korean War (1950-1953) precipitated new conditions for US
involvement in the Chinese civil war and, in effect, insured the
long-range maintenance of a Nationalist status quo on Taiwan. For
the next twenty-nine years, the US upheld a defensive arrangement
with Taipei that was anathema to Peking. Washington's recognition
of Taiwan as the sole government of China, as well as the stationing
of American military forces in and near the island, provided powerful
constraints on any solution to US-PRC problems.
Peking considered Washington's presence in Taiwan as an
aggressive violation of China's territorial integrity and an interference in its internal affairs. The US commitment to the Nationalist
government, coupled with the war in Korea, prompted the PRC to
reassess its plans for Taiwan's liberation. At the same time, political
debates in the US over the "loss" of China led Washington to
continue its generous support of Chiang Kai-shek.
The PRC increased its pressure against the Nationalist-held
coastal islands after the Korean armistice in 1953. As tension
mounted, Washington and Taipei moved to insure the security of
Taiwan and the Penghu Islands by concluding the Mutual Defense
Treaty on December 2, 1954.5 Ostensibly, the treaty affirmed both
nations' desire for peace in the West Pacific. In practice, it aimed at
preventing the PRC from using military forces against any Chinese
territories, except the coastal islands, held by the Nationalists. It
increased American involvement in Taiwan to a significant extent.
This dramatic development could not have been anticipated in 1949
when the Taiwan-related chain of events began.
Despite the enmity between Peking and Washington over the
Taiwan question, the two nations did attempt to resolve their
problems. At the Bandung Conference in April 1955, Chou En-lai
insisted that the PRC did not want a war with the US, and he
expressed his willingness to discuss with Washington for the purpose
of relaxing tensions in the Asia-Pacific region and, especially, the
Taiwan area. 6 Similarly, in his report to the Second Session of the
First National People's Congress (NPC) on July 20, 1955, Chou
emphasized that the Chinese people "were ready to seek the
liberation of Taiwan by peaceful means," maintaining that "there
was no lack of precedents for peaceful liberation." He noted, however,
5. For the full text of the treaty, see Moorsteen and Abramowitz, Remaking
China Policy, Document 5, pp. 96-99.
6. "Premier Chou En-lai's Statement on the Situation in the Taiwan Area, April
23, 1955," Moorsteen and Abramowitz, Remaking China Policy, Document 7, p. 103.
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that the possibility of"peacefulliberation" depended on Washington's
noninterference in China's internal affairs. 7
Indeed, prior to Chou's statements, the two nations had already
started to make serious efforts to defuse the hostile situation.
Beginning in 1954, bilateral talks were held in Geneva at the
consular and ambassadorial levels. They served to keep the two
governments in official contact while establishing their long-term
negotiating positions. The US tried to ask the PRC to promise not to
use force against the Nationalists, whereas Peking demanded the
withdrawal of American troops from the Taiwan area. After 1956, the
talks were shifted to Warsaw where PRC representatives maintained
a firm line. According to Peking, Taiwan was a part of China, and the
US military presence on the island was undesirable; it contributed to
tension in the Asia-Pacific region. Although the PRC did signal a
certain "willingness to adopt a flexible position over fundamental
Chinese national interests, including the recovery of Taiwan," cold
war politics on both sides prevented any conclusive results from the
talks. 8
The Indochina War in the 1960s and 1970s, as had the Korean
War before it, created additional tension which further delayed the
resolution of the Taiwan question. China's concern over encirclement
by its enemies became more apparent in the 1960s with alleged
threats not only from the US, but also from India and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). The formerly bipolar world had, by
the late 1960s, become sufficiently complex as to make both
Washington and Peking appreciate better the need for some form of
reconciliation. But the Taiwan issue remained, as always, a crucial
question for the two nations.
China's preoccupation with its domestic turmoil during the
activist phases of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1969) was greatly
altered by the increasing Soviet threat. Moscow's invasion of
Czechoslovakia in 1968 prompted Peking to start a new diplomatic
initiative. Ambassadorial relations were gradually resumed with
socialist countries, while overtures were made to neutral and
nonaligned nations. A new balance was sought between "politics of

7. Ibid., Document 8, p. 104.
8. Robert G. Sutter, China-Watch: Toward Sino-American Reconciliation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1978), p. 47. For a detailed analysis of the talks, see pp.
47-62. For the texts of proposals and counterproposals, see Moorsteen and Abramowitz,
Remaking China Policy, Document 9, pp. 105-109.
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Maoist insurrection and conventional diplomacy," as the PRC
adopted an increasingly pragmatic approach to foreign affairs. 9
In November 1968, Peking proposed to resume the US-China
Warsaw talks which had been suspended since the previous January.
The PRC's continued insistence on a Taiwan settlement, however,
made it politically difficult for the new Nixon administration to move
propitiously toward Peking. 10 It was therefore not until January 1970
that the Warsaw talks were finally resumed.
The extension of the Vietnam War into Cambodia, as well as the
US maneuverings in the United Nations (UN) on behalf of the
Republic of China (ROC), provided continued hindrances to any
accord. Despite the "ping-pong" diplomacy, the relaxation of China
trade barriers, and Nixon's surprise announcement that he would
visit the PRC, the US maintained what Peking perceived as a
"two-China" policy. The UN vote in October 1971, which resulted in
the admission of the PRC into the organization, relieved a significant
pressure point in US-China relations. Although Washington had
opposed Taiwan's expulsion to the last hour, the seating of Peking
was a necessary step toward any kind of US-PRC rapprochement.

SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE RELATIONS, 1972-1978 11
It took a long period (from February 28, 1972, when the
Shanghai Communique was promulgated, to December 15, 1978,
when the establishment of diplomatic relations was announced) for
Washington and Peking to find a mutually satisfactory formula for
normalization. While most countries breaking relations with Taipei
and establishing relations with Peking had to resolve the problem
from their own perspective, none, including Japan, had the same
connection with Taiwan as had the US. 12 During this era pf
"Shanghai Communique relations," there were many global and
bilateral developments which, eventually leading to normalization,
9. Robert G. Sutter, Chinese Foreign Policy After the Cultural Revolution,
1966-1971 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1978), pp. 7, 14.
10. For an analysis of the PRC overtures to the early Nixon administration, see
Sutter, China-Watch, pp. 63-82.
11. This section is based partially on a paper, "A perspective on US-China
Relations since the Shanghai Communique," presented at the annual meeting of the
Association for Asian Studies on March 31, ~978, and on a revision of that paper later
published in Asian Profile <Hong Kong), VII, No. 1 <February 1979l, pp. 1-16.
12. See US House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs,
Recognizing the People's Republic of China: The Experiences of Japan, Australia,
France, and West Germany (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1979>.
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confirmed the unique nature of US-China ties. The Shanghai
Communique was an important document because it allowed the two
sides to defer, somewhat ambiguously, the Taiwan issue while
pursuing their strategic relations. This was a compromise not
attainable in the seventeen years of Geneva and Warsaw talks. 13
President Nixon's visit to china and the promulgation of the
Shanghai Communique were significant first steps toward the
evolution of a new US-PRC relationship. Many American officials
and observers of the Chinese scene argued that friendly relations
between the two nations could be developed and maintained without
achieving normalization. Indeed, public opinion polls in the US in
1972-1978 favored a "two-China" policy, improving relations with
Peking without "abandoning" Taipei. The leadership on both sides of
the Pacific, however, persistently pressed forward on the issue of
normalization.
The years of 1972-1973, representing the early stage of the era of
"Shanghai Communique relations," were marked by such events as
the Nixon and Kissinger visits to China, the end of US military
involvement in Vietnam, the beginning of the withdrawal of
American forces from Taiwan, and the establishment of liaison offices
in Peking and Washington. These years witnessed real progress in
the normalization process and were characterized by an initial
enthusiasm in both nations. Many American delegations and individuals visited China, while reciprocal visits to the US by PRC
officials were restrained owing to the presence of ROC representatives in Washington and other American cities.
Chinese leadership and media hailed the new friendly contacts
although differences in principle continued to exist between the two
nations. 14 The deferment of the Taiwan question was emphasized in
November 1972 when Chou En-lai conceded that Taiwan was not the
foremost issue in US-China relations; he named Indochina as the
"key area" of differenceY Thus, after Washington signed the
13. For the complete text, see "Joint Communique," PR, No. 9 <March 3, 1972), pp.

4-5.
14. See, for example, "Strive for New Victories," the National Day joint editorial
in Jen-min jih-pao (hereinafter JMJP), Hung-ch'i [Red Flag], and Chief-fang chun pao
[Liberation Army Daily], October 1, 1972, as translated in PR, No. 40 (October 6,
1972), p. 9; and Ch'iao Kuan-hua's October 1972 speech to the UN General Assembly,
English text in PR, No. 41 (October 13, 1972), p. 4.
15. Interview with Australian journalists, Vienna Domestic Service, November 7,
1972, as quoted in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, People's
Republic of China (hereinafter FBIS-Cffi), November 10, 1972, p. All.
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"Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam" on
January 27, 1973, further progress was made in normalizing US-PRC
relations. Peking commended the peace in Vietnam for having "a
positive influence on reducing tension in Asia and the world." 16
Shortly afterward, the process of normalization accelerated and an
agreement was reached to establish liaison offices in Peking and
Washington. Significantly, Taiwan was not mentioned in this
agreement. 17
In 1973, China commemorated the February 28 Taiwan Uprising
of 1947. At a meeting in the Taiwan Hall of Peking's Great Hall of
the People, speakers stressed that it was the "common desire and
sacred duty" of the Chinese people, "including Taiwan compatriots,"
to liberate the island and unify China. For example, Liao Ch'engchih, an official responsible for Taiwan affairs in· the PRC, claimed
that "the domestic and international situations are now . . . very
favorable to the . . . struggle to liberate Taiwan." He cited the
Shanghai Communique and the talks between leaders of the US and
China as some of the "important victories" in foreign affairs, which
improved the situation for Taiwan's liberation. Fu Tso-yi, NPC vice
chairman and former Nationalist military leader, charged that "by
erroneously relying on the US, my former colleagues in Taiwan have
delayed the unification of the motherland for more than twenty
years." He also quoted the Shanghai Communique, arguing that
Washington had indeed "recognized" Taiwan as a part of China's
territory. According toFu, Henry A. Kissinger had indicated during
his February 1973 visit that the US favored "the peaceful resolution
of the disagreements between the mainland and Taiwan." Fu
interpreted this as a sign that Washington would no longer defend
Taiwan. As he argued, since the US had committed itself to peace in
the Asia-Pacific region, it would be "impossible" for Washington to
damage its process of normalizing relations with the PRC by
maintaining its existing ties with Taiwan for an extensive period of
time. Fu believed that the US valued its peaceful coexistence with
China more than its relations with the Nationalists. In an acknowledgment of Taipei's "Soviet card," Fu warned that the US would
not "allow Taiwan to 'cooperate' with anyone else to disrupt peace in

16. "Welcome the Signing of the Agreement on Vietnam," JMJP editorial,
January 28, 1973, English text in PR, No. 5 <February 2, 1973), pp. 6-7.
17. "Communique, February 22, 1973," PR, No.8 (February 23, 1973), p. 4.
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the Asia and Pacific region." He offered to meet either formally or
secretly with the Nationalist authorities for reunification talks! 8
In the speeches made later by Chou En-lai at the Tenth CCP
Congress in August 1973 and by Ch'iao Kuan-hua at the UN General
Assembly in October, they did not mention the Taiwan issue,
although Chou did imply that the People's Liberation Army (PLA)
was ready to liberate the island. Nonetheless, Vice Premier Teng
Hsiao-p'ing told a visiting Japanese delegation in October that the
settlement of the Taiwan question was a prerequisite for the
normalization of US-PRC relations. 19 This was his first public
statement on the subject, and he gradually emerged as China's
principal actor in the Washington-Peking negotiations.
In November 1973, Kissinger made a hi.gh-key visit to Peking
which belied the intensity of the debate among Chinese leaders over
Taiwan and US policies. The November communique, unlike the one
signed during Kissinger's February visit, made specific reference to
Taiwan. As Washington reaffirmed, "all Chinese on either side of the
Taiwan Strait maintain that there is but one China and that Taiwan
is a part of China;" the US also reiterated its intention not to
challenge this position. The Chinese again insisted that relations
with Washington could only be normalized in accordance with "the
principle of one China."20
The year 1974 was a difficult one in US-PRC relations.
Disagreements in Peking over Taiwan and US policies came to the
fore. The annual commemoration of the February 28 Uprising
displayed a more militant tone than in 1973. Fu Tso-yi, for instance,
called for the liberation of Taiwan "at an early date," emphasizing
that the "choice of means" (by peaceful methods or by force) was
China's internal affair. He warned the Nationalist military personnel
that the Taiwan Strait was "no longer an obstacle" to the liberation
process. 21
In April, Chiang Ch'ing's "Chu Lan" writing group issued a
scathing criticism of the "bourgeois" music that the Philadelphia
Orchestra had played in Peking eight months earlier. In the same

18. "'February 28' Uprising in Taiwan Province Marked," PR, No. 10 <March 9,
1973), pp. 10-11, 21.
19. Quoted in FBIS-CHI, October 16, 1973, p. A.15.
20. "Secretary of State Kissinger in Peking," PR, No. 46 <No¥ember 16, 1973J, pp.
6-7; and "Communique," PR, No. 46, p. 10.
21. "Peking Meeting Commemorates 27th Anniversary of February 28 Uprising in
Taiwan Province," PR, No. 10 (March 8, 1974J, pp. 18-20.
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month, Teng Hsiao-p'ing appeared at the UN Special Session on Raw
Materials and Development. He announced Peking's new foreign
policy on the "three worlds," with explicit attacks on the two
superpowers. 22
Other setbacks in the normalization process included Chou
En-lai's hospitalization with a terminal illness and Richard Nixon's
resignation from the US presidency. To provide additional ammunition to those in Peking who were opposed to the US-China initiative,
Washington appointed a new ambassador to Taipei. It also allowed
two new ROC consulates to open in the US, thus bringing to a total of
five such openings since the promulgation of the Shanghai Communique
In October 1974, Teng attracted attention on the Taiwan issue
during a reception for overseas Chinese, including some overseas
Taiwanese. He stated that the US recognition of the island as an
inseparable part of PRC territory had been a prerequisite for the
signing of the Shanghai Communique and the exchange of liaison
offices. He expressed his hope for a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan
question, but he insisted that such a settlement was not feasible
while Chiang Kai-shek and his son, Ching-kuo, remained in power; a
"non-peaceful" method should not, therefore, be excluded from
consideration. He called for further "development of patriotic forces"
in Taiwan, since they could play an important role in the island's
liberation. He compared the Tiaoyu (Senkaku) Islands issue in
Japan-China relations with the Taiwan issue in US-PRC rapprochement. In 1972, Peking had put aside the differences on the Tiaoyu
Islands when diplomatic relations were established with Tokyo. 23
Teng's implication on the subject of Taiwan was subtle but apparent.
A late 1974 visit to China by Senate Democratic leader Mike
Mansfield shed new light on the state of US-PRC relations. After
meeting with Chou En-lai, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, and Ch'iao Kuan-hua,
he returned to Washington to write a glowing tribute to Mao
Tse-tung's China. Nevertheless, he also noted that US-China relations had reached a "plateau," with the Taiwan issue blocking further
progress toward normalization. According to Mansfield, in order for
the US to follow the "Japanese formula" in its relations with the PRC

22. "Chairman of Delegation of People's Republic of China Teng Hsiao-p'ing's
Speech at Special Session of UN General Assembly," Supplement to PR, No. 15 !April
12, 1974).
23. Ch'i-shih nien-t'ai [The Seventies) <Hong Kong), December 1974, pp. 15-17, as
translated in FBIS-CHI, December 10, 1974, p. El-7.
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and Taiwan, Washington would have to fulfill Peking's "three
preconditions" by terminating the Mutual Defense Treaty with
Taiwan, withdrawing all US troops from the island, and severing·
diplomatic relations with the ROC. 24
In this report to the Fourth NPC in January 1975, Chou noted
the continuation of "fundamental differences" between China and the
US, and he emphasized the need to carry out "in earnest" the
principles of the Shanghai Communique. In his brief comments on
Taiwan, he reiterated the PRC's determination to liberate the island,
and he maintained that Peking was militarily ready for this
endeavor. 25
When the commemorative meeting of the February 28 Uprising
was held in 1975, Fu Tso-yi had died. Liao Ch'eng-chih became the
keynote speaker, and he hailed the "revolutionary spirit" of the
Taiwanese people. 26 For the first time, a significant number of
military leaders were present in the meeting. Among the notable
examples were Yeh Chien-ying, Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien, and Yang
Ch'eng-wu.
There were relatively minor problems in the US-China-ROC
relations. Peking was angered, for example, when the Department of
State cancelled the scheduled Chinese Performing Arts Troupe tour
of the US. Washington had objected to the inclusion of the song,
"People of Taiwan, Our Own Brothers," in the program, yet China
argued that the US position was unwarranted and in contravention of
the spirit of the Shanghai Communique. As the PRC pointed out,
both nations had agreed that the Taiwan question was an internal

24. For the "three preconditions," see Mike Mansfield, China: A Quarter Century
After the Founding of the People's Republic (Washington, D.C.: US Government
Printing Office, 1975), p. 23. These "preconditions" can be dated back at least to 1955
when they were stated in the following form: withdrawal of all US troops and bases
from Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait and; the establishment of a relationship based on
the five principles of peaceful coexistence. In Peking's viewpoint, US respect for the
principles of territorial integrity and noninterference in internal affairs implied that
Washington recognized Taiwan as a part of the PRC, thus precluding any possible US
diplomatic or defense ties with Taipei. See Seymour Topping's interview with Chou
En·lai, June 21, 1971, in Topping, Journey Between Two Chinas <New York: Harper &
25. Chou En-lai, "Report on the Work of the Government," in Documents of the
First Session of the Fourth National People's Congress <Peking: Foreign Languages
Press, 1975), p. 58.
26. "28th Anniversary of February 28 Uprising of People in Taiwan Province
Commemorated," PR, No. 10 (March 7, 19751, pp. 14-17.
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affair in which no foreign country had the right to interfere.
Washington was accused of "retreating'' from its commitment to the
Shanghai Communique, as well as violating its principles. 27
The year 1975 drew to a close with a spectacular show of
American visitors to Peking. A "World Affairs" delegation was
headed by Cyrus Vance, chairman of the Board of the Rockefeller
Foundation, who would later become secretary of state in the Carter
administration. He met with Teng Hsiao-p'ing on October 11, 1975,
and they debated about China's US policy. The delegation also raised
the issue of the song about Taiwan. Teng expressed the hope that
American behavior in the incident did not reflect a "retreat" from the
normalization process. 28
Before the year's end, Henry Kissinger made two visits to China,
the latter one with President Gerald Ford. The Chinese were
obviously unhappy with Ford's reluctance to act on the Taiwan issue
before the 1976 election. Ford had found it politically difficult to
break with the Nationalists in the same year as the collapse of
US-supported regimes in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. As a result,
no communique was issued at the end of the negotiations, and no
significant progress was made. 29
China's displeasure with the Ford administration was emphasized in a well-publicized reception by Mao Tse-tung of Julie Nixon
Eisenhower on New Year's Eve. To demonstrate his appreciation for
Richard Nixon's initiative toward normalizing relations with the
PRC, Mao invited the former president to visit China again. This
action had considerable effect on American politics in an election
year. At one point, Ford feared that this might cost him his victory in
an early primary race.
In general, 1976 constituted a vacuum in US-China relations.
The deaths of Chou En-lai in January, Chu Teh in July, and Mao
Tse-tung in September were accompanied by the second dismissal of
Teng Hsiao-p'ing in April, the ascendancy of Hua Kuo-Feng in the
same month, and the political demise of the so-called "Gang of Four"
in October. These tumultuous events provided too many uncertainties
for any progress to be made in the faltering normalization process.

27. "US Unreasonably Cancels Chinese Performing Arts Troupe's Tour," PR, No.
15 (April 11, 1975), pp. 10, 21. The song about Taiwan was not part of its repertoire
when the PRC troupe toured the US in 1978.
28. John H. Knowles, China Diary (New York: Rockefeller Foundation, 1976), pp.
78-79.
29. Sutter, China-Watch, p. 112.
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Visits to China by ex-President Nixon and ex-Secretary of Defense
James Schlesinger were played up for their pro-Shanghai Communique and anti-Soviet symbolisms.
The Taiwan factor in this chaotic year was high-lighted on at
least two occasions. At the commemorative meeting of the February
28 Uprising, Liao Ch'eng-chih stressed the "contradictions" among
the Taiwan authorities and the general "state of unrest" in the
island. Although Peking claimed to continue its liberation policy, the
meeting clearly emphasized, instead, the importance of the Taiwan
people to liberate themselves. Moreover, despite the presence of such
PLA leaders as Ch'en Hsi-lien and Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien, military
participation in this meeting was much more subdued than in 1975. 30
In an alleged August 24 speech to graduates of the Institute of
Diplomacy in Peking, Keng Piao, director of the CCP International
Liaison Department, contradicted earlier PRC statements on USTaiwan policy. He reportedly insisted that the US had not yet
accepted the principle of "one China" as a major premise for
normalization. Although he believed that Taiwan was still the
"greatest obstacle" to US-PRC relations, he conceded, in an allusion
to the Soviet threat, that it was not the most important issue of
mutual concern. 31
The year 1977 saw a resurgence of normalization activity.
Peking's Ministry of Foreign Affairs explained that post-Mao China's
openings to the US were "important strategic policy decisions," and it
cited the Shanghai Communique as the basis for all future relations.
It argued, however, that Washington was still "forcibly occupying
Taiwan," thereby creating a continually abnormal situation. 32 On a
later occasion, a Foreign Ministry spokesman expressed the hope that
the new Carter administration would respect the Shanghai Communique and fulfill the "three preconditions" for normalization. 33
30. "29th Anniversary of February 28 Uprising of People in Taiwan Province
Commemorated," PR, No. 10 (March 5, 1976), pp. 12-13.
31. "Keng Piao's Talks on 'A Turning Point in China-US Diplomatic Relations'
(Excerpts)," Chinese Law & Government, X, No. 1 (Spring 1977). The original source
was identified as Fei-ch'ing yueh-pao [Bandit Affairs Monthly) <Taipei), XIX, No. 7
(January 1977), pp. 105-106.
32. "Premier Chou Creatively Carried Out Chairman Mao's Revolutionary Line in
Foreign Affairs," PR, No. 5 (January 28, 1977), pp. 11-12.
33. See the interview which Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Yu Chan had with
the managing editor of Mainichi shimbun on Febuary 5, 1977, as reported by Agence
France-Presse, Hong Kong, February 6, 1977; quoted in FBIS-CHI, February 7, 1977,
p. All.
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The thirtieth anniversary of the February 28 Uprising brought
forth a number of anti-US criticisms. Liao Ch'eng-chih, for instance,
condemned the formulas of "two Chinas," "one China, one Taiwan,"
"one China, two governments," and the "independence on Taiwan."
The 1976 theme of self-liberation continued; many expressed the
attitude of "let bygones be bygones" toward those Taiwan residents
"wishing to take the patriotic road."34
According to interviews with key Chinese leaders before the
arrival in Peking of Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, the PRC insisted
that Taiwan was a "remaining question" in US-China relations. Vice
Premier Chi Teng-k'uei dismissed Washington's desire for a "peaceful
solution" as an interference in China's internal affairs, and Vice
Minister of Foreign affairs Yu Chan charged that Taiwan was a
stumbling block to normalization. 35 The pressure on Washington
increased in July 1977, when Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien told former
US Chief of Naval Operations Elmo Zumwalt that the "three
preconditions" could not be dispensed with in the US-PRC negotiations for normalization. 36 This was the first time that the Chinese
press attributed to a specific PRC leader the demand for the
fulfillment of the "three preconditions," and it was indicative of
Peking's determination to exert its will. Li later argued that the US
had already accepted in the Shanghai Communique the "one China"
concept; in spite of this, however, Taiwan continued to be the "focus
of our differences." 37
Shortly before Vance's visit to China in late August, Minister of
Foreign Affairs Huang Hua expressed his dissatisfaction with
34. "Peking Marks 30th Anniversary of 'February 28' Uprising by People of
Taiwan Province," PR, No. 10 (March 4, 1977), pp. 4-6. Another article in the same
issue expressed similar sentiments on the subject of self-liberation. See "Preparing for
the Liberation of Taiwan," pp. 7-8.
35. See Chi Teng-k'uei's interview on May 15, 1977, with a Yomiuri delegation, as
reported in Ta-kung pao [L'impartial] <Hong Kong), May 17, 1977, p. 1; quoted in
FBIS-CHI, May 18, 1977, p. Nl. Chi also demanded, in a meeting with a delegation of
the US Committee on Scholarly Communications with the PRC in mid-June, that the
US carry out the "three preconditions." See Fox Butterfield, "China Rebuffs US Aid to
Widen Scholarly and Scientific Visits," New York Times, June 29, 1977, p. A6. For Yu
Chan's interview with Swedish military commentator Stig Lofgren in early June, see
Svenska Dagbladet (Stockholm), August 12, 1977, as translated in FBIS-CHI, August
25, 1977, p. A2.
36. "Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien on Sino-American Relations," PR, No. 29 (July
15, 1977), p. 3.
37. Svenska Dagbladet, August 14, 1977, as translated in FBIS-CHI, August 18,
1977, p. E1-5. The interview took place on July 25 with Gnistan editor Stefan
Lindgren.
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Washington's normalization efforts, and he stated that he did not
expect any meaningful progress toward that end in the next one or
two years. He suggested that the major problem between the two
nations was not the Taiwan issue, but rather the US attitude toward
the USSR. 38 Nevertheless, in his report to the Eleventh CCP
Congress, Chairman Hua Kuo-feng stressed the importance of the
"three preconditions," and he expressed the PRC's determination to
liberate Taiwan. He argued that this was an internal affair in which
China would not tolerate any US interference. 39
The Vance visit reaffirmed the status of the "Shanghai Communique relations." Washington's optimism, however, was dispelled
in early September when Teng Hsiao-p'ing, who had been reinstated
in July, told Associated Press and Japanese Diet delegations that the
visit had actually been a retrogression. According to him, Gerald
Ford had promised to break diplomatic relations with Taipei if he
would be reelected. Moreover, Teng revealed that he had earlier
rejected Washington's proposal to establish a US liaison office in
Taipei, while sending a full diplomatic mission to Peking. He
condemned this suggestion as an attempt to play "two cards," with
the PRC against Taiwan. 40 Yet, he was clearly willing to compromise.
As he had told Vance in their talks, although Taiwan was an internal
issue, the PRC would consider the special conditions on the island
and try to solve the problem with the US.
Peking's displeasure with President Carter's seeming weakness
vis-a-vis the USSR continued to be tied to the normalization issue. In
October, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Yu Chan told the editors of
Wall Street Journal and Asian Wall Street Journal that the Soviet
threat was more important to China than the Taiwan question,
although he insisted that the PRC would not compromise its basic
stand on the island. 41 In the same month, Teng asked all countries,
including the US, to unit against Moscow. 42 Shortly afterward, a
38. See report of Huang Hua's speech to Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials in
late July, Agence France-Presse, Hong Kong, October 17, 1977, as quoted in FBIS-CHI,
October 18, 1977, p. Al.
39. Hua Kuo-feng, "Political Report to the 11th National Congress of the
Communist Party of China, August 12, 1977," PR, No. 35 <August 26, 1977), p. 42.
40. Louis Boccardi, "Teng Says Vance Trip Set Back Normal Ties," New York
Times, September 7, 1977, pp. A1, A2.
41. Warren H. Phillips, "Peking's Posture," Asian Wall Street Journal <Hong
Kong), October 20, 1977, pp. 1, 6.
42. Interview by Claude Roussel, chairman and managing director of Agence
France-Presse, October 20, 1977, as quoted in FBIS-CHI, October 21, 1977, pp. A1-4.
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lengthy Jen-min jih-pao [People's Daily] (JMJP) article likewise
called for the creation of a broad united front. It quoted Mao
Tse-tung's 1970 statement that he had placed "great hopes" on the
American people. Interestingly, the article compared the US "invasion and occupation" of Taiwan with the Soviet occupation of China's
northeastern and northwestern borderland; both threatened the
PRC's territorial integrity and national security.•a
The year 1978 started with several positive moves toward
normalization. Senators Edward Kennedy and Henry Jackson, both
in favor of the process, visited China in January and February,
respectively. They met with Teng, Huang Hua, and other Chinese
leaders.
At the Fifth NPC, which began in February, Premier Hua
Kuo-feng emphasized his government's resolute opposition to the
concept of "two Chinas." He declared that the PRC had placed its
hopes on the people of Taiwan who struggled against Chiang
Ching-kuo. He remained firm, however, on China's right to use force
to support Taiwan's liberation. The new PRC constitution echoed the
general policies on national reunification. 44
Peking used the annual commemoration of the February 28
Uprising as a forum to delineate further what the CCP leaders
perceived as the instability of the Nationalist authorities and to hail
the "glorious revolutionary tradition" of the compatriots on the
island. The PRC encouraged military and administrative personnel
in Taiwan, Penghu, Quemoy, and Matsu to "take the patriotic road,"
while urging the US to accept the "three preconditions" and to give
up any "two China" illusions. 45
In May, President Carter's anti-Soviet national security adviser,
Zbigniew Brzezinski, visited China. Both governments agreed on the
strategic aspects of the US-China relationship, but neither brought
up the Taiwan issue in subsequent public statements. The way was
apparently cleared for final normalization talks. Privately, Brzezinski told Hua Kuo-feng and Teng Hsiao-p'ing that Leonard Woodcock,
43. "Chairman Mao's Theory of the Differentiation of the Three Worlds Is a Major
Contribution to Marxism-Leninism," PR, No. 45 <November 4, 1977!, pp. 10-41.
44. Hua Kuo-feng, "Unite and Strive to Build a Modern Powerful Socialist
Country! Report on the Work of the Government, February 26, 1978," PR, No. 10
(March 10, 1978), p. 35; and "The Constitution of the People's Republic of China, March
5, 1978," PR, No. 11 (March 17, 1978), p. 6.
45. "CPPCC [Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference] Meeting Marks
31st Anniversary of Taiwan Uprising,' New China News Agency (hereinafter NCNA),
Peking, February 28, 1978, as quoted in FBIS-CHI, March 1, 1978, pp. 09-15.
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who headed the US liaison Office, was prepared to begin "serious
negotiations" on the process of normalization. He also assured that
the Carter administration would not object to the antihegemony
clause in the Treaty of Peace and Friendship, which was about to be
concluded by the PRC and Japan. 46

NORMALIZATION AND THE FUTURE
The final normalization talks were highly secretive, with their
share of reversals. The determination of Jimmy Carter and Teng
Hsiao-p'ing to accomplish the task with a specific deadline in mind
kept the momentum going. The Chinese insisted on their "three
preconditions," while the US offered three "preconditions" of its own:
(1) continuation of commercial and cultural ties with Taiwan; (2) a
statement on the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question; and (3)
the right to sell arms to the Nationalists after the completion of the
normalization process.
In late October, according to Teng, normalization negotiations
were in progress, and the Taiwan issue remained the "only
hindrance."47 The Chinese urged that Washington should not allow
its desire to maintain good relations with Moscow to be an
impediment to US-China relations.
On December 15, 1978, China and the US simultaneously
announced their decision to normalize relations on January 1, 1979.
In a joint communique, the two nations reaffirmed the principles of
the Shanghai Communique, including the antihegemony clause, and
they stressed that normalization not only served the interests of the
Chinese and American peoples, but was also conducive to the cause of
peace in Asia and the world.
The Taiwan question was addressed in two separate parts of the
communique. Washington noted its recognition of the PRC as the sole
legal government of China, and stated that "within this context, the
people of the US will maintain cultural, commercial, and other
unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan." Washington also
acknowledged "the Chinese position that there is but one China and
Taiwan is part of China."48
46. "Dr. Brzezinski in Peking," PR, No. 21 !May 26, 1978), pp.4-6; and Martin
Tolchin, "How China and the US Toppled Barrier to Normalized Relations," New York
Times, December 18, 1978, pp. Al, Al2.
47. "Vice Premier Teng at Tokyo Press Conference: New Upsurge in Friendly
Relations Between China and Japan," PR, No. 44 !November 3, 1978l, pp. 14-15.
48. "Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between PRC and USA," PR, No. 51
<December 22, 1978), p. 8.
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The communique did not explicitly address any of the Chinese
"preconditions," although they were implicitly conceded in the US
recognition of the PRC and its acknowledgment of Chinese sovereignty claims over Taiwan. The document also accepted the US "precondition" of continuing cultural, commercial, and other "unofficial
relations" with Taiwan. Despite a unilateral declaration in President
Carter's announcement, many American critics regarded the want of
a clause in the joint communique on the peaceful resolution of the
Taiwan issue as a major mistake on the part of Washington.
The two governments attempted to clarify the nature of their
new relationship. Carter announced that the US would continue to
have an interest in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue, and
he maintained that normalization would not jeopardize the wellbeing
of the island. Simultaneously, the Department of State declared that
the US would terminate the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan a
year later in accordance with Article 10 and would withdraw its
remaining military personnel in four months. Washington would
henceforth have no "official government representation" in Taiwan;
neither would it have "diplomatic relations with" the Nationalist
government. The US would, however, adjust its laws and regulations
in order to maintain its commercial, cultural, and other nongovernmental relationships with the people of the island. 49 Moreover,
despite Peking's opposition to US arms sales to Taiwan, Washington
announced its decision to continue to supply "carefully chosen
defensive military equipment" to Taiwan after the termination of the
defense treaty on December 31, 1979. 50
On the other hand, the PRC noted in an official statement that
the "crucial issue" of Taiwan had been resolved between China and
the US. "As for the way of bringing Taiwan back to the embrace of
the motherland and unifying the country," Peking insisted, "it is
entirely China's internal affair." Apparently, Washington had been
able to persuade the PRC to drop the term "liberation" from its
rhetoric in favor of a less aggressive phrase. 51
In an unprecedented press conference, Hua Kuo-feng provided
further clues to Peking's Taiwan policy in the post-normalization era.
He reiterated the PRC stand that Taiwan was a part of Chinese
territory, stressed the theme of reunification, and acknowledged that
49.
of State
50.
51.

"Normalization of Relations with the People's Republic of China," Department
News Release, December 15, 1978.
"US Arms Sales to Taiwan," GIST: Department of State, January 1979.
"Statement of Chinese Government," PR, No. 51 (December 22, 1978), pp. 8-9.
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the US would only be allowed under the new diplomatic arrangement
to have unofficial relations with the people of the island. Hua also
revealed that the two nations had disagreed over the US decision to
continue arms sales to Taiwan after normalization; according to
Peking, such sales would "not conform to the principles of normalization, would be detrimental to the peaceful liberation of Taiwan, and
would exercise an unfavorable influence on the peace and stability of
the Asia-Pacific region." Hua maintained that the PRC "absolutely
would not agree" to the sales. 52
During the first year or so after normalization, both the US and
the PRC were determined to have their own way on the Taiwan
question, even though the issue had been declared "resolved" in their
public statements. Chinese leaders announced that the return of
Taiwan was "now on the agenda," and they hoped that the task would
be accomplished "at an early date." 53 This was a somewhat surprising
statement, since the island's reunification with the mainland had
been a general policy of the PRC since 1949. The NPC maintained
that Peking would "take present realities" into account during the
process of political reunification. The PRC would, for example,
respect the status quo in Taiwan, achieve reunification without loss
to the people of the island, establish transportation and postal
services between Taiwan and the mainland at an early date, and
develop trade relations. The NPC also applauded the Nationalist
authorities for their "firm stand" on the concept of "one China," as
well as for their opposition to an independent Taiwan. 54 As a gesture
toward the US and as an affirmation of the belief that normalization
had lessened tensions in the area, the defense minister of the PRC
ordered the termination of the shelling of the offshore islands. 55 In
52. "Chairman Hua Gives Press Conference," PR, No. 51 <December 22, 1978), pp.
9-11. For the full texts of Carter's announcement and the US government statement,
see pp. 11-12.
53. "An Unusual New Year's Day: Three Salient Points," PR, No. 1 (January 5,
1979), p. 4, quoting a speech by Teng as chairman of the CPPCC; and "NPC Standing
Committee: Message to Compatriots in Taiwan," pp. 16-17.
54. "NPC Standing Committee," pp. 16-17; and NCNA (Peking), February 28,
1979, in FBIS-CHI, March 1, 1979, p. Cl.
55. "Shelling of Jinmen [Quemoy] and Other Islands Stopped," PR, No.1 (January
5, 1979), p. 4. See also Ralph N. Clough, "The Taiwan Issue in Sino-American
Relations," in William J. Barnds (ed.), China and America: The Search for a New
Relationship (New York: New York University Press, 1977), with regard to the need
for the PRC to induce and pressure the US, Japan, and Taiwan in order to bring
Taiwan back under mainland control. According to Clough, such inducements and
pressures were necessary because Peking was afraid of both an independent Taiwan
and Soviet support of the Nationalists on the island (p. 157).
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domestic politics in Peking, the Revolutionary Committee of the
Kuomintang and the Taiwan Self-Government League gained new
prominence in 1979 and 1980.
Teng Hsiao-p'ing's visit to the US in January and February 1979
marked the real beginning of the normalization period, with both
governments emphasizing their mutual concern for global affairs. In
the Teng-Carter joint communique of February 1, the two leaders
noted their areas of "common interest" and "differing perspectives" in
the international situation, and they made no mention of Taiwan. 56
Nonetheless, in an interview with four American television network
commentators, Teng stated that his government would "try our very
best by peaceful means" to bring about a reunification of Taiwan with
the mainland. While recognizing the US determination to resist any
PRC use of force against Taiwan, Teng insisted that non-peaceful
actions would result only if the Nationalist authorities should refuse
to negotiate with Peking for a peaceful reunification. 57 He rejected
any suggestion that China should renounce its right to use force. He
must have reiterated these points in his private talks with US
officials, although there was no reference to Taiwan in the joint
communique
·
In March 1979, the US Congress passed the Taiwan Relations
Act, which formalized the US stand, as enunciated by the Department of State in mid-December 1978, that Taiwan's future should be
determined by peaceful means. This new act further declared that a
threat to the island would be considered a threat to the peace and
security of the Western Pacific; it would also be of "grave concern" to
the US. In an appropriate application of the "Japanese formula," the
act, too, provided for the establishment of the American Institute in
Taiwan, which would henceforth be responsible for the "nongovernment" affairs of the American people on the island. Taipei
created the Coordination Council for North American Affairs to serve
similar purposes for its people in the US.
The PRC regarded the act as interference in its internal affairs,
and it was particularly piqued by the provision that Washington
56. "Joint Sino-US Press Communique," NCNA !Peking), February 1, 1979, as
reported in FBIS-CHI, February 2, 1979, pp. A3-4. As Ralph Clough argues, even after
normalization, there would be "little room to expect that this act would lead to the
early peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question." See Clough, "Taiwan Issue," p. 150;
and his book, Island China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978>, pp.
202ft'.
57. "In Washington: Interview with Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping [Teng Hsiaop'ing] by US TV Commentators," PR, No. 7 (February 16, 1979), pp. 19-20.
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would continue to sell defensive arms to Taiwan despite the
termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty. 58 Minister of Foreign
Affairs Huang Hua informed US Ambassador Leonard Woodcock that
Carter's support of the Congress on this issue would cause "great
harm" to the new relationship between Peking and Washington. The
Chinese media likewise charged that the act was "tantamount to
saying the US will continue to regard Taiwan as a 'country' and the
Taiwan authorities as a 'government.' "59
Chinese criticism of the act, however, diminished after the initial
flurry. Peking's attention was somewhat diverted by two Taiwanrelated court cases in the US. The first involved a suit filed to allow
Taiwan's athletes to participate in the US 1980 Olympic Games,
using the ROC flag and anthem. In Peking's opinion, a decision in
Taipei's favor would result in a "serious political problem," but, as it
turned out, the athletes were barred from the games. The second
case, which went as far as the US Supreme Court, involved President
Carter's authority to terminate the Mutual Defense Treaty with
Taiwan. In spite of reversals in lower courts, the Supreme Court
ruled in mid-December 1979 that the President had the authority to
terminate the treaty on December 31, 1979.
Vice President Walter Mondale's visit to China in August 1979
evoked expressions of satisfaction with the progress in US-PRC
relations. Teng Hsiao-p'ing continued to be disturbed by Washington's Taiwan policies and demanded that the US act in strict
accordance with the principles of the bilateral agreement on establishing diplomatic relations. In an apparent return to the prenormalization line, Li Hsien-nien later told an American interviewer
that complete agreement on the Taiwan question had not yet been
reached. 60
When Peking announced its long-range goals for the 1980s as the
new decade began, they included the following three major points: (1)
opposition to the Soviet Union; (2) modernization in China; and (3)
reunification of Taiwan with the mainland. Although there is

58. For the text of the Taiwan Relations Act, see Hungdah Chiu (ed.), China and
the Taiwan Issue (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1979), Document 35, pp. 266-75. Vice
Minister of National Defense Su Yu called the act a "breach of trust" on the part of the
US; see his interview with Japanese defense instructors, March 13, 1980, as quoted in
FBIS-CHI, March 14, 1980, p. D2.
59. NCNA (Peki,l)g), March 23, 1979, in FBIS-CHI, March 26, 1979, pp. K1-2.
60. Interview with New York Times managing editor, Seymour Topping, cited by
NCNA (Peking), September 27, 1979, in FBIS-CHI, October 5, 1979, p. B5.
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sufficient support in Mao Tse-tung's teachings to postpone the
solution of the Taiwan problem for some years, there are limits to
Peking's flexibility on the issue. 61
As more conciliatory policies gained influence in the PRC, the
annual commemoration of the February 28 Uprising was not held in
1980. Peking was perhaps afraid that such an uprising in the future
might lead to an independent Taiwan, thereby creating problems for
political reunification. Though seldom publicly expressed, the CCP
leaders have also entertained the concern of possible Soviet involvement in the island. Such situations will likely drive Peking to act
cautiously to protect its short-term interests. The PRC will tolerate
the continued US presence in Taiwan, as long as it does not
contribute to either independence or Soviet involvement, and as long
as the Washington-Peking strategic relationship will remain benefica! to China.
Peking has vital interests in the stability of Taiwan's economy
because of its future potential benefit to China after some form of
reunification has taken place. The US influence on the island's
stability and its resolve to take a firm stand against the Soviet
Union's strategic maneuverings are both sensitive factors in Peking's
policy toward Washington. The latter is the more critical issue in
post-normalization US-China relations. Should the US resolve
against Soviet threats weaken, the Washington-Peking entente will
be affected, and the PRC will probably readjust its timetable for
action on Taiwan reunification. Conversely, should the US remain an
influential force both globally and in the Asia-Pacific region,
Taiwan's status quo will likely be maintained in the near future.
Hence, the "crucial question" of Taiwan remains to be settled, and it
will continue to affect the relations between Washington and Peking
in the coming years.

61. Hungdah Chiu, "The Question of Taiwan in Sino-American Relations," in
Chiu (ed.), China and the Taiwan Issue, pp. 192-93. For discussions of postnormalization US-Taiwan relations and Taiwan's international status after normalization, see ibid., pp. 186-88; and Chiu's articles, "Certain Legal Aspects of Recognizing
the People's Republic of China," in Journal of International Law, II, No. 2 !spring
1979), pp. 404-16; and "The Outlook for Taiwan," Asian Affairs, VII, No. 3
(January-February 1980), pp. 137-48; as well as William R. Kinter and John F. Copper,
A Matter of Two Chinas: The China-Taiwan Issue in US Foreign Policy !Philadelphia:
Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1979).
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Chapter Four
UNIFICATION AND MODERNIZATION: TWO DIMENSIONS
OF CHINA'S NEW TAIWAN POLICY
Byron S. J. Weng

In a speech to the Standing Committee of the Chinese People's
Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) on January 1, 1979, Teng
Hsiao-p'ing claimed that the New Year's Day of 1979 was unique,
since it was marked by the following three salient points: (1) the
focusing of the nation's work on the "Four Modernizations;" (2) the
normalization of relations between China and the United States (US)
and; (3) the presence on the agenda of the return of Taiwan to the
motherland and the reunification of the country. 1 On the same day,
the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NCP)
issued a "Message to Compatriots in Taiwan," launching a new "soft
offensive." It called for an end to military confrontation on the
Taiwan Strait, the establishment of links in transportation and
postal services, the development of economic ties and trade relations,
and the initiation of academic, cultural, technological, and sports
exchanges. 2 Thereafter, in a series of overtures, Peking moderated its
conditions for reunification negotiations with Taipei. Apparently,
Taiwan could maintain its status quo if it would only abandon its
official name, lower its flag, and recognize Peking as the national
capital.
Taipei's official response was negative. Premier Sun Yun-suan
maintained that the Republic of China (ROC) would never engage in

1. See "Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation, January-March 1979," China
Quarterly (hereinafter CQ), No. 78 (June 1979), pp. 400-403; Beijing Review (known as
Peking Review until December 1978) (hereinafter PR), XXII, No. 1 (January 5, 1979),
p. 4.
2. This message appeared in Jen-min jih-pao [People's Daily] (hereinafter
JMJP), on New Year's Day under the leading headline on the front page. For the
English text, see PR, XXII, No. 1, pp. 16-17.
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a negotiation to surrender. Instead, he challenged the Peking
government to give up Communism. 3
On the New Year's Day of 1980, Teng Hsiao-p'ing spoke again to
the same CPPCC group, this time on China's three major tasks for
the 1980s. His speech was expanded and repeated on January 16 to a
gathering of more than 10,000 cadres of the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) at the Great Hall in Peking. He identified the tasks as
opposing hegemonism and maintaining world peace in international
affairs; working for Taiwan's return to the mainland and realizing
national unification; and accelerating the construction of the "Four
Modernizations." 4
Peking's new conciliatory Taiwan policy raises a number of
questions that cannot be easily answered. Teng's three tasks for the
1980s are essentially the same as the three silent points of 1979,
except that antihegemonism has replaced normalization of relations
with the US as the focal point in international affairs. In both cases,
modernization is China's principal concern. In January 1979, a press
editorial likewise described this concern as "the central task" of the
CCP. 5 As Teng affirmed in 1980, the core of Peking's three major
tasks was modernization; this was the key to solving China's
domestic and international problems.
According to Teng, "a scholar of Chinese descent" expressed to
him strong reservations about emulating Taiwan in Peking's drive
toward modernization, because the island's economy "is actually
under American control." Yet, the task of national reunification
seems closely related to that of modernization. As Teng conceded,
"unification with Taiwan cannot be accomplished unless our political
and economic systems, as well as our economic development, are
superior to Taiwan's to a certain extent." Nonetheless, economic
development on the island is so far ahead of the People's Republic of
China (PRC) that it is doubtful whether Peking can catch up with
Taipei by the end of the twentieth century. Teng himself dared only
hope that China's per capita GNP would by then have increased to
US $1,000, a figure already exceeded by Taiwan in 1977 (Table 1).

3. Central Daily News (International Edition), November 7, 1979, p. 1.
4. The full text appears in Cheng-ming [To Compete in Expression) (Hong Kong),
No. 29 (March 1980), pp. 11-23.
5. "Historical Shift: All-Out Effort for Modernization," PR, XXII, No. 1, pp. 7-8.
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How can national reunification be accomplished in the 1980s under
these circumstances? Is Teng serious about this political objective?6
Indeed, do the Peking leaders have an accurate and up-to-date
understanding of Taiwan and its people? Is the advice of Teng's
"scholar of Chinese descent" regarding Taiwan a wise one? Should
the PRC dismiss Taiwan's modernization experience so cavalierly
without examining the facts? This chapter attempts to answer some
of these questions, while explaining the meaning of Peking's new
Taiwan policy and exploring the island's potential conrtributions to
China's modernization efforts.

THE PRC'S NEW TAIWAN POLICY
The new Taiwan policy launched on the New Year's Day of 1979
had apparently been planned and approved at the Third Plenum of
the Eleventh Central Committee and related working meetings of the
CCP leadership during December 1978. Indeed, during the latter half
of the month, Hua Kuo-feng, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Ambassador Fu Hao
in Tokyo, and other officials had clearly indicated that a new policy
on Taiwan was evolving. 7
The tone of this new policy is conciliatory, and the terms for
reunification seem, at first glance, to be almost too generous. PRC
officials now speak of "the return of Taiwan to the motherland," and
the term used in the 1978 constitution, "liberation" of the island, has
been dropped. The government in Taipei is, at present, referred to as
"the Taiwan authorities," instead of the "Chiang gang" or "Chiang
clique."
More important, instead of calling for the overthrow of the
Taiwan government as it had done before 1976, the PRC now offers to

6. Lu K'eng is a noted Hong Kong journalist with high-level connections in both
Peking and Taipei. In 1979, he learned from some senior PRC officials that Peking did
not really expect the unficiation with Taiwan to materialize for decades. For
complicated reasons, the CCP leaders felt it necessary to maintain the present stance.
Lu's information was included in a speech at the Chinese University of Hong Kong in
March 1980.
7. Reports of an impending new Taiwan policy appeared in Hong Kong
newspapers as early as October 1978 (see South China Morning Post, October 5, 1978,
p. 6), and filled the front pages in the latter half of December. For a discussion of this
subject, see Li Chih-yuan, "Chung-Mei chien-chiao yu ta-lu, T'ai-wan ho Hsiang-kang"
[The Establishment of Sino-American Diplomatic Relations and Mainland China,
Taiwan, and Hong Kong], in Kuan-ch'a chia [Observers Monthly] <Hong Kong), No. 15
(January 1979), pp. 15-19.
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discuss with Taipei, appealing to common national interests and to
the people's desire for reunion with their long separated families. It
promises to make arrangements to assure that the higher standard of
living in Taiwan will not be lowered; that the present social and
economic system will remain intact; that the security forces will be
retained and disarmament will not be required. After the transitional
period, Taiwan can still enjoy an autonomous status. Meanwhile,
Peking proposes to establish closer contacts with Taiwan. 8 On
January 7, 1979, the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications held
discussions about setting up postal links with Taiwan. On January 11
and 25, a Ministry of Foreign Trade spokesman stated that direct
trade with Taipei could be expanded in various ways. China could
supply special local products such as wine, tea, porcelain, and herbal
medicines, while Taiwan could offer industrial and agricultural
products such as television sets, tape-recorders, sugar, bananas, and
the like. Taiwan could even resell goods manufactured with raw
materials imported from the mainland. The residents on the island
were invited to the Canton Fair, and customs duties on goods moving
to and from Taiwan were removed or reduced. Peking also proposed
that the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait be allowed to visit
each other.
Furthermore, the PRC released a group of former Kuomintang
(KMT) officials and sent them to Taiwan. It publicized a new policy
by which landlords, rich peasants, and other bad elements who had
been reeducated would be reclassified as normal members of communes. It noted that Chiang Kai-shek's niece and other ex-KMT
personnel in Chikou, Chekiang, had been freed from the landlord
designation. Much has also been made of the rehabilitation of the
national bourgeoisie and intellectuals, as well as other moves toward
social democracy.
For the first time, Communist propaganda does not depict life on
Taiwan as "suffering in misery;" instead, Peking concedes that
Taiwan is prosperous, a worthy example from which the PRC can
learn. China's technical journals and literary magazines have
reprinted articles published in Taiwan or by Taiwan authors. Scenes
of Taiwanese tourist attractions have appeared on China's television

8. Li Fu-hua, "Chung-kung yu Mei-kuo chien-chiao hou tui wo t'ung-chan
yin-mou te fen-hsi" [An Analysis of the Chinese Communist United Front Conspiracy
Toward Us After the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations with the United States], in
Chung-kuo tsa-chih [China Magazine] (Taipei) (hereinafter CKTCl, March 1979, pp.
70-75.
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broadcasts and on special stamp sets. Symbolic shelling of the
offshore islands has also stopped and troops adjacent to the Taiwan
Strait were transferred to other parts of China.
The tactics of this new offensive are wide-ranging and flexible.
On January 9, 1979, Teng Hsiao-p'ing claimed that he had already
sent several reunification proposals to the Taiwan authorities. Mass
organizations, such as labor unions and women's associations, invited
the Taiwanese to participate in their activities, while democratic
parties, especially the KMT Revolutionary Committee and the
Taiwan Democratic League, were resuscitated and made to work on
the Taiwan question. Former KMT officials and relatives of present
leaders in Taiwan wrote open letters to their compatriots, and many
government units issued specific proposals for cooperation with their
counterparts in Taiwan. The press, too, made certain that Taiwanrelated features, such as national sports events, were not slighted in
news reporting. Peking also appealed to compatriots in Hong Kong
and Macao, as well as the overseas Chinese, to work for the cause of
national unification.
According to press reports, Peking has been considering various
reunification options. There is the Hong Kong-Macao formula, under
which the PRC and the ROC will maintain mutually profitable
relations, while allowing non-Peking rule in Taiwan for an indefinite
length of time. The Tibet model will give Taiwan an autonomous
status over a long transitional period. 9 There may even be some kind
of federalist relationship between Peking and Taipei. 10 In short, the
PRC is ready to make concessions, if Taipei only recognizes Peking as
the national capital.
Teng Hsiao-p'ing and his associates have, however, refrained
from painting themselves into a corner. They insisted that Peking
would not forswear the use of military forces to achieve reunification,
since such renunciation might discourage Taiwan from participating
9. A Taipei radio reported in early 1979 that US Senator Sam Nunn had related
promises by Vice Premier Teng whereby Taiwan might, in future, have a status
similar to that of Hong Kong and Macao. See CQ, No. 78, p. 408. For suggestions
regarding the Tibet model, see the Associated Press dispatch by John Roderick, in
South China Morning Post, January 2, 1979.
10. Peking has not stated that it favors a federal system, although leftist
magazines in Hong Kong have discussed this possibility. See Hai-hsia-jen (pseud.l,
"Chieh-chueh T'ai-wan wen-t'i: Hsi-ts'ang shih? Lien-pang shih?" [Resolving the
!taiwan Problem: Tibet Formula? Federation Formula?], in Ching pao [Mirror Monthly]
(Hong Kong), No. 18 (January 1979), pp. 12-13; and Huang Hsing-chih, "Chung-kuo
ho-p'ing t'ung-i ts'ao-an" [A Draft Proposal for the Peaceful Unification of China!, in
Kuang-chueh ching [Wide Angle Mirror] (Hong Kong), No. 77 (February 1979), pp.
41-53.
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in serious talks. Besides, as Teng told a visiting US Senate delegation
on January 9, 1979, China might have to resort to force, should
Taiwan refuse to hold discussion indefinitely, or should Soviet Russia
attempt to meddle in the affairs of the island. Significantly, this
important conversation with the Americans is conspicuously missing
in both Beijing Review (known as Peking Review until January
1979, hereinafter PR) and the special pamphlet, entitled Chung-kuo
cheng-fu tui T'ai-wan te cheng-ts'e [The Policy of the Government of
China Toward Taiwan], issued by a PRC outlet in Hong Kong. 11
Peking is also unwilling to let Taiwan get away with the "one
China, one Taiwan" or "one sovereignty, two government" approach
to the question of representation in international organizations or
conferences. On this issue, the PRC's concession is limited to allowing
Taiwan to be present along with Peking if the name, flag, and
anthem of the ROC are not used. 12 The concession is, however,
significant since PRC officials have hitherto preferred to withdraw
rather than sit in the same meeting hall with ROC representatives.
Moreover, among the thirty provincial units in China, including
Tibet and other autonomous regions, Taiwan alone can attend
international gatherings on its own under the new tacit arrangements.

THE PRC'S MOTIVES
What are Peking's motives in adopting this new strategy? The
ROC charges that this is just another subtle and treacherous move in
the continuing civil war, designed to capture Taiwan without
sacrificing a solider. 13 Specifically, observers on the island have
offered the following explanations:
11. Chung-kuo cheng-fu tui T'ai-wan te cheng-ts'e [The Policy of the Government
of China Toward Taiwan] (Hong Kong: San-lien shu-tien, 1979).
12. Most notable is the case of the International Olympic Committee <IOCl. By a
vote of sixty-two to seventeen, the IOC decided to restore the PRC's membership, while
demanding Taipei to change its official name in the IOC to "Chinese Taipei Olympic
Committee," and adopt a new anthem, flag, and emblem if it wished to continue to
participate.
13. Many articles on this subject have appeared in the KMT's CKTC; see especially
the issue of February 1979. The thesis of "continuing civil war" is consistent with
Taipei's earlier positions; see Hsiung Shu-chung, Chung-kung ts'e-lueh chi ch'i tso-fa
chih yen-chih [A Study of Chinese Communist Strategy and Its Operation] !Taipei:
Cheng-chung shu-chu, 1977), Chapter 5. Others have contented that this united front
thesis does not explain the Chinese policy as adequately as the alliance model. See J.
D. Armstrong, Revolutionary Diplomacy: Chinese Foreign Policy and the United Front
Doctrine <Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).
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First, the normalization of Sino-American relations has led to
Taipei's growing diplomatic isolation, and Peking hopes to accelerate
that process. Both Peking and Taipei seem to believe that if the ROC
is no longer recognized by any government, it will have to consider
seriously returning to "the embrace of motherland." A 1978 study by
Taipei's Foreign Ministry predicted that when the US recognized the
PRC, the ROC could only count on the support of Saudi Arabia out of
the twenty-one governments with which the ROC still maintained
diplomatic relations at that time! 4 Similarly, Ch'en Yi-sung, a
member of the Standing Committee of the NPC, told Kyodo News
Service on December 16, 1978 that he expected the number of
countries having diplomatic ties with Taiwan to dwindle from
twenty-one to five or six in three months. 15
Second, in Taipei's view, another thrust of the PRC's new
offensive is directed specifically at Washington. The US-ROC mutual
defense pact was nullified at the end of 1979, but the US is
continuing to supply military hardware to Taiwan. Peking is trying
to convince the Americans that their limited support of the ROC will
no longer be necessary, as the Chinese are prepared to solve the
Taiwan question by themselves. This explanation is plausible,
judging from the politics of the Taiwan Relations Act adopted by the
American Congress, as well as the PRC's protest over continued US
sales of arms to Taiwan. 16
Third, the New Year's Day message and all other gestures, as
Taipei points out, are consistent with the united front "trickery" of
the Communists, aimed at promoting dissension among adversaries
and thus undermining their morale. 17 There are indeed sentiments
and separatist tendencies in Taiwan which Peking can exploit to
pressure the KMT authorities to look favorably toward the reunification proposals. Older mainlanders, nostalgic for their homeland, can
be lured into hoping for reunion with long-separated loved ones.
Patriotic Chinese, too, may be attracted by the PRC's great power

14. Frank Ching, "China: A Soft Line on Taiwan," Asian Wall Street Journal,
December 18, 1978.
15. South China Morning Post, December 18, 1978, p. 1.
16. Hungdah Chiu (ed.), Normalizing Relations with the People's Republic of
China: Problems, Analysis, and Documents (Baltimore: School of Law, University of
Maryland, 1978).
17. See the January and March 1979 issues of CKTC.
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status, something which Taiwan can never attain. 1" The prosperous
new middle class, especially the young Taiwanese businessmen, can
be led to believe that "maintaining the status quo," as promised by
the PRC, will definitely be a better alternative to the threat of war.
Fourth, with its united front strategy, Peking also attempts to
"delude" the pro-Taiwan elements, especially the overseas Chinese
and the American public. In the eyes of third parties, the reasonable
conditions outlined by Teng Hsiao-p'ing and other PRC leaders may
appear magnanimous, while Taipei's refusal to consider them may
seem stubborn and unworthy of support.
There is as yet little, if any, trust between the two parties, and
trust is a prerequisite for meaningful negotiations. As ROC commentators suggest, the "soft offensive" is but a call to surrender, for
behind the offers of "peaceful unification" are plans to infiltrate,
subvert, and eventually destroy the existing political and socioeconomic structures of Taiwan. To these commentators, Communists are
Communists, and it is unrealistic to believe that they can be
otherwise.
Nonetheless, Taiwan's jaundiced perception of Peking cannot
satisfactorily explain the motives of China's new policy toward the
island. One must look beyond the united front thesis for more
plausible explanations. For example, the PRC's current policy is
doubtless shaped by its determination to pursue the "Four Modernizations." Compared to the pressing needs for a workable national
development program and an effective birth control policy, political
reunification is a low priority concern. Hasty moves against Taiwan
at the present time may be counterproductive. While the PRC is
anxious to obtain technology and capital from the industrialized
nations, the latter, especially Japan and the US, are reluctant to
relinquish their present lucrative economic ties with Taiwan. 19
The PRC has probably come to realize that it is in China's
interest to avoid jeopardizing the status quo in Taiwan. In order to
promote modernization, Peking has put into practice in the last three
years the "revisionist" line of Liu Shao-ch'i. Taiwan can assist China
in the pursuit of the "Four Modernizations" if cooperation between
18. Ray Cline, a former official of the Central Intelligence Agency, projected the
perceived power weights for the PRC and the ROC in 1977 at 120 to 37 units,
respectively. See Cline, World Power Assessment, 1977 (Colorado: Westview Press,
1977), pp. 173 ff.
19. See Yuan-li Wu and Kung-chia Yeh (eds.l, Growth, Distribution, and Social
Change: Essays on the Economy of the Republic of China <Baltimore: School of Law,
University of Maryland, 1978l, Chapter 5.
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the two sides develops. At that time, a booming economy in Taiwan
may even help to stimulate China's own economic growth. It does not
serve Peking's interests, therefore, to create confusion and panic in
Taiwan through controlled air raids, blockade, or international trade
squeeze. 20
Peking's Taiwan policy can also be construed as an offer of truce
with Taipei in order to forestall Taiwan's use of the "Russian card,"
and to reduce internal unrest caused directly or indirectly by the
ROC's clandestine operation in the mainland.
The PRC's concern over Taiwan's "Russian card" is understandable. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) had created by
1978 a network of pro-Soviet states in South and Southeast Asia.
Tensions at China's borders had been mounting, and Peking had
found it necessary to wage a war to "punish" the Vietnamese. China
would certainly feel threatened by the establishment of a Taiwan
base for the Russian navy. A conciliatory truce offer could induce
Taipei to abandon any thought of playing the "Russian card."
Apparently, Taipei has not yet seriously contemplated the possibility
of a USSR-ROC entente despite the Kremlin's overtures. 21 Peking
must have been relieved, since it was able to free some of its troops
from the coastal areas adjacent to Taiwan for the anti-Vietnam
campaign in 1979.22
Internally, the PRC's pursuit of "Four Modernizations" must be
supported by political stability and national unity. Taipei has been
active in backing dissidents in the mainland through its propaganda
machine and planted agents. As China becomes more open to the
outside world, these agents are bound to have more opportunity to
create trouble. A truce offer to Taipei would give Peking time to
bring about internal stability. The new conciliatory policy toward
Taiwan is therefore making a virtue out of necessity.
20. To a lesser extent, the PRC wields similar power over Hong Kong and Macao.
Walter Easey of Hong Kong Research Project, London, has written a provocative
article on Hong Kong's future. A Chinese translation appears in Ch'i-shih nien-tai I
The Seventies) (Hong Kong) (hereinafter CSNT), No. 119 <December 1, 1979), pp.
67-71.
21. John W. Garver, "Taiwan's Russian Option: Images and Realty," Asian
Survey, XVIII, No. 7 (July 1978), pp. 751-66.
22. For discussions on China's war with Vietnam, see "Chung-kuo yu Yueh-nan"
[China and Vietnam), in Nan-pei chi [South and North Poles] (Hong Kong), No. 106
(March 1979), pp. 6-14; and Kuo Ch'ien, "Chung-Yueh chih chan: Shuang-fang
chuang-pei, chan-lueh chi chan-shu" [Sino-Vietnamese War: Equipments, Strategies,
and Tactics of the Two Parties), in Ming-pao yueh-k'an (Ming-pao Monthly( tHong
Kong) (hereinafter MPYKl, XIV, No. 4 (April 1979), pp. 19-26.
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In sum, China wants to concentrate on its work on "Four
Modernizations," and it needs political stability at home and peace
abroad, as well as foreign capital and technology. It is genuinely
concerned with the Taiwan question, but it may also have begun to
appreciate Taiwan's potential contribution to the PRC's program of
modernization. By late 1978, Peking must have realized the normalization of relations with the US was necessary to ward off the
Russian threat; this might also open the possibility of obtaining
technology and capital from the West. Meanwhile, Taiwan (as well as
Hong Kong, Macao, and the overseas Chinese) must be wooed into
cooperating with, or at least acquiescing in, Peking's new ventures.
These considerations, more than the united front tactics, are indeed
the motivating factors governing Teng Hsiao-p'ing's three salient
points, which included the new Taiwan policy.

THE "FOUR MODERNIZATIONS" AND
THE REUNIFICATION OF TAIWAN
The program of "Four Modernizations" is politically attributable
to the late Premier Chou En-lai and his associates, and those
opposing it today may be castigated as supporters of the "Gang of
Four." Mao Tse-tung is being attacked posthumously by his
successors for his "red and expert" approach to China's development
which has, according to his critics, made the present modernizing
efforts doubly difficult. As noted by Jen-min jih-pao [People's Daily]
(JMJP), "carrying out the Four Modernizations is the biggest politics"
in Peking today. 23 •
Economically, the PRC can ill afford to postpone its work on
"Four Modernizations." Its economy is beset with such serious
problems as overpopulation and unemployment; imbalance among
the economic sectors; bottlenecks in industry; low productivity in
agriculture; an outmolded and inappropriate management system
copied from Stalinist Russia; and serious shortages of qualified
scientists, technicians, and managers. 24 The people's standard of
23. PR, XXII, No. 17 (April 27, 1979), pp. 10-13.
24. See Hua Kuo-feng's report on the work of the government, presented to the
Second Session of the Fifth NPC on June 18, 1979; and "Readjusting the National
Economy: Why and How?" PR, XXII, No. 26 (June 29, 1979), pp. 13-23. See also Chien
Yuan-heng, "Tui Chung-kung t'iao-cheng ching-chi kung-tso te yen-chiu" [An Analysis
of Communist China's Task of Economic Adjustments], in Chung-kung yen-chiu
[Studies on Chinese Communism] <Taipei), XIII, No.7 (July 15, 1979), pp. 63-78; and T.
T. Hsueh, "Wei Chung-kung ching-chi cheng-ts'e k'an-ping yu ch'u-fang" [Diagnosis
and Prescription for Communist China's Economic Policy," MPYK, XIV, No. 10
<October 1979), pp. 49-57.
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living cannot be improved without moving swiftly along the road to
modernization. 25
The program of "Four Modernizations" is also likely to help the
PRC's national security. Most observers agree that Peking does not,
at present, have the military power to "liberate" Taiwan by force, let
alone protecting its borders against the USSR and the pro-Moscow
states in the south.
Even in the ideological realm, the ruling CCP elites cannot fail
to realize that the superiority of socialism over capitalism will not be
proven by a Communist China frantically running in circles at a low
level of development. Only through successful modernization can the
PRC continue to uphold its belief that Communism will eventually
triumph.
The importance of "Four Modernizations" was underscored by
Yeh Chien-ying's lengthy speech on the eve of the thirtieth
anniverary of the founding of the PRC. "At the present," he claimed,
"the Four Modernizations constitute the pivot of our political life. The
security of the state, social stability, and a better material and
cultural life for our people all hinge ultimately on the success of
modernization, on the growth of production. Our work in every field·
must revolve around and serve modernization." He urged everyone in
China to "concentrate on this great cause of construction."26
Compared to the work on "Four Modernizations," political
reunification can hardly be considered equally important. Although
both are national goals to be realized, yet at least for now,
reunification with Taiwan has to be either laid aside or approached in
the least costly way. Modernization, a rational desire for changes and
improvement, requires immediate attention. The PRC would be
gratified if, by adopting a new policy toward the island, the Taiwan
question could be used to serve the program of "Four Modernizations"
in some ways.
Thus, the new Taiwan policy embraces the two dimensions of
modernization and reunification. The emphasis on modernization has
yielded a conciliatory policy toward the island, while the appreciation
of Taiwan's potential usefulness has created a new element in the
program of "Four Modernizations."

25. James E. Nickum and David C. Schak, "Living Standards and Economic
Developments in Shanghai and Taiwan," CQ, No. 77 (March 1979), pp. 25-49.
26. The English version appears in PR, XXII, No. 40 (October 5, 1979), pp. 7-32.
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THE PRC AND TAIWAN: SOME COMPARISONS
The developmental processes of the PRC and Taiwan are so
different that it is difficult to compare them in any detailed and
comprehensive fashion (Table D. Nonetheless, they are both Chinese,
sharing the same historical, cultural, and linguistic roots, and they
are, by their own claims, two separate parts of a larger entity. It is
therefore necessary, perhaps, to compare them in those specific areas
targeted by the PRC in its program of "Four Modernizations." 27
In agriculture, Taiwan has been notably successful in its land
reform program during the 1950s and, to a lesser extent, in its
approach to rural construction in the 1970s. The land reform program
transferred landownership to the tillers and transformed former
landlords into new industrial capitalists. The rural construction
programs, supported by a growing industrial sector, absorbed surplus
labor, upgraded agricultural technology, and commercialized the
rural economy.
But Taiwan, as does the PRC, experiences problems of balance
between agricultural and nonagricultural sectors of the economy. The
ratio of agricultural product to gross domestic product has dropped
from 38 percent in 1953 to 16.7 percent in 1972. The growth rate of
agriculture has likewise declined from an average of 4.5 percent
during 1953-1968 to a low of 2.1 percent in 1969-1972. Per capita
income for agricultural households, though substantially increased in
absolute terms, has dropped from 75 percent of that of nonagricultural households in 1954 to only 66 percent in 1972. 28 This is not so bad
as it seems however, at least as compared to the situation in the PRC.
Since 1957, the PRC's population has increased by 50.6 percent
while its cultivated land has dropped by 11 percent. 29 Peasant income

27. The KMT's CKTC published a special issue in October 1979, in which it
compared the PRC with Taiwan in the areas of politics, economy (agriculture, industry,
and trade), society, culture and education, and the military. The PRC was put in the
worst light, while the ROC appeared remarkably successful and progressive. Some
information in the issue is useful, however.
28. Wang Yu-chao, "Chia-su nung-ts'un chien-she ch'eng-chiu chi yuan-ching"
[Accelerate the Effects and Prospects of Rural Construction], CKTC, August 1979, pp.
19-23; and Wu and Yeh, "Taiwan's External Economic Relations."
29. Ch'en Ting-chung, "Chung-kung nung-yeh san-shih-nien lai te huo-hai"
[Thirty Years of Scourge in Communist China's Agriculture], CKTC, October 1979, p.
62; and Robert F. Dernberger and David Fasenfest, "China's Post-Mao Economic
Future," in Joint Economic Committee, US Congress, Chinese Economy Post-Mao,
Volume I, Policy and Performance <Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1978), p. 6.

90

CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STuDIES SERIEs

is so low that inclement weather can still precipitate famine in some
areas. Many communes are debt-ridden and hard work alone is not
likely to improve their poor conditions. At the national level, there
are serious problems of coordination between the growth of agricultural production and that of population, as well as between agriculture
and industry. Agriculture has become a bottleneck in economic
development.
The desire to improve agricultural production had led Mao
Tse-tung and his supporters to initiate a nationwide movement to
"Learn from Tachai." Defying nature and economic laws, this
campaign brought little sustained benefit to the nation as a whole.
Many communes squandered away valuable manpower and materials
in their attempt to emulate Tachai's example of removing mountains
and opening new fields. In a speech on "Four Modernizations" in July
1978, Hu Ch'iao-mu, president of the Academy of Social Science,
stressed that it was best to observe economic laws, instead of the laws
of Mao. Hua Kuo-feng, too, admitted later that China's economy
required restructuring because "in many areas and in varying
degrees it violates objective economic laws."30 The Tachai model has
since been abandoned.
In industry, Taiwan experienced relatively rapid growth in the
latter half of the 1960s during and after its fourth four-year economic
plan. In 1963, industry overtook agriculture for the first time as the
main sector of the economy. The ratio of industrial product to gross
domestic product has increased from 17.9 percent in 1952 to 40.3 per
cent in 1978.31
Because of its limited resources and market, Taiwan has tried to
coordinate its industrial development with an expansion in exports
by means of such innovative ideas as the export processing zone.
There has been no great leap, but the steady growth has been
impressive and consequential. Throughout the last three decades,
overall government plans have guided and helped private enterprises. Foreign aid and private investment have, by and large, been
put to effective use. A structural change is taking place as Taiwan
begins to develop heavy and more sophisticated industries on the

30. The full text of Hu's speech appears serially in three issues of PR, XXI, Nos.
45-47 (November 10-21, 1978). Hua's statement is derived from his report on the work
of the government, presented to the Second Session of the Fifth NPC.
31. Wei Yung-ning, ''T'ai-wan te kung-yeh ch'eng-chang chi ch'i chi-kou chuanpien" [Taiwan's Industrial Growth and Its Structural Change], CKTC, October 1979, p.
72.
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basis of its experiences in labor-intensive light industries. Some
observers have even argued that the ten great construction projects
completed during the 1970s have elevated Taiwan to the rank of an
"industrialized nation."
The picture in the PRC is comparatively bleak. 32 The lack of
material incentives and personal accountability for project mistakes
and delays encourages wastefulness, undermines morale, and fosters
apathy among the workers. Industrial production, controlled by
central plans, is often based on unrealiable and unrealistic data. This
is especially true in times of frenzied political campaigns when rigid
ideological demands outweigh pragmatic decisions and stifle initiatives. Exaggerated claims of production increases are made; quantity,
instead of quality, becomes the sole criterion. Consequently, valuable
resources are wasted in the overproduction of low technology, low
quality goods.
In national defense, Taiwan relies on a smaller, but more
professional and better equipped force than the PRC's. At present,
observers generally agree on its ability to defend itself against a
potential invasion from Peking. The ROC air force, in particular, has
had an impressive performance record. The real test, however, is yet
to come for Taiwan's defense capability, especially with the termination of the US-Taiwan defense pact at the end of 1979. In the final
analysis, Taiwan's military forces cannot hope to match those of the
PRC. In this, time is on Peking's side.
Nonetheless, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in China has
its problems, too. It suffered heavy casualties in the 1979 war against
Vietnam, and it withdrew without accomplishing its goal. As
commentators in Taiwan point out, the PLA's ills have been caused
by Mao Tse-tung's anachronistic military thought. Moreover, the
purges of P'eng Teh-huai and Huang K'o-ch'eng in 1959, as well as
the Lin Piao affair in 1971, have substantially weakened the
military's stature. Consequently, modernization of the armed forces
has been retarded, while their capabilities have declined. 33

32. See supra n. 24.
33. Chu Liang, "Ts'ung Chung-kung chun-tui kan-pu ssu-hsiang lu-hsien te
fen-ch'i k'an Chung-kung chun te hsien-tai-hua ch'ien-t'u" [ The Prospects of the
Chinese Army's Modernization as Seen from Cleavages in the Thinking of the Army
Cadres], in Chung-kung yen-chiu, XIII, No. 8 !August 15, 19791, pp. 75-81; and Ellis
Joffe and Gerald Segal, "The Chinese Army and Professionalism," Problems of
Communism, XXVII, No. 6 !November-December 19781, pp. 1-19.
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'rhe problems of the socialist system and the disasters of the
Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution have intensified
China's weaknesses in science and technology. Vacillations between
"ideo-logic" and "techno-logic" lines are not conducive to basic
research and development in these two areas. 34 Over the years, there
have been some impressive achievements in medicine and in the
development of nuclear weapons and orbiting satellites, yet China's
recovery from the self-inflicted damages of the Cultural Revolution is
likely to take a long time.
For two decades, the PRC has been losing ground in training new
scientists and technologists. According to the annual reports of Who
Is Publishing in Science, there have been fewer authors in the last
several years from the PRC than from Taiwan who publish articles in
any Western language in some 5,000 scientific journals (Table II).
One writer characterizes the PRC's "size of science" as "vanishingly
small" in terms of published scientific literature. 35 Who Is Publishing
in Science lists 339,078 authors in 1977. While 327 of them were from
the ROC, 137 were associated with the PRC.
China's import of foreign technology increased around 1970, and
it has since reached a high level. The PRC has been mostly importing
complete sets of equipment; it would like to change gradually to
importing mainly technology, "selectively purchasing key equipment
and designing the engineering projects ourselves."36 Moreover, because of limited foreign exchange, China would have to pursue the
goal of "Four Modernizations . . . through self-reliance and hard
work, not through purchases and borrowing."37

TAIWAN'S POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE PRC'S
MODERNIZATION
In spite of their differences, the PRC may, as suggested earlier in
this chapter, find Taiwan's experience helpful to its work on "Four
34. Hans Heymann, Jr., China's Approach to Technology Acquisition: Part Ill,
Summary Observations (Santa Monica, California: Rand, 1975), pp. v-vi, 4-9.
35. Derek J. de Solla Price, "Measuring the Size of Science," in Who Is Publishing
in Science (Philadelphia: Institute for Scientific Information, 1977), p. 20.
36. "Importing Technology: Plans Readjusted, Policy Unchanged," PR, XXII, No.
30 (July 27, 1979), p. 10. In his report to the Second Session of the Fifth NPC, Hua
Kuo-feng also emphasized the importance of technology. He spoke of building up "a
number of model enterprises" that could pave the way for adopting modern
management methods and advanced technology, especially in the major sectors of the
national economy. This was to be achieved "by learning from foreign countries,
importing technology, and exerting our own efforts in innovation and invetion."
37. JMJP, May 8, 1979; translated in PR, XXII, No. 22 (June 1, 1979), pp. 11-13.
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Modernizations." For Peking, a moderate policy toward the island is
therefore desirable. The following are some of the roles which Taiwan
can play in the PRC's modernization efforts: First, Taiwan can be a
pilot project area for Peking. The island's economic success in the last
two decades has, at least, some instructional value for the PRC.
Second, Taiwan can be China's friendly competitor. As long as it
remains civil, this competition may stimulate progress, and both
sides will benefit. Third, Taiwan can assume the form of an
opposition party to the CCP on the mainland, thereby offering the
Chinese people a choice in governmental system and the way of life.
These roles, however, suggest a much broader concept of
modernization than the PRC leadership is, at present, willing to
contemplate. According to an article authored by Chou Chen-hua,
modernization is an historical and universal concept, instead of an
unchanging, abstract notion. It has concrete contents and definite
standards in relation to specific times and places. Chou views
modernization as a technological revolutionary process of "equipping
the national economy, defense and other units with the newest
contemporary science and technology, reshaping . . . the entire
domain of material production, and raising the societal economy and
technology of a given country to the advanced level of its contemporary world." 38
This narrow interpretation overlooks the social, cultural, and
political aspects of modernization. It echoes the common Chinese
interpretation as presented by Chou En-lai in 1964 and 1975, and by
Hua Kuo-feng in February 1978. 39 More thought, however, has been
devoted to the matter since then. As Yeh Chien-ying announced in
September 1979, China wanted to build an "advanced socialist
democracy and a complete socialist legal system . . . and develop a
rich and many-sided cultural life," beyond the four major aspects of
modernization. Nonetheless, even this interpretation fails to consider
the environmental and psychological consequences of modernization.
In a speech on January 16, 1980, Teng Hsiao-p'ing identified the
four conditions that would help to achieve the goals of the "Four
38. Chou Chen-hua, "Hsien-tai-hua shih i-ko li-shih te shih-chieh-hsing te
kai-nien" [Modernization Is an Historical, World-Wide Concept], Ching-chi yen-chiu
[Studies on Economics], August 1979, pp. 19-22.
39. Yin Chih-p'eng, "Chung-kuo te chiao-yu ke-rning yu ssu-ko hsien-tai-hua"
[China's Educational Revolution and the Four Modernizations], in China Toward
Modernization: Collected Essays for the Fifth China Week <Hong Kong: Hong Kong
Federation of Students, 1977), p. 113; and Hua Kuo-feng's report on the work of the
government, delivered to the First Session of the Fifth NPC on February 26, 1978,
especially Part 3.
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Modernizations." They were: (1) a firm and continual political line;
(2) a political situation of stability and unity; (3) a struggling and
enterprising spirit and; (4) a troop of able cadre, with professional
knowledge and devoted to socialism. Many of the other conditions
which have contributed to Taiwan's remarkable success cannot be
duplicated in China, yet the island's experience in modernization is,
indeed, worthy of Peking's attention.
Specifically, the program of "Four Modernizations" needs a
tremendous amount of capital. In 1976-1985, China plans to spend
600-630 billion US dollars, of which no more than 400 billion can be
accumulated through forced domestic savings.41l The rest must be
raised from foreign loans and investments. As the PRC has already
found out, this is not easy, since the capitalist lenders are demanding
collaterals after advancing initially some easy credit. The 1979 Joint
Venture scheme is likely to attract only a small amount of funds,
pending enactment of auxiliary laws and regulations on property
rights, taxes, and the like!'
The ROC cannot offer China much capital, even though Taiwan's
investment in the US and some Asian countries is considerable.
Nonetheless, Taiwan's effort to introduce new technology and attract
private investment from overseas by such means as the export
processing zones is an experience which Peking cannot afford to
ignore.
The PRC also needs scientists, technicians, social scientists,
managers, and highly skilled personnel. To train these experts,
Peking must expand and improve its higher education. Yet, the
Cultural Revolution has devastated the PRC's higher education
system. Without such interruptions, China could have produced 1.5
million more scientists and technicians in 1966-1976!2

40. Estimates vary. These figures are given by Li Kuo-ting, former minister of
economics in Taiwan, in "I T'ai-wan fa-chan ching-yen p'ing-ku ta-lu hsien-tai-hua"
[Evaluating and Forecasting Modernization on the Mainland by Tawan's Developmental Experiences], Hai-wai hsueh-jen [Overseas Scholars] (Taipei), No. 84 (July 1979), p.
5; and by Cheng Chu-yuan, "Chung-kung te ching-chi wen-t'i" [Communist China's
Economic Problems], in Chung-kuo jen [The Chinese] (Hong Kong), I, No. 9 <October
1979), p. 15.
41. Ch'en Hsin, "Chung-wai ho-tzu-fa wen-t'i ch'u-t'an" [A Preliminary Analysis
of the Laws on Joint Ventures with Chinese and Foreign Investments], CSNT, No. 115
(August 1979), pp. 34-37.
42. This is an estimate of the number of PRC students (about 150,000 per year)
who could have received higher education in 1966-1976, had there been no Cultural
Revolution.
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By contrast, the ROC has produced an impressive number of
well-trained and highly capable people in all fields through education
at home and abroad (Table III). This is one of the major reasons for
Taiwan's successes in economic development and overall modernization. Indeed, the PRC has already begun to tap scientists and experts
in various disciplines, who have received at least part of their
education and training in Taiwan. Clearly, there is a serious
educational problem in the PRC which Taiwan may help to remedy.
Ironically, the fact that the island has not been "liberated" during
these years may be a blessing in disguise for Peking.
In China, scientific and technological training in the West
continues to enjoy greater prestige than that in the USSR. The
majority of the Chinese leaders in scientific and technical fields
received their education in the West before 1949. In its exchange of
students and scholars with the US after the purge of the "Gang of
Four," China has admitted that the pre-1978 training of its
university and college graduates was largely inadequate. 43 They are
not capable of engaging in postgraduate studies when sent abroad to
the advanced Western nations. This difficulty is compounded by the
problems of prohibitive costs and cultural shock, as well as the risk of
defections. Peking has to decide whether to send more students to the
West under the present circumstances. A report shows that there
were only 2,230 PRC students abroad during the twenty-two months
preceding November 1979. 44
Taiwan, on the other hand, has been sending students to foreign
countries over the years (Table IV). For a time, there were complaints
of the "brain drain" from the island. Recently, however, many foreign
trained scholars, scientists, technicians, managers, and other highly
skilled personnel have returned to fill key posts in Taiwan, and they
have contributed significantly to its progress. There is probably a
surplus of overseas Chinese experts in many fields who are currently
unemployed or otherwise temporarily idle. It is sad that this should
be so when their talents and skills are badly needed by the PRC.
For linguistic, cultural, and nationalistic reasons, an expert from
Taiwan can relate to the Chinese conditions more effectively than a
non-Chinese. Should Peking be willing to minimize its ideological

43. Chang Tu-sheng, "San-shih-nien lai Chung-kung chiao-yu te yu-hui tao-lu"
[The Winding Road of Communist China's Education During the Last Thirty Years],
MPYK, XIV, No. 10 October 1979), pp. 107-13.
44. PR, XXII, No. 47 (November 23, 1979), p. 7.
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differences with the non-Communist world, it could attract experts in
Taiwan and the overseas Chinese in the West. This may cause some
resentment among locally trained people in the PRC, but it is a price
worth paying in the present situation. Indeed, Peking may want to
send some of its students to Taiwan. In terms of China's immediate
needs, Taiwan has much to offer.
The PRC also has the "fifth modernization" problem. 45 In the
winter of 1978-1979, big character posters on the Democratic Wall in
Peking called for a move toward democracy, with greater freedom
and participation in public decision-making. Moreover, they favored
the rule of law, with greater protection of human rights. To a limited
extent, this sentiment is shared by many CCP leaders who were
victimized by the abuses of the Cultural Revolution. But they are
unwilling to allow this "fifth modernization" problem either to
undermine their authority or to create social and political instability.
How can the PRC mobilize its people to support the modernization efforts without yielding to the demands for a more democratic
political process? To maintain a proper balance, Teng Hsiao-p'ing and
his associates have, on the one hand, encouraged production by
offering material incentives, redress of past grievances, and greater
freedom in decision-making at the production level, in the market,
and even in the mass media. On the other hand, they insisted on the
people's compliance with such regulations of conduct as the six
prohibitive rules and the four basic principles. 46 They also ordered the
45. This is the key issue in the celebrated case of Wei Ching-sheng; see MPYK,
XIV, No. 11 (November 1979); Chung-kuo jen, I, No. 11 (December 1979); and CSNT,
No. 119 (December 1979).
46. The six prohibitive rules, promulgated on March 29, 1979, by the Peking
Revolutionary Committee, were as follows: (1) Citizens should obey the direction of the
people's police when engaging in assembly or demonstration; (2) Assault upon party,
government and military organs, and enterprise units was not permitted; neither was
occupation of offices, obstruction of public business, or destruction of public facilities;
(3) People were not allowed to incite strife, misguide the masses with rumors, do
mischief, or libel and make false charges; (4) Citizens were prohibited from blocking
vehicles or riding vehicles without ticket; (5) Except in specified areas, people were not
permitted to post or print slogans, posters, big character posters, or small character
posters; and (6) Slogans, posters, big character posters, and small character posters, as
well as books, magazines, pictorials, photographs, and pictures that were opposed to
socialism, dictatorship of the proletariat, CCP leadership, Marxism-Leninism and Mao
Tse-tung's thought were all prhobitied; so were those that leaked national secrets or
violated the constitution and the laws. The four basic prinicples, announced in a JMJP
editorial on April 5, 1979, reaffirmed the need to keep to the socialist road, to uphold
the dictatorship of the proletariat, CCP leadership, and Marxism-Leninism and Mao
Tse-tung's thought.
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incarceration of the boldest of the dissidents who dared not only to
demand democracy but also to challenge Marxism-Leninism and the
basis of Teng's power. During the Fifth Plenum of the Eleventh
Central Committee, the CCP proposed to eliminate the following
"Four Great Freedoms" from the 1978 PRC constitution: (1) speak out
freely; (2) air views fully; (3) hold great debates; and (4) write big
character posters!7
By Western standards, Taiwan is not a shining example of
democracy. For more than thirty years, the KMT's central leadership
has ruled the island with firm hands. The Legislative and Control
Yuans, as well as the National Assembly, are gerontological bodies
claiming to represent not only the inhabitants of Taiwan, but also the
nearly one billion people on the mainland. 48 The island has been
47. See the communique and resolutions of the Fifth Session of the Eleventh CCP
Central Committee, in PR, XXIII, No. 10 (March 10, 1980), pp. 7-17; and Ch'i Hsin,
"K'an Chung-kung ju-ho ch'iang-hua tsu-chih" [Let Us See How the Chinese
Communists Strengthen Their Organization], CSNT, No. 123 (April 1980), pp. 55-60.
48. (Editors' note) Of the 2961 National Assembly members elected in 1947, only
1393 were still serving in 1971; of the 759 members of the Legislative Yuan, 434
remained; and in the Control Yuan, where the average age of members was over
sixty-five years, membership declined from 180 in 1949 to 69 in April 1971. Because it
claims to be the only government of China, the Nationalist government was reluctant
to hold a general election in Taiwan. Nevertheless, the ROC has had to recognize the
phenomenon of political stagnation and the rising demands of its local residents to
participate in the policymaking process. As a result, in 1972, 53 new members were
elected to the National Assembly, 36 to the Legislative Yuan, and 7 to the Control
Yuan. Their terms are three (Legislative Yuan) and six years (Control Yuan and
National Assembly), respectively, according to the provisions of the constitution. See
Yung Wei, "Political Development in the Republic of China," in Hungdah Chiu, ed.,
China and the Taiwan Question (New York, Praeger, 1973), p. 98.
On June 11, 1980, the government announced further expansion of the number of
new members for the above three bodies. In total 204 new members will be elected in
Taiwan - 76 to the National Assembly, bringing the total to 1218, 96 to the
Legislative Yuan, bringing the total to 412, and 32 to Control Yuan, bringing the total
to 74. "Parliamentary Seats Added," Free China Weekly, Vol. XXI, No. 23 (June 15,
1980), p. 1.
Among the three bodies, the most important one is the Legislative Yuan. The
election of 96 new members to this body will significantly revitalize that body.
Moreover, many remaining members are too old or ill to be active. As a result, less
than half of the remaining members regularly attend the meetings of the Yuan. So, in
practical terms, after the recent increase of the membership, approximately half of the
active members of the Legislative Yuan will be elected in Taiwan. See Hungdah Chiu,
"The Future of Political Stability in Taiwan," in Taiwan: One Year After United States
- China Normalization (A Senate Foreign Relations Committee - Congressional
Research Service of Library of Congress Workshop, (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, June 1980), pp. 40-41.
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under martial law since 1947, and the myth of "recovering the
mainland" is still a national policy not open to discussion. The press
is controlled, and magazines stepping beyond "acceptable" bounds are
suspended. In 1980, eight leading dissidents were brought to trial in
Taipei, and they were punished according to martial law. 49
Yet, it would be mistaken to argue that Taiwan is as undemocratic as the PRC. To the common people on the island who acquiesce to
his supreme power, Chiang Ching-kuo is benevolent. They support
him because of his populist style, and also because of the success of
his economic policies. Taiwan has survived international setbacks,
and it has time and again reemerged stronger and more prosperous.
The KMT government has relaxed its control, and it has even allowed
local elections to take place, if only grudgingly.
Perhaps the PRC can learn from Taiwan's experience in holding
local elections. If one accepts the thesis that democratic tradition has
never been a part of the Chinese political culture, what is taking
place in Taiwan must then be considered a significant step toward
the creation of a democratic process. Taiwan has indeed been
experimenting with a limited democracy in the last decade, and there
are promising signs pointing to greater popular participation in the
governmental process. It may therefore serve the PRC's interest to
allow Taiwan's experiment to continue instead of terminating it by
premature unification.

CONCLUSION
In his fable of the "Foolish Old Man," Mao Tse-tung described
imperialism and feudalism as the two mountains standing in the way
of China's goal of achieving modernity and national greatness. The
present rulers in the PRC name two more such obstables: (1)
bureaucratic capitalism which they claim to have got rid of and; (2)
economic and technological backwardness which they are now trying
to eliminate through the program of "Four Modernizations."50 Yet, to
accomplish the objectives of "Four Modernizations," the PRC must

49. For non-KMT reports and analyses of the Kao-hsiung Incident, see the two
issues of Ya-chou-jen [The Asians], published by dissidents in Taipei in Feburary and
March 1980. On April 18, 1980, the eight defendants were found guilty and sentenced
to life or long-term imprisonment. Peking condemned the KMT's "suppression of
democratic movement." See Ta-kung pao [L'impartial] <Hong Kong), April 21, 1978,

p.2.
50. MJP, February 9, 1979; translated in PR, XXII, No. 8 (February 23, 1979), pp.

5-6.
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put aside Mao's revolutionary rhetoric, observe objective economic
laws, devise realistic plans, import foreign technology, raise a huge
amount of capital, train a large number of skilled personnel, and,
above all, curb its population growth.
Following the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee,
Chinese leaders have displayed a more pragmatic and business-like
attitude. 51 There is a growing awareness of the worth of the
individual and the need to enlist his genuine support in working
toward national goals. To motivate the workers, the leaders have
resorted to material incentives similar to the system championed in
the early 1960s by Liu Shao-ch'i, who was officially· rehabilitated in
February 1980. The general mood reflects a new realism and
open-mindedness.
In his report to the Second Session of the Fifth NPC, Hua
Kuo-feng stressed the need for readjustment, restructuring, consolidation and improvement as the task for the PRC in 1979-1981. It
is evident that China's modernization cannot be accelerated at will by
Peking. The post-Mao leaders are realistic and courageous enough to
recognize the shortcomings of their ideology and admit their past
mistakes. They are now regrouping for their next move toward
modernization, and Taiwan's possible role in that move is an
important part of Peking's consideration.
At a time when the PRC needs all the resources it can muster to
push forward the program of "Four Modernizations," it would be
foolish for the leaders to divert any of these resources to "liberate"
Taiwan. The island poses no real threat to the PRC; it may, indeed,
be helpful to China's modernization efforts. Moreover, the US and
Japan are still keen on doing business with Taiwan, and it would not
be to China's advantage to antagonize the Americans and the
Japanese.
Taiwan can play these positive roles in China's modernization
only if it is free from Peking's direct political control. It would seem
advisable, therefore, that China should leave Taiwan alone, except
for certain mutually acceptable contacts. The KMT authorities have
already rejected the idea of reunification with the mainland, even

51. Ch'i Hsin, "Chung-kung wan-ch'eng liao chi chuan-wan: San-chung ch'uan-hui
te t'ai-ch'ien no-hou" [Communist China Makes a Quick Turnabout: The Ins and Outs
of the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee], in CSNT, No. 109 <February
1979), pp. 7-9; and "Chung-kuo ta-lu te chieh-chi chuang-k' uang ho chu-yao mao-tun"
[The Class Situation and the Mlijor Contradictions in the Chinese Mainland], CSNT,
No. 115 (August 1979), pp. 26-33.
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under the generous terms offered by the PRC. This must have been a
factor in Peking's formulation of its new Taiwan policy in 1979, a
policy which may well be calculated to permit the island to play
certain roles as China proceeds toward modernization. Time will
tell.
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TABLE I
PRC VERSUS ROC:
A COMPARISON OF VITAL STATISTICS
PRC

Area (thousand square kilometers)
Population (millions in mid-1977)
Literacy
Life expectancy at birth (1977)
GNP per capita (US dollars, 1977)
Average annual growth rate, 1960-1977
Gross domestic product:
Average annual growth rate, 1960-1970
1970-1977
Working age (15-64) population, 1960
1977
Labor force in agriculture, 1960
1977
Labor force in industry, 1960
1977
Labor force in services, 1960
1977
Daily per capita calorie supply:
1974
As percentage of requirement
Total manufactured exports:
1976 (millions US dollars)
Destination of manufactured exports, 1976
To developed countries
To developing countries
To centrally planned economies
To capital surplus oil exporters
Per capita energy consumption:
Kilograms of coal equivalent, 1960
1976
Physical quality of life index (PQLI)*
Per capita military expenditures:
1973 (US dollars)

ROC

9,597
36
885.6
16.8
25%
85%
64
72
390
1,170
5.1%
6.2%
6.6%
5.8%
58%
61%
75%
53%
15%
24%
10%
13%

9.2%
7.7%
52%
63%
56%
34%
11%
27%
33%
39%

2,330
99%

2,780
119%

3,124

6,922

32%
53%
12%
3%

73%
24%
0%
3%

683
706
59

583
1,797
88

19

53

* The PQLI of the PRC and the ROC ratings are based on an average of each
government's index ratings for life expectancy, infant mortality, and literacy in the
mid-1970s.
Sources: World Development Report, 1979 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1979l; and
The United States and World Development: Agenda 1977 (New York:
Praeger Publishers, 1977!.
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TABLE II
NUMBERS OF PUBLISHING AUTHORS IN SCIENCES,
IN THE PRC AND THE ROC, 1973-1977

1977
1976
1975
1974
1973

PRC

ROC

137
102
107
136
47

327
292
275
269
226

Source: Who Is Publishing in Science, Philadelphia: Institute for Scientific Information, 1974-1978 Annuals.

TABLE III
HIGHER EDUCATION ENROLLMENTS IN THE
PRC AND THE ROC:
SELECTED YEARS
PRG
Population in
Total
enrollments
millions
1952-1953
1956-1957
1965-1966
1973-1974
1974-1975

191,000
403,000
695,000
324,000
440,000

590
623
722
825
839

ROC
%*

0.037
0.065
0.097
0.039
0.053

Total
Population in
enrollments millions**
10,037
22,606
85,346
270,895
282,618

8.29
9.54
12.81
15.71
16.00

%

0.12
0.23
0.66
1.72
1.77

* estimated % of total population.
** population figures in this column are averages of the two related years in each case.

Sources: For the PRC, see Richard P. Suttmeyer, "Scientific Institutions," in Science
and Technology in the People's Republic of China, Paris: OECD, 1976; and
Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the Pacific, 1976, United Nations. For the
ROC, see Council for International Economic Cooperation and Development,
Executive Yuan, ROC, Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1966, Taipei; China
Yearbook, 1978, Taipei; and Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and
Statistics, Executive Yuan, ROC, Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of
China, 1976.
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TABLE IV
TAIWAN STUDENTS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES, 1973-1977

1973
1974
1975
1976
1977

us

Japan

Canada

Other
Countries

Total

1,650
1,992
1,824
3,173
3,369

74
74
112
156
156

30
43
139
111
44

212
177
226
201
219

1,966
2,285
2,301
3,641
3,788

Source: China Yearbook, Taipei, 1974-1978.

INDEX
Abas, 31
Acheson, Dean, 58
Afghanistan, 5, 14, 52-53
Aigun, 11
Akhmedjan, 18, 19, 23, 24
American Institute in Taiwan, 75
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 50
Bandung Conference, 59
Bator, Osman, 18, 20, 24
Brest-Litovsk Treaty, 42
Brezhnev Doctrine, 38
Brezhnev, Leonid, 3, 5, 30, 31, 41, 42, 54, 55
Brown, Harold, 53
Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 6, 71, 72
Burhan, 18
Cairo Conference, 58
Cambodia, 39, 45, 67
Carter, Jimmy, 5, 6, 52, 67, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76
Central lntelligency Agency, 1, 27, 85
Chamberlain, Neville, 48
Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, 43, 45
Ch'en Hsi-lien, 68
Ch'en Shao-yu, 3
Ch'en Yi-sung, 84
Chi Teng-k'uei, 69
Chiang Ch'ing, 43, 64
Chiang Ching-kuo, 65, 71, 98
Chiang Kai-shek, 13, 17, 18, 58, 59, 65, 81
Ch'iao Kuan-hua, 62, 64, 65
China, see People's Republic of China
Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 1, 2, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 23, 26, 30,
40, 58, 64, 68, 70, 77, 79, 80, 88, 93, 96, 97
Chou Chen-hua, 93
Chou En-lai, 4, 26, 38, 39, 40-42, 43, 44-45, 48, 49, 57, 59-60, 62, 64,
65, 66, 67, 68, 87, 93
Chu Teh, 48, 67
Cline, Ray, 85
Confucius, 44
Coordination Council for North American Affairs, 75

Cultural Revolution, see Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution
Czechoslovakia, 38, 60
East Turkistan Republic (ETR), 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, 24, 26, 28
Eisenhower, Julie Nixon, 67
Fallaci, Oriana, 4
February 28 Uprising, 63, 64, 66, 68, 69, 71, 77
Ford, Gerald, 5, 47, 48, 67, 70 ·
Four Modernizations, 78, 79, 85-86, 87-88, 89-90, 92-93, 94, 98, 99
Fu Hao, 80
Fu Tso-yi, 63, 64, 66
Gang 'of Four, 43, '48, 4"9, 67, 87, 95
Gaspirali, Ismail Bey, 14
Genghis Khan, 9
Great Leap Forward (GLF), 24, 25, 92
Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, 31, 32, 38, 42, 44, 54, 60, 92,
94, 96
Hitler, 41, 48
Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien, 66, 68
Hu Ch'iao-mu, 90
Hua Kuo-feng, 4, 5, 48, 67, 70, 71, 73-74, 80, 87, 90, 92, 93, 99
HuangHua, 69, 70, 71,76
Huang K'o-cheng, 91
India, 50
Jackson, Henry, 71
Jahoda, 23
Japan, 4, 12, 40, 42, 46, 47,49, 50, 54, 55, 57, 58, 61, 64, 65, 70, 72,
74, 75, 99
K'ang Sheng, 3
Kazakhs, 8-37 passim
K~ng Piao, 68
Kennedy, Edward, 71
Khrushchev, N. S., 2, 15, 21, 22, 42
Kiakhta, 3, 11
Kirghiz, 9, 18, 28, 31, 33
Kissinger, Henry, 62, 63, 64, 67

Kolchak, A. V., 13
Korea, 50, 55, 59
Korean War, 58, 59, 60
Kuomintang (KMT), 1, 13, 17, 18, 81, 82, 83, 84, 89, 97, 98, 99
Laos, 47, 67
Lenin, V. 1., 42
Li Hsien-nien, 48, 69, 76
Liao Ch'eng-chih, 63, 66, 68, 69
Lin Piao, 31, 32, 44, 54, 91
Liu Shao-ch'i, 85, 99
Mansfield, Mike, 65, 66
Mao Tse-min, 17
Mao Tse-tung, 4, 5, 17, 22, 31, 32, 38, 41, 43, 48, 54, 65, 67, 68, 71, 77,
87, 90, 91, 96, 98, 99
Mondale, Walter, 76
Mongolian People's Republic MPR), 9, 36
Nerchinsk, 3
Nixon Doctrine, 39, 40
Nixon, Richard, 4, 5, 38, 39, 40, 42, 57, 61, 62, 65, 67, 68
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 54
Nunn, Sam, 82
Pacific Doctrine, 47
Pakistan, 53
P'eng Teh-huai, 91
People's Liberation Army (PLA), 19, 22, 64, 68, 91
People's Republic of China (PRC), 1-6 passim, 19, 21, 22, 24, 27, 28,
30, 31, 34, 35, 38-100 passim
Philippines, 55
Potsdam Proclamation, 58
Republic of China (ROC), 5, 6, 61, 62, 65, 66, 76, 78, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86,
91, 92, 94, 95, 97; see also Taiwan
Rumania, 42
Russia, see Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Russian Revolution (1917), 3, 13, 15
Sakharov, Andrei, 16
Salfudin, 19, 20, 23, 30, 32
Saudi Arabia, 84

Schlesinger, James, 33, 34, 47-48, 68
Shabdanov, Kazhykumar, 23
Shanghai Communique, 5, 6, 39, 40, 46, 57, 61, 62, 63, 65, 66, 68, 69,
70, 72
Sheng Shih-ts'ai, 3, 16-17, 21
Sinkiang, 1, 2, 3, 8-36 passim~ 44, 45; see also Sinkiang Uighur
Autonomous Region
Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region (SUAR), 22, 23, 32, 35; see also
Sinkiang
Sino-Japanese Treaty (1978), 51, 72
Sino-Soviet Treaty (1950), 1, 2, 19, 20
Spivanhov, Ivan, 30
Stalin, J., 2, 3, 15, 17
Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT), 52
Su Yu, 76
Sun Yun-suan, 7, 78
Taipov, Zunin, 23, 26, 29
Taiwan, 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 21, 39, 40, 44, 48, 55, 57-99 passim; see also
Republic of China
Taiwan Relations Act, 6, 75, 76, 84
Tamerlane, 30
Teng Hsiao-p'ing, 4, 5, 7, 43, 45, 48, 49, 56, 64, 65, 67, 70, 71, 72, 74,
75, 76, 78, 79, 80, 82-83, 85, 87, 93, 96
Thailand,4, 46
Truman, Harry, 58
Uighurs, 8, 9, 15, 18-37 passim
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 14, 17-56
passim, 60, 70, 86, 88, 95
United Nations (UN), 42, 61, 62, 64, 65
United States (US), 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 38-77 passim, 78, 79, 84, 87, 91, 94,
99
Uzbeks, 9
Vance, Cyrus, 67, 69, 70
Vietnam, 3, 4, 42, 45, 47, 50, 51, 52, 53, 55, 61, 62, 63, 67, 86
Wang Hung-wen, 43
Woodcock, Leonard, 7, 71, 76

Yakub Beg, 12
Yang Ch'eng-wu, 66
Yao Wen-yuan, 43
Yeh Chien-ying, 48, 66, 88, 93
Yu Chan, 68, 69, 70
Zumwalt, Elmo, 69

Occasional Papers/Reprints Series
in Contemporary Asian Studies
1977 Series
No.1- 1977
Chinese Attitude Toward Continental Shelf and Its Implication on
Delimiting Seabed in Southeast Asia (Hungdah Chiu) 32 pp.

$ 1.00

No.2- 1977
Income Distribution in the Process of Economic Growth of the
Republic of China (Yuan-Li Wu) 45 pp.

$ 1.00

No.3- 1977
The Indonesian Maoists: Doctrines and Perspectives (Justus M. van
der Kroef) 31 pp.

$ 1.00

No.4- 1977
Taiwan's Foreign Policy in the 1970s: A Case Study of Adaptation
and Viability (Thomas J. Bellows) 22 pp.
No.5- 1977
Asian Political Scientists in North America: Professional and
Ethnic Problems (Edited by Chun-tu Hsueh) 148 pp. Index

$ 1.00

$ 3.00

No.6- 1977
The Sino.Japanese Fisheries Agreement of 1975: A Comparison
with Other North Pacific Fisheries Agreements (Song Yook
Hong) 80 pp.

$ 2.00

No.7- 1977**
Foreign Trade Contracts Between West German Companies and the
People's Republic of China: A Case Study (Robert Heuser) 22
pp.

$ 1.00

No.8- 1977*
Reflections on Crime and Punishment in China, With Appended
Sentencing Documents (Randle Edwards, Translation of
Documents by Randle Edwards and Hungdah Chiu) 67 pp.

$ 1.00

No.9- 1977
Chinese Arts and Literature: A Survey of Recent Trends (Edited by
Wai-lim Yip) 126 pp.

$ 3.00

No. 10- 1977
Legal Aspects of U.S.-Republic of China Trade and Investment Proceedings of A Regional Conference of the American Society
of International Law (Edited by Hungdah Chiu and David
Simon) 217 pp. Index

$ 5.00

Occasional Papers/Reprints Series
in Contemporary Asian Studies
1977 Series
No. 11- 1977
Asian American Assembly Position Paper: I. A Review of U.S.China Relations 62 pp.

$ 1.00

No. 12- 1977
Asian-American Assembly Position Paper: II. A Review of U.S.
Employment Policy 24 pp.

$ 1.00

1978 Series
No. 1 - 1978 (13)
Indian Ocean Politics: An Asian-African Perspective (K.P.
Misra) 31 pp.

$ 1.00

No. 2 - 1978 (14)
Normalizing Relations with the People's Republic of China;
Problems, Analysis, and Documents (Edited by Hungdah Chiu,
with contribution by G. J. Sigur, Robert A. Scalapino, King C.
Chen, Eugene A. Theroux, Michael Y.M. Kau, James C. Hsiung
and James W. Morley). 207 pp. Index

$ 3.00

No. 3 - 1978 (15)
Growth, Distribution, and Social Change: Essays on the Economy
of the Republic of China (Edited by Yuan-li Wu and Kung-chia
Yeh) 227 pp. Index

$ 3.00

No. 4 - 1978 (16)
The Societal Objectives of Wealth, Growth, Stability, and Equity in
Taiwan (Jan S. Prybyla) 31 pp.

$ 1.00

No. 5 - 1978 (17)*
The Role of Law in the People's Republic of China as Reflecting
Mao Tse-Tung's Influence (Shao-Chuan Leng) 18 pp.

$ 1.00

No.6- 1978 (18)Criminal Punishment in Mainland China: A Study of Some
Yunnan Province Documents (Hungdah Chiu) 35 pp.

$ 1.00

No. 7 - 1978 (19)
A Guide to the Study of Japanese Law (Lawrence W. Beer and
Hidenori Tomatsu) 45 pp.

$ 2.00

Occasional Papers/Reprints Series
in Contemporary Asian Studies
1978 Series
No.8- 1978 (20)
The Pueblo, EC-121, and Mayaguez Incidents: Some Continuities
and Changes (Robert Simmons) 40 pp.

$ 2.00

No. 9 - 1978 (21)
Two Korea's Unification Policy and Strategy (Yong Soon Yim) 82
pp. Index

$ 2.00

1979 Series
No. 1 - 1979 (22)
Asian Immigrants and Their Status in the U.S. (Edited by
Hungdah Chiu) 54 pp.

$ 2.00

No. 2 - 1979 (23)Social Disorder In Peking After The 1976 Earthquake Revealed By
A Chinese Legal Document (By Hungdah Chiu) 20 pp.

$ 2.00

No. 3 - 1979 (24)
The Dragon and the Eagle - A Study of U.S. - People's Republic
of China Relations in Civil Air Transport (Jack C. Young) 65
pp.

$ 3.00

No. 4 - 1979 (25)
Chinese Women Writers Today (Edited by Wai-lim Yip and William
Tay) 108 pp.

$ 3.00

No. 5 - 1979 (26)*
Certain Legal Aspects of Recognizing the People's Republic of
China (Hungdah Chiu) 49 pp.

$ 2.00

No. 6 - 1979 (27)
China's Nationalization of Foreign Firms: The Politics of Hostage
Capitalism, 1949-1957 (Thomas N. Thompson) 80 pp. Index

$ 3.00

No. 7 - 1979 (28)
U.S. Status of Force Agreement with Asian Countries: Selected
Studies (Charles Cochran and Hungdah Chiu 130 pp. Index

$ 2.50

No. 8 - 1979 (29)
China's Foreign Aid in 1978 (John F. Cooper) 45 pp.

$ 2.00

Occasional Papers/Reprint Series
in Contemporary Asian Studies
1980 Series
No. 1 - 1980 (30)
The Chinese Connection and Normalization (Edited by Hungdah Chiu)
200 pp. Index

$ 5.00

No. 2 - 1980 (31)
The Conceptual Foundations of U.S. China Policy: A Critical Review
(James C. Hsiung) 17 pp.

$ 1.00

No. 3 - 1980 (32)
Policy, Proliferation and the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty: U.S.
Strategies and South Asian Prospects (Joanne Finegan) 61 pp.

$ 2.50

No. 4 - 1980 (33)
A Comparative Study of Judicial Review Under Nationalist Chinese and
American Constitutional Law (Jyh-pin Fa) 200 pp. Index

$ 3.50

No. 5 - 1980 (34)*
Certain Problems in Recent Law Reform in the People's Republic of China
(Hungdah Chiu) 34 pp.

$ 1.50

No.6- 1980 (35)*
China's New Criminal & Criminal Procedure Codes (Hungdah Chiu) 16
pp.

$ 1.00

No. 7 - 1980 (36)
China's Foreign Relations: Selected Studies (Edited by F. Gilbert Chan &
Ka-che Yip) About 120 pp.

$ 3.00

Forthcoming
No. 5 - 1980 (37)
Annual Review of Selected Books on Contemporary Asian Studies (19791980) (Edited by John F. Cooper) About 60 pp.

* Reprinted with revision (all other papers are original).
** Translated from German with revision.

$ 2.00

---------------------------------ORDER FORM
To Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian
Studies, University of Maryland School of Law, 500 West
Baltimore Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21201, U.S.A.
Check One:
D

D

Please Send:
No.

Author

Title

Copies

Please start my subscription of the OPRSCAS:
Starting issue _ _ _ __
Subscription price is U.S. $10.00 for 8 issues (regardless of the
price of individual issues in the U.S. and Canada and $12.00
for overseas.)
My check of U.S. $
is enclosed
copy(s)
of invoice/receipt required. (Institution/library may request
billing before making payment) (Make check payable to
OPRSCAS)
Please send book to:
Name/Corp./Library:
Address: (Please include zip code)

----------------------------------

